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  in	  your	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  in	  your	  shoes	  
You	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  because	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  speed.	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  pass	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  whole	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  and	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  the	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Wherever	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  fly,	  you'll	  be	  the	  best	  of	  the	  best.	  
Wherever	  you	  go,	  you	  will	  top	  all	  the	  rest.	  
	  
…You	  will	  come	  to	  a	  place	  where	  the	  streets	  are	  not	  marked.	  
Some	  windows	  are	  lighted.	  But	  mostly	  they're	  darked.	  
A	  place	  you	  could	  sprain	  both	  you	  elbow	  and	  chin!	  
Do	  you	  dare	  to	  stay	  out?	  Do	  you	  dare	  to	  go	  in?	  
How	  much	  can	  you	  lose?	  How	  much	  can	  you	  win?	  
	  
And	  IF	  you	  go	  in,	  should	  you	  turn	  left	  or	  right...	  
or	  right-­‐and-­‐three-­‐quarters?	  Or,	  maybe,	  not	  quite?	  
Or	  go	  around	  back	  and	  sneak	  in	  from	  behind?	  
Simple	  it's	  not,	  I'm	  afraid	  you	  will	  find,	  
for	  a	  mind-­‐maker-­‐upper	  to	  make	  up	  his	  mind.	  
	  
You	  can	  get	  so	  confused	  
that	  you'll	  start	  in	  to	  race	  
down	  long	  wiggled	  roads	  at	  a	  break-­‐necking	  pace	  
and	  grind	  on	  for	  miles	  across	  weirdish	  wild	  space,	  
headed,	  I	  fear,	  toward	  a	  most	  useless	  place.	  
The	  Waiting	  Place...	  
	  
...for	  people	  just	  waiting.	  
Waiting	  for	  a	  train	  to	  go	  
or	  a	  bus	  to	  come,	  or	  a	  plane	  to	  go	  
or	  the	  mail	  to	  come,	  or	  the	  rain	  to	  go	  
or	  the	  phone	  to	  ring,	  or	  the	  snow	  to	  snow	  
or	  waiting	  around	  for	  a	  Yes	  or	  a	  No	  
or	  waiting	  for	  their	  hair	  to	  grow.	  
Everyone	  is	  just	  waiting.	  
	  
Oh,	  the	  places	  you'll	  go!	  There	  is	  fun	  to	  be	  done!	  
There	  are	  points	  to	  be	  scored.	  there	  are	  games	  to	  be	  won.	  
And	  the	  magical	  things	  you	  can	  do	  with	  that	  ball	  
will	  make	  you	  the	  winning-­‐est	  winner	  of	  all.	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Exerpts from “Oh, The Places You’ll Go!” (Dr. Seuss, 1990) 
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Abstract 
The role of subcortical pathology in altered cognition is increasingly recognised. 
However, measurement and monitoring of impairments in motivation and 
behaviour due to subcortical disease is challenging. Basal ganglia – cortico-
thalamo-cortical loops and the neurotransmitter, dopamine, are recognised to 
be important in modulating both reward learning and oculomotor performance. 
This thesis considers the use of novel and adapted oculomotor (saccadic) tasks 
as a means of interrogating these dynamic circuits as measures of rewarded 
decision-making under risk and time pressure. 
 
I first describe a novel rewarded oculomotor task, the Traffic Light Task, which 
provokes two distributions of saccades – one anticipatory, and one reactive. The 
balance of these distributions, the number of errors and the reward obtained are 
used to index oculomotor decision-making. Demonstrated effects of healthy 
aging include a significant reduction in anticipatory responding and 
consequent reduction in reward. I then compare behavioural oculomotor task 
responses in healthy controls with established “self-report” measures of 
impulsivity, finding significant correlations. Next, I consider a patient with 
focal lesions of the basal ganglia causing profound apathy. I demonstrate 
reduced oculomotor anticipatory responding and reward sensitivity. I then 
show the positive effects of dopaminergic medications (levodopa and 
ropinirole) upon his oculomotor decision-making in tandem with a clinical 
improvement in his motivational state. To further qualify this dopaminergic 
effect, I then assess the effects of two dopaminergic drugs (levodopa and 
methylphenidate) upon healthy volunteers. Finally, I use oculomotor tasks to 
compare patients with Parkinson’s Disease, with and without impulse control 
disorders, with both healthy volunteers and pathological gamblers without 
neurological disease. 
 
The results of these experiments raise questions regarding the development of 
models of basal ganglia – cortico-thalamo-cortical loops and how best to 
understand them. 
 Contents 
Acknowledgments	  ................................................................................................................	  3	  
Publications	  ............................................................................................................................	  3	  
Abstract	  ....................................................................................................................................	  5	  
Contents	  ...................................................................................................................................	  6	  
Figures	  ....................................................................................................................................	  17	  
Tables	  .....................................................................................................................................	  19	  
Abbreviations	  .......................................................................................................................	  20	  
1.	  Introduction	  .....................................................................................................................	  21	  
1.1	   	  General	  Introduction	  .......................................................................................................	  22	  
1.1.1.	   	  Basal	  ganglia	  thalamocortical	  loops	  and	  behaviour	  ...................................................	  22	  
Figure	  1.1	   	  Simplified	  view	  of	  pathways	  connecting	  prefrontal	  to	  subcortical	  
structures	  involved	  in	  different	  aspects	  of	  executive	  control.	  ......................................	  24	  
1.1.2.	   	  Oculomotor	  performance	  as	  measure	  of	  loop	  function	  ............................................	  25	  
1.1.3.	   	  Dopamine	  modulates	  loop	  function	  for	  reward	  learning	  ........................................	  25	  
1.1.4.	   	  Parkinson’s	  Disease	  as	  a	  model	  of	  disrupted	  loop	  function	  and	  aberrant	  
motivated	  behaviour	  .................................................................................................................................	  25	  
1.1.5.	   	  Dopaminergic	  drugs	  may	  influence	  patients’	  decisions	  ...........................................	  26	  
1.1.6	   	  Saccades	  can	  provide	  an	  index	  of	  motivational	  behaviour	  ......................................	  26	  
1.2	   	  Saccade	  latencies	  as	  a	  cognitive	  measure	  ................................................................	  26	  
1.2.1	   	  Cortical	  and	  subcortical	  areas	  interact	  to	  drive	  and	  control	  saccade	  production
	   27	  
1.2.2	   	  The	  neural	  basis	  of	  oculomotor	  decisions	  .......................................................................	  27	  
Figure	  1.2	   	  Neural	  circuitry	  controlling	  saccadic	  eye	  movements.	  ..........................	  28	  
1.2.3	   	  Choice	  of	  Saccadic	  Task	  Design	  ............................................................................................	  30	  
1.2.4	   	  Anticipatory	  Saccadic	  Responses	  ........................................................................................	  30	  
Figure	  1.3	   	  Saccadic	  Tasks	  Commonly	  Used	  in	  Cognitive	  Research	  .........................	  31	  
1.2.5	   	  Accumulator	  models	  describe	  multiple	  task-­‐driven	  oculomotor	  latency	  
distributions	  ..................................................................................................................................................	  32	  
Figure	  1.4	   The	  LATER	  model	  can	  explain	  simple	  saccadic	  tasks	  and	  complex	  
tasks	  that	  generate	  multiple	  latency	  distributions.	  .........................................................	  33	  
1.2.6	   	  Using	  risk	  and	  reward	  to	  modulate	  anticipatory	  saccades	  ......................................	  34	  
Figure	  1.5	   The	  Lateral	  Reward	  Task	  ..................................................................................	  35	  
 7 
1.3	   Impulsivity	  ...........................................................................................................................	  36	  
1.3.1	   	  Impulsivity	  is	  difficult	  to	  define	  and	  measure	  ................................................................	  36	  
1.3.2	   Current	  Measures	  of	  Impulsivity	  ..........................................................................................	  37	  
1.3.2.1	   	  Self-­‐Report	  Questionnaires	  of	  Impulsivity	  ...................................................................	  37	  
1.3.2.2	   	  Performance-­‐based	  measures	  of	  Impulsivity	  .............................................................	  38	  
Table	  1.1	   	  Tasks	  used	  to	  measure	  various	  cognitive	  processes	  relevant	  to	  
impulsive	  behaviour.	  ..................................................................................................................	  39	  
1.3.2.3	   	  Current	  oculomotor	  measures	  of	  impulsivity	  ............................................................	  40	  
1.3.3	   Summary	  .........................................................................................................................................	  41	  
1.4	   Apathy	  ...................................................................................................................................	  42	  
1.4.1	   	  Apathy,	  like	  impulsivity,	  is	  poorly	  defined	  and	  quantified	  .......................................	  42	  
1.4.2	   	  The	  roles	  of	  the	  frontostriatal	  circuits	  and	  dopamine	  in	  apathy	  ...........................	  42	  
1.4.3	   	  Apathy	  and	  oculomotor	  behaviour	  .....................................................................................	  44	  
1.5	   	  Dopaminergic	  roles	  in	  rewarded	  decision-­‐making	  ..............................................	  44	  
1.5.1	   	  Dopamine	  modulates	  both	  apathy	  and	  impulsivity	  .....................................................	  44	  
1.5.2	   	  Dopamine	  and	  reward:	  evidence	  from	  animal	  experiments	  ...................................	  45	  
1.5.3	   	  Bidirectional	  effects:	  evidence	  from	  human	  experiments	  ........................................	  45	  
Figure	  1.6	   The	  inverted	  U-­‐shape	  relationship	  between	  neurotransmitter	  levels	  
and	  performance.	  .........................................................................................................................	  46	  
1.5.4	   	  Apathy	  in	  PD	  is	  modulated	  by	  Dopamine	  .........................................................................	  47	  
1.5.5	   	  The	  cognitive	  effects	  of	  levodopa	  (L-­‐dopa)	  .....................................................................	  48	  
1.5.5.1	   	  L-­‐dopa	  effects	  upon	  reward	  learning	  .............................................................................	  48	  
1.5.5.2	   	  L-­‐dopa	  effects	  upon	  risk,	  time	  perception,	  reaction	  times	  and	  saccades	  .......	  49	  
1.5.5.3	   	  L-­‐dopa	  and	  cognition	  in	  Parkinson’s	  Disease	  .............................................................	  49	  
Figure	  1.7	   Dopaminergic	  Effects	  in	  Healthy	  Patients	  and	  PD	  patients	  ...................	  50	  
1.5.6	   	  The	  cognitive	  effects	  of	  Methylphenidate	  (MPH)	  .........................................................	  51	  
1.5.6.1	   MPH	  effects	  upon	  decision-­‐making	  in	  healthy	  human	  subjects	  ..........................	  52	  
1.5.6.2	   	  MPH	  effects	  upon	  reward	  learning	  in	  animals	  and	  humans	  demonstrate	  
task-­‐dependence	  and	  an	  inverted	  U-­‐shaped	  relationship	  ........................................................	  52	  
1.5.6.3	   	  MPH	  effects	  upon	  eye	  movements	  ..................................................................................	  53	  
1.5.6.4	   	  Summary	  .....................................................................................................................................	  53	  
1.6	   The	  effects	  of	  Age	  upon	  rewarded	  decision-­‐making	  .............................................	  53	  
1.6.1	   	  Age	  alters	  dopaminergic	  function	  in	  frontostriatal	  circuitry,	  leading	  to	  changes	  
in	  reward-­‐motivated	  behaviours	  .........................................................................................................	  53	  
1.6.2	   	  Are	  older	  people	  more	  or	  less	  impulsive	  or	  just	  apathetic?	  .....................................	  54	  
1.6.3	   	  Age	  affects	  saccadic	  performance	  ........................................................................................	  55	  
1.7	   Parkinson’s	  Disease	  is	  associated	  with	  apathy	  and	  impulsivity	  .......................	  56	  
 8 
1.7.1	   	  Disordered	  Decision-­‐Making	  occurs	  in	  PD	  ......................................................................	  56	  
1.7.2	   	  Dopaminergic	  effects	  upon	  decision-­‐making	  in	  PD	  relate	  to	  a	  dorso-­‐ventral	  
gradient	  of	  degeneration	  .........................................................................................................................	  57	  
Table	  1.2	   	  Possible	  Site	  of	  Striatal	  Dopamine	  Dysfunction	  Causing	  Different	  
Motor	  and	  Cognitive	  Symptoms	  in	  Parkinson’s	  Disease	  .................................................	  58	  
1.7.3	   	  Dopaminergic	  agents	  increase	  risk	  taking	  in	  PD	  ..........................................................	  59	  
1.7.4	   	  Parkinson’s	  Disease	  has	  effects	  upon	  saccades	  that	  reflect	  cognition	  ................	  59	  
1.7.5	   	  Summary	  ........................................................................................................................................	  60	  
1.8	   	  Pathological	  Gambling	  in	  otherwise	  healthy	  people	  may	  result	  from	  
different	  mechanisms.	  ................................................................................................................	  60	  
1.8.1	   	  Cognitive	  control	  and	  impulsivity	  in	  Pathological	  Gambling	  ..................................	  60	  
1.8.2	   	  Pathological	  Gambling	  has	  both	  corticostriatal	  lesion	  and	  imaging	  correlates
	   61	  
1.9	   	  Summary	  &	  Thesis	  Synopsis	  .........................................................................................	  62	  
2.	  Rapid	  decision	  making	  under	  uncertainty:	  ...........................................................	  63	  
The	  effects	  of	  age	  .................................................................................................................	  63	  
2.1	   Introduction	  ........................................................................................................................	  64	  
2.1.1	   	  Task	  Design	  ...................................................................................................................................	  64	  
2.1.2	   	  Age	  Effects	  .....................................................................................................................................	  64	  
2.2	   Methods	  ................................................................................................................................	  66	  
2.2.1	   	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  (Figure	  2.1)	  ..............................................................................................	  66	  
Figure	  2.1	   	  The	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  .......................................................................................	  68	  
2.2.2	   	  Control	  saccadic	  reaction	  time	  (SRT)	  task	  (Figure	  2.2)	  .............................................	  69	  
2.3	   Results	  ...................................................................................................................................	  69	  
2.3.1	   	  Saccadic	  distributions	  in	  young	  controls	  .........................................................................	  69	  
Figure	  2.2	  	   The	  Saccadic	  Reaction	  Time	  (SRT)	  Task	  .....................................................	  70	  
Figure	  2.3	   	  Saccadic	  Reaction	  Time	  task	  and	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  Results	  for	  Young	  
Subjects	   71	  
Figure	  2.4	   Saccadic	  response	  distributions	  varied	  with	  amber	  duration.	  ............	  72	  
2.3.2	   	  A	  linear	  rise-­‐to-­‐threshold	  model	  predicts	  likelihood	  of	  saccades	  arising	  from	  
reactive	  and	  anticipatory	  distributions	  .............................................................................................	  73	  
Figure	  2.5	   	  How	  two	  LATER	  Units	  might	  describe	  the	  observed	  data.	  ....................	  74	  
2.3.3	   	  Anticipations,	  Rewards	  and	  Errors	  .....................................................................................	  75	  
Figure	  2.6	   Young	  volunteer	  data	  modelled	  as	  two	  linear	  rise-­‐to-­‐threshold	  
processes.	   76	  
2.3.5	   	  Saccadic	  distributions	  in	  older	  controls	  ...........................................................................	  77	  
Figure	  2.7	   	  Saccadic	  response	  distributions	  and	  model	  distributions.	  ..................	  78	  
 9 
Figure	  2.8	   	  Saccade	  distributions	  as	  a	  function	  of	  amber	  duration:	  data	  and	  
model	  findings.	  ..............................................................................................................................	  79	  
Figure	  2.9	   	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  Early	  Responses	  ...............................................................	  80	  
Figure	  2.10	   Traffic	  Light	  Task	  saccadic	  distributions	  in	  older	  volunteers	  ...........	  80	  
Figure	  2.11	   Older	  Healthy	  Volunteers:	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  ..........................................	  81	  
2.4	   Discussion	  ............................................................................................................................	  82	  
3.	   Reward	  Sensitivity,	  Risk	  Aversion	  and	  Impulsivity	  ........................................	  85	  
3.1	   Introduction	  ........................................................................................................................	  86	  
3.1.1	   	  Saccadic	  measures	  of	  reward	  sensitivity	  and	  risk	  .......................................................	  86	  
3.1.2	   	  Non-­‐saccadic	  measures	  ............................................................................................................	  87	  
3.1.2.1	  	   The	  Barratt	  Impulsiveness	  Scale	  ......................................................................................	  87	  
3.1.2.2	   	  Cloninger	  Tri-­‐dimensional	  Personality	  Questionnaire	  ..........................................	  87	  
3.1.2.3	   	  Summary	  .....................................................................................................................................	  88	  
3.2	   Methods	  ................................................................................................................................	  88	  
3.2.1	   	  Saccadic	  Reaction	  Time	  (SRT)	  Task	  ....................................................................................	  88	  
3.2.2	   	  The	  Lateral	  Reward	  Task	  ........................................................................................................	  89	  
3.2.3	   	  The	  Reverse	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  .............................................................................................	  89	  
Figure	  3.1	   	  The	  Lateral	  Reward	  Task	  .................................................................................	  91	  
Figure	  3.2	   	  Lateral	  Reward	  Task	  Reward	  Function	  .......................................................	  91	  
Figure	  3.3	   	  The	  Reverse	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  ......................................................................	  92	  
Figure	  3.4	   	  Reverse	  Traffic	  Light	  Reward	  Function	  Varies	  According	  to	  Amber	  
Duration	   93	  
3.2.4	   	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  ........................................................................................................................	  94	  
3.2.5	   	  The	  Barratt	  Impulsiveness	  Scale	  (BIS-­‐11)	  .......................................................................	  95	  
3.2.6	   	  Cloninger	  Tridimensional	  Personality	  Questionnaire	  (TPQ)	  ..................................	  95	  
3.2.7	   	  Analysis	  ...........................................................................................................................................	  95	  
3.3	   Results	  ...................................................................................................................................	  96	  
3.3.1	   	  SRT	  Task	  .........................................................................................................................................	  96	  
3.3.2	   	  Lateral	  Reward	  Task	  .................................................................................................................	  96	  
3.3.3	   	  Reverse	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  ......................................................................................................	  96	  
Figure	  3.5A	   	  Saccade	  distribution	  produced	  by	  young	  volunteers	  (n=46)	  
performing	  the	  SRT	  task.	  ...........................................................................................................	  97	  
Figure	  3.5B	   	  Saccade	  distribution	  produced	  by	  middle-­‐aged	  volunteers	  (n=13)	  
performing	  the	  SRT	  task.	  ...........................................................................................................	  97	  
Figure	  3.6	   	  Stop	  Anticipatory	  Interval	  on	  Reverse	  Traffic	  Light	  task	  ......................	  98	  
Figure	  3.7A	   	  Reaction	  Times	  from	  amber	  onset	  for	  young	  volunteers	  ...................	  99	  
 10 
Figure	  3.7B	   	  Reward	  Distribution	  for	  young	  volunteers	  performing	  the	  reverse	  
traffic	  light	  task	  .............................................................................................................................	  99	  
Figure	  3.8A	   	  Reaction	  Times	  from	  amber	  onset	  for	  middle	  aged	  volunteers	  
performing	  the	  reverse	  traffic	  light	  task.	  ..........................................................................	  100	  
Figure	  3.8B	   	  Reward	  Distribution	  for	  middle	  aged	  volunteers	  (n=8)	  performing	  
the	  reverse	  traffic	  light	  task.	  .................................................................................................	  100	  
3.3.4	   BIS	  11	  .............................................................................................................................................	  101	  
Figure	  3.9	   	  Box	  and	  whisker	  plot	  of	  responses	  to	  the	  BIS-­‐11	  from	  the	  survey	  of	  
201	  UCL	  students	  and	  staff.	  ....................................................................................................	  102	  
Figure	  3.10	   	  BIS-­‐11	  scores,	  factors	  and	  sub-­‐factors	  by	  age	  group	  from	  the	  UCL	  
survey.	   102	  
Table	  3.1	   	  BIS-­‐11	  Scores	  ......................................................................................................	  103	  
3.3.5	   	  Tridimensional	  Personality	  Questionnaire	  (TPQ)	  ....................................................	  104	  
3.3.6	   	  Between-­‐Measure	  Correlations	  .........................................................................................	  104	  
Table	  3.2	   TPQ	  scores	  from	  UCL	  Students	  .......................................................................	  106	  
Table	  3.3	   Significant	  correlations	  between	  BIS-­‐11	  subscores	  (columns)	  and	  
oculomotor	  task	  scores.	  ..........................................................................................................	  107	  
3.3.7	   Oculomotor	  Tasks	  Correlations	  	  (Table	  3.4)	  .................................................................	  108	  
Table	  3.4	   Significant	  correlations	  between	  oculomotor	  task	  performance	  
indicators	   109	  
Table	  3.5	   Significant	  correlations	  between	  BIS-­‐11	  subscores	  (columns)	  and	  TPQ	  
subscores	  (rows).	  ......................................................................................................................	  111	  
3.4	   Discussion	  .........................................................................................................................	  112	  
3.4.1.	   Findings	  ........................................................................................................................................	  112	  
3.4.2	   	  Significance	  of	  these	  findings	  .............................................................................................	  113	  
4.	   Dopamine	  reverses	  apathy	  due	  to	  focal	  globus	  pallidus	  lesions	  .............	  116	  
4.1	   Introduction	  .....................................................................................................................	  117	  
4.2	   Methods	  .............................................................................................................................	  118	  
4.2.1	   Participants	  .................................................................................................................................	  118	  
4.2.2	   	  Lesion	  anatomy,	  DaT	  scan	  and	  probabilistic	  diffusion	  tractography	  ...............	  118	  
4.2.3	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  ..........................................................................................................................	  119	  
4.2.4	   	  Lateral	  Reward	  Task	  ..............................................................................................................	  121	  
4.2.5	   	  Dopaminergic	  drug	  challenges	  ..........................................................................................	  121	  
4.3	   Results	  ................................................................................................................................	  122	  
4.3.1	   	  Lesion	  anatomy	  and	  probabilistic	  tractography	  data	  ..............................................	  122	  
4.3.2	   	  Oculomotor	  baseline	  performance	  ..................................................................................	  122	  
Figure	  4.1	   	  KD’s	  Pallidal	  Lesions	  .......................................................................................	  123	  
 11 
Figure	  4.2	   	  Lesion	  Mapping	  ................................................................................................	  124	  
Figure	  4.3	   KD’s	  GPi	  lesions	  projected	  onto	  anatomical	  boundaries	  of	  basal	  
ganglia.	   125	  
Figure	  4.4	   Lesion	  location	  in	  relation	  to	  pallido-­‐thalamo-­‐cortico	  projections.	  125	  
4.3.3	   	  Dopaminergic	  modulation	  of	  oculomotor	  performance	  .........................................	  126	  
Figure	  4.5	   	  Traffic	  light	  task	  (TLT):	  saccade	  distributions.	  ................................................	  127	  
Figure	  4.6	   	  Percentage	  early	  responses	  on	  traffic	  lights	  task	  (TLT)	  over	  time.	  129	  
Figure	  4.7	   	  Results	  from	  the	  lateral	  reward	  task.	  .......................................................	  130	  
4.4	   Discussion	  .........................................................................................................................	  131	  
4.4.1	   Findings	  .........................................................................................................................................	  131	  
4.4.2	   	  Significance	  .................................................................................................................................	  131	  
5.	   The	  effects	  of	  levodopa	  on	  oculomotor	  decisions	  .........................................	  135	  
5.1	  Introduction	  .........................................................................................................................	  136	  
5.1.1	   	  The	  Cognitive	  Effects	  of	  Levodopa	  ...................................................................................	  136	  
5.1.1.1	   	  L-­‐dopa	  affects	  reaction	  time	  and	  time	  perception	  ................................................	  136	  
5.1.1.2	   	  L-­‐dopa	  has	  oculomotor	  effects	  .......................................................................................	  136	  
5.1.1.3	   	  Effects	  upon	  decisions	  and	  reward	  processing	  .......................................................	  137	  
5.1.2	   	  Experimental	  design	  ...............................................................................................................	  137	  
5.1.2.1	   	  Pharmacology	  ........................................................................................................................	  138	  
5.1.2.2	   	  General	  levodopa	  effects	  &	  dose	  rationale	  ................................................................	  138	  
5.2	   Methods	  .............................................................................................................................	  139	  
5.2.1	   	  Questionnaires	  ..........................................................................................................................	  139	  
5.2.2	   	  Eye	  Movement	  Tasks	  .............................................................................................................	  140	  
5.2.2.1	   	  SRT	  Task	  ..................................................................................................................................	  140	  
5.2.2.2	   	  The	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  ........................................................................................................	  140	  
5.2.2.3	   	  Reverse	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  ...............................................................................................	  141	  
5.2.2.4	   	  Lateral	  Reward	  Task	  ...........................................................................................................	  141	  
5.3	   Results	  ................................................................................................................................	  143	  
5.3.1	   	  Questionnaires	  ..........................................................................................................................	  143	  
5.3.2	   	  Saccadic	  reaction	  Time	  (SRT)	  Task	  ..................................................................................	  143	  
Figure	  5.1	   	  The	  SRT	  Task:	  Effects	  of	  Training	  and	  Drug	  ...........................................	  145	  
Figure	  5.2	   	  SRT	  Task:	  The	  effect	  of	  session	  order	  .......................................................	  146	  
Table	  5.1	   	  Modelling	  Data	  from	  the	  SRT	  Task	  ..............................................................	  147	  
Figure	  5.3	   	  SRT	  task	  responses	  are	  well	  modelled	  by	  a	  single	  LATER	  unit	  ........	  148	  
Figure	  5.4	   	  Correlations	  between	  SRT	  Task	  data	  derived	  true	  median	  latencies	  
and	  those	  found	  by	  maximum	  likelihood	  estimation	  of	  parameters	  for	  a	  LATER	  
unit	   149	  
 12 
5.3.3	   	  Traffic	  Lights	  ..............................................................................................................................	  150	  
5.3.3.1	   	  Training	  Effects	  .....................................................................................................................	  150	  
5.3.3.2	   	  Drug	  Effects	  ............................................................................................................................	  150	  
Figure	  5.5	   	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  Training	  Effects	  .............................................................	  152	  
Figure	  5.6	   	  Training	  Effects	  upon	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  Saccade	  Distributions	  .....	  153	  
Figure	  5.7	   	  The	  interaction	  between	  session	  effects	  and	  drug/placebo	  condition	  
upon	  error	  rates	  in	  the	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  ........................................................................	  154	  
Figure	  5.8	   	  Drug	  Effects	  on	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  Performance	  ...................................	  155	  
Figure	  5.9	   	  Drug	  Effects	  Upon	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  Saccade	  Distributions	  ............	  156	  
5.3.3.3	   	  Modelling	  the	  distributions	  .............................................................................................	  157	  
Table	  5.2	   	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  Parameters	  ......................................................................	  157	  
5.3.4	   	  Reverse	  Traffic	  Lights	  ............................................................................................................	  158	  
Figure	  5.10	   	  Reverse	  Traffic	  Light	  Mean	  STOP	  anticipation	  ....................................	  159	  
Figure	  5.11	   	  Reverse	  traffic	  Light	  Saccade	  distributions	  ..........................................	  160	  
5.3.5	   	  The	  Lateral	  Reward	  Task	  .....................................................................................................	  161	  
5.3.5.1	   	  Lateral	  Reward	  Task	  Session	  Effects	  ...........................................................................	  161	  
5.3.5.2	   	  Lateral	  Reward	  Task	  Drug	  Effects	  ................................................................................	  161	  
5.3.4	   	  Correlations	  with	  Questionnaire	  findings	  .....................................................................	  162	  
Figure	  5.12	   	  Interaction	  of	  drug	  and	  session	  effects	  upon	  rewarded	  saccades	  163	  
5.4	   Discussion	  .........................................................................................................................	  164	  
5.4.1	   	  Experimental	  Results	  .............................................................................................................	  164	  
5.4.2	   	  General	  Discussion	  ..................................................................................................................	  165	  
5.4.2.1	   	  L-­‐dopa	  has	  variable	  reaction	  time	  and	  dosage	  effects	  .........................................	  165	  
5.4.2.2	   	  Patient	  and	  volunteer	  responses	  to	  L-­‐dopa	  may	  differ	  .......................................	  165	  
5.4.2.3	   	  There	  may	  be	  independent	  optimal	  levels	  of	  dopamine	  for	  both	  individuals	  
and	  tasks	  ......................................................................................................................................................	  166	  
5.4.2.4	   	  Differential	  learning	  effects	  due	  to	  the	  order	  of	  drug/placebo	  presentation
	   166	  
5.4.2.5	   	  L-­‐dopa	  modulates	  reward	  sensitivity	  .........................................................................	  167	  
5.4.2.6	   	  More	  potent	  dopaminergic	  modulation	  or	  alternate	  agents	  may	  have	  greater	  
impact	  upon	  oculomotor	  decisions.	  .................................................................................................	  167	  
6.	   The	  effects	  of	  methylphenidate	  on	  oculomotor	  decisions	  .........................	  168	  
6.1	   Introduction	  .....................................................................................................................	  169	  
6.1.1	   	  Methylphenidate:	  Pharmacology	  ......................................................................................	  169	  
6.1.2	   	  Methylphenidate:	  Clinical	  and	  Experimental	  Effects	  ...............................................	  169	  
6.1.3	   	  Stimulant	  behavioural	  effects	  are	  variable	  and	  task	  dependent	  .........................	  169	  
6.1.4	   	  MPH	  effects	  on	  tasks	  of	  response	  inhibition	  ................................................................	  169	  
 13 
6.1.5	   	  MPH	  may	  have	  effects	  on	  other	  higher	  processes	  .....................................................	  170	  
6.1.6	   	  Methylphenidate:	  Eye	  Movement	  Effects	  ......................................................................	  171	  
6.1.7	   	  Summary	  .....................................................................................................................................	  171	  
6.2	   Methods	  .............................................................................................................................	  172	  
6.2.1	   	  Experimental	  Design	  ..............................................................................................................	  173	  
6.2.2.1	   	  Questionnaires	  ......................................................................................................................	  173	  
6.2.2.2	   	  Eye	  Movement	  Tasks	  ..........................................................................................................	  173	  
6.3	   Results	  ................................................................................................................................	  177	  
6.3.1	   	  Questionnaires	  ..........................................................................................................................	  177	  
6.3.2	   	  SRT	  Task	  ......................................................................................................................................	  177	  
Figure	  6.1	   	  Drug/Placebo	  &	  Session	  order	  effects	  on	  the	  SRT	  task	  ......................	  178	  
Figure	  6.2	   	  Drug	  Effects	  on	  the	  SRT	  task	  ........................................................................	  179	  
Table	  6.1	   	  SRT	  Raw	  Data	  and	  modelled	  distributions	  ...............................................	  180	  
Figure	  6.3	   	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  Performance:	  Saccadic	  Distributions	  ....................	  182	  
Figure	  6.4	   	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  Performance:	  Sessional	  and	  conditional	  effects	  183	  
Figure	  6.5	   	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  Learning	  by	  Session	  .....................................................	  184	  
Table	  6.2	   	  Learning	  effects	  within	  sessions	  by	  100	  trial	  epoch	  .............................	  185	  
Figure	  6.6	   Traffic	  Light	  Task	  Learning	  by	  Drug/Placebo	  condition	  .....................	  186	  
6.3.4	   	  Reverse	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  ...................................................................................................	  187	  
Figure	  6.7	   	  Reward	  and	  Error	  Effects	  in	  Reverse	  Traffic	  Lights	  .............................	  188	  
Figure	  6.8	   	  Reverse	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  Anticipatory	  Response	  Effects	  ................	  189	  
6.3.5	   	  Lateral	  Reward	  Task	  ..............................................................................................................	  190	  
6.3.6	   	  Correlations	  ................................................................................................................................	  190	  
Figure	  6.9	   	  Lateral	  Reward	  Task	  Training	  and	  Drug	  Effects	  ...................................	  191	  
Table	  6.3	   	  Lateral	  Reward	  Task	  Response	  Latencies	  .................................................	  192	  
6.4	   	  Discussion	  ........................................................................................................................	  193	  
6.4.1	   	  Findings	  .......................................................................................................................................	  193	  
6.4.2	   	  General	  Discussion	  ..................................................................................................................	  193	  
6.4.3	   	  Summary	  .....................................................................................................................................	  195	  
7.	   The	  Effects	  of	  Parkinson’s	  Disease,	  Impulse	  Control	  Disorders	  and	  
Pathological	  Gambling	  upon	  Oculomotor	  Impulsivity	  ........................................	  196	  
7.1	   Introduction	  .....................................................................................................................	  197	  
7.1.1	   	  Disordered	  Decision-­‐Making	  occurs	  in	  PD	  ...................................................................	  197	  
7.1.2	   	  Eye	  Movements	  in	  Parkinson’s	  Disease	  Reflect	  Cognitive	  Processes	  ...............	  199	  
7.1.3	   	  Pathological	  Gambling	  (PG)	  causes	  impaired	  prepotent	  response	  inhibition
	   200	  
7.1.4	   Summary	  ......................................................................................................................................	  200	  
 14 
7.2	   Methods	  .............................................................................................................................	  201	  
7.2.1	   	  Experimental	  Groups	  .............................................................................................................	  201	  
7.2.2	   	  The	  Barratt	  Impulsiveness	  Scale	  (BIS-­‐11)	  ....................................................................	  203	  
7.2.3	   	  Oculomotor	  Tasks	  ...................................................................................................................	  203	  
7.2.3.1	   	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  (See	  Chapter	  2	  &	  Figure	  2.1)	  .....................................................	  203	  
7.2.3.2	   	  Saccadic	  reaction	  time	  (SRT)	  task	  (See	  Chapter	  2	  &	  Figure	  2.2)	  ....................	  204	  
7.2.3.3	   	  The	  Lateral	  Reward	  Task	  (See	  Chapter	  3)	  ................................................................	  204	  
7.2.3.4	   	  The	  Reverse	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  ......................................................................................	  205	  
7.3	   Results	  ................................................................................................................................	  205	  
7.3.1	   BIS-­‐11	  .............................................................................................................................................	  205	  
Table	  7.1	   	  Mean	  BIS-­‐11	  Scores	  for	  each	  group	  .............................................................	  207	  
7.3.2	   SRT	  Task	  .......................................................................................................................................	  208	  
Figure	  7.1	   SRT	  Task	  performances	  across	  groups	  .....................................................	  209	  
7.3.3	   	  The	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  ............................................................................................................	  210	  
Figure	  7.2	   	  PD	  Probability	  densities	  for	  saccadic	  latencies	  in	  the	  Traffic	  Light	  
task:	   211	  
Figure	  7.3	   	  Traffic	  Light	  Saccade	  Distributions	  and	  Performance	  Analysis.	  ......	  212	  
Figure	  7.4	   	  PD-­‐ICD	  Probability	  densities	  for	  saccadic	  latencies	  in	  the	  Traffic	  Light	  
task	   214	  
Figure	  7.5	   	  PD-­‐ICD	  Saccade	  distributions	  in	  response	  to	  the	  Traffic	  Light	  Task
	   215	  
Figure	  7.6	   	  PG	  Probability	  densities	  for	  saccadic	  latencies	  in	  the	  Traffic	  Light	  
task	   217	  
Figure	  7.7	   	  Saccade	  distributions	  for	  Gamblers	  compared	  to	  age-­‐matched	  
controls	  on	  the	  traffic	  Light	  Task.	  ........................................................................................	  218	  
Figure	  7.8	   	  Traffic	  Light	  Response	  Distributions	  –	  Age	  &	  Disease	  Effects	  ..........	  219	  
Figure	  7.9	   	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  Performance	  ..................................................................	  219	  
7.3.4	   	  Lateral	  reward	  ..........................................................................................................................	  220	  
7.3.5	   	  Reverse	  Traffic	  Lights	  ............................................................................................................	  220	  
7.3.6	   	  Levodopa	  equivalent	  dose	  (LED)	  &	  disease	  severity	  ...............................................	  221	  
7.4	   Discussion	  .........................................................................................................................	  221	  
7.4.1	   	  Summary	  of	  findings	  ..............................................................................................................	  221	  
7.4.2	   	  PD	  patients	  demonstrate	  reward	  insensitivity,	  low	  anticipation	  and	  slow	  
responses	  whereas	  PD-­‐ICD	  patients	  did	  not.	  ...............................................................................	  222	  
7.4.3	   	  There	  are	  some	  similarities	  but	  also	  significant	  differences	  between	  the	  
pathophysiology	  of	  de	  novo	  pathological	  gambling	  and	  ICDs	  in	  PD	  ...................................	  223	  
7.4.4	   	  Similarities	  and	  differences	  are	  task	  dependent	  ........................................................	  223	  
 15 
7.4.5	   	  Limitations	  of	  this	  study	  .......................................................................................................	  224	  
7.4.6	   	  Summary	  .....................................................................................................................................	  224	  
8.	   Discussion	  ..................................................................................................................	  225	  
8.1	   	  	  Summary	  of	  findings	  ....................................................................................................	  226	  
8.1.1	   	  The	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  Age	  ..............................................................	  226	  
8.1.2	   	  The	  relationship	  of	  traffic	  light	  task	  performance	  to	  other	  measures	  of	  
oculomotor	  responding	  and	  motivated	  behaviours	  .................................................................	  227	  
8.1.3	   	  Dopaminergic	  modulation	  of	  oculomotor	  responses	  in	  a	  patient	  with	  apathy	  
due	  to	  bilateral	  pallidal	  lesions	  ..........................................................................................................	  228	  
8.1.4	   	  Dopaminergic	  modulation	  of	  oculomotor	  responding	  in	  healthy	  volunteers
	   228	  
8.1.5	   	  Parkinson’s	  Patients	  and	  Impulse	  Control	  Disorders	  ..............................................	  229	  
8.2	   	  General	  Discussion	  ........................................................................................................	  231	  
8.2.1	   	  Conclusions	  ................................................................................................................................	  231	  
8.2.2	   	  The	  current	  knowledge	  of	  oculomotor	  impulsivity	  ..................................................	  231	  
8.2.3	   	  The	  Significance	  of	  early	  (saccadic)	  response	  distributions	  .................................	  231	  
8.2.4	   	  What	  does	  the	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  Measure?	  .................................................................	  232	  
8.2.5	   	  Confounds	  of	  time	  estimation	  and	  speed/accuracy	  trade-­‐	  off	  .............................	  232	  
Figure	  8.1	   	  Hypothesised	  Traffic	  Light	  Task	  Saccadic	  Probability	  Distribution	  
Effects	   233	  
8.2.7	   Mesolimbic	  dopamine	  and	  reward	  ...................................................................................	  234	  
8.2.8	   	  How	  might	  we	  otherwise	  demonstrate	  drug	  effects?	  ..............................................	  234	  
8.2.8	   	  Other	  neurotransmitters	  are	  implicated	  in	  impulsivity	  .........................................	  235	  
8.2.9	   	  The	  relevance	  of	  the	  ventral	  striatum	  to	  oculomotor	  responses	  ........................	  235	  
Figure	  8.2	   	  Functionally	  Distinct	  Dorsal	  and	  Ventral	  frontostriatal	  circuits	  .....	  236	  
Figure	  8.3	   	  Ventromedial	  to	  dorsolateral	  direction	  of	  information	  flow	  through	  
frontostriatal-­‐nigral	  circuitry.	  ..............................................................................................	  236	  
8.2.10	   	  Combined	  imaging	  and	  electrophysiology	  enable	  the	  temporal	  and	  spatial	  
precision	  required	  to	  elucidate	  the	  neural	  substrates	  of	  oculomotor	  decisions	  ..........	  237	  
8.2.11	   	  Toward	  models	  of	  rewarded	  oculomotor	  decision	  making	  ...............................	  237	  
Figure	  8.4	   	  Schematic	  diagram	  of	  a	  reward	  modulated	  oculomotor	  circuit	  in	  the	  
basal	  ganglia	  (BG).	  ....................................................................................................................	  238	  
Figure	  8.5	   Hypothesised	  sites	  of	  disruption	  of	  oculomotor	  reward	  learning	  ...	  239	  
Figure	  8.6	   Separate	  cortical	  and	  subcortical	  loops	  ....................................................	  239	  
Figure	  8.7	   Structure	  of	  a	  model	  which	  predicts	  early	  response	  distributions.	   240	  
8.2.12	   Subcortical	  “short	  cut”	  loops	  to	  explain	  early	  response	  distributions	  ...........	  241	  
8.3	   Summary	  ...........................................................................................................................	  241	  
 16 
References	  ..........................................................................................................................	  242	  
Appendix	  .............................................................................................................................	  286	  
i	   The	  Barratt	  Impulsiveness	  Scale	  ...................................................................................	  286	  
ii	   Tridimensional	  Personality	  Questionnaire	  ..............................................................	  287	  
 
 17 
Figures 
 
Figure 1.1	    Simplified view of pathways connecting prefrontal to subcortical structures 
involved in different aspects of executive control. .................................................................... 24	  
Figure 1.2	    Neural circuitry controlling saccadic eye movements. ............................................... 28	  
Figure 1.3	    Saccadic Tasks Commonly Used in Cognitive Research ............................................ 31	  
Figure 1.4	   The LATER model can explain simple saccadic tasks and complex tasks that 
generate multiple latency distributions. ..................................................................................... 33	  
Figure 1.5	   The Lateral Reward Task .................................................................................................. 35	  
Figure 1.6	   The inverted U-shape relationship between neurotransmitter levels and 
performance. ................................................................................................................................... 46	  
Figure 1.7	   Dopaminergic Effects in Healthy Patients and PD patients ........................................ 50	  
Figure 2.1	    The Traffic Light Task ...................................................................................................... 68	  
Figure 2.2 	   The Saccadic Reaction Time (SRT) Task ........................................................................ 70	  
Figure 2.3	    Saccadic Reaction Time task and Traffic Light Task Results for Young Subjects ... 71	  
Figure 2.4	   Saccadic response distributions varied with amber duration. ................................... 72	  
Figure 2.5	    How two LATER Units might describe the observed data. ....................................... 74	  
Figure 2.6	   Young volunteer data modelled as two linear rise-to-threshold processes. ............. 76	  
Figure 2.7	    Saccadic response distributions and model distributions. ......................................... 78	  
Figure 2.8	    Saccade distributions as a function of amber duration: data and model findings. 79	  
Figure 2.9	    Traffic Light Task Early Responses ................................................................................ 80	  
Figure 2.10	   Traffic Light Task saccadic distributions in older volunteers ................................... 80	  
Figure 2.11	   Older Healthy Volunteers: Traffic Light Task ............................................................. 81	  
Figure 3.1	    The Lateral Reward Task ................................................................................................. 91	  
Figure 3.2	    Lateral Reward Task Reward Function ......................................................................... 91	  
Figure 3.3	    The Reverse Traffic Light Task ....................................................................................... 92	  
Figure 3.4	    Reverse Traffic Light Reward Function Varies According to Amber Duration ...... 93	  
Figure 3.5A	    Saccade distribution produced by young volunteers (n=46) performing the SRT 
task. 97	  
Figure 3.5B	    Saccade distribution produced by middle-aged volunteers (n=13) performing the 
SRT task. .......................................................................................................................................... 97	  
Figure 3.6	    Stop Anticipatory Interval on Reverse Traffic Light task ........................................... 98	  
Figure 3.7A	    Reaction Times from amber onset for young volunteers ........................................ 99	  
Figure 3.7B	    Reward Distribution for young volunteers performing the reverse traffic light 
task 99	  
Figure 3.8A	    Reaction Times from amber onset for middle aged volunteers performing the 
reverse traffic light task. .............................................................................................................. 100	  
Figure 3.8B	    Reward Distribution for middle aged volunteers (n=8) performing the reverse 
traffic light task. ............................................................................................................................ 100	  
Figure 3.9	    Box and whisker plot of responses to the BIS-11 from the survey of 201 UCL 
students and staff. ........................................................................................................................ 102	  
Figure 3.10	    BIS-11 scores, factors and sub-factors by age group from the UCL survey. ........ 102	  
 18 
Figure 4.1	    KD’s Pallidal Lesions ..................................................................................................... 123	  
Figure 4.2	    Lesion Mapping .............................................................................................................. 124	  
Figure 4.3	   KD’s GPi lesions projected onto anatomical boundaries of basal ganglia. ............. 125	  
Figure 4.4	   Lesion location in relation to pallido-thalamo-cortico projections. ......................... 125	  
Figure 4.6	    Percentage early responses on traffic lights task (TLT) over time. ......................... 129	  
Figure 4.7	    Results from the lateral reward task. ........................................................................... 130	  
Figure 5.1	    The SRT Task: Effects of Training and Drug .............................................................. 145	  
Figure 5.2	    SRT Task: The effect of session order .......................................................................... 146	  
Figure 5.3	    SRT task responses are well modelled by a single LATER unit .............................. 148	  
Figure 5.4	    Correlations between SRT Task data derived true median latencies and those 
found by maximum likelihood estimation of parameters for a LATER unit ...................... 149	  
Figure 5.5	    Traffic Light Task Training Effects ............................................................................... 152	  
Figure 5.6	    Training Effects upon Traffic Light Task Saccade Distributions ............................. 153	  
Figure 5.7	    The interaction between session effects and drug/placebo condition upon error 
rates in the Traffic Light Task ..................................................................................................... 154	  
Figure 5.8	    Drug Effects on Traffic Light Task Performance ....................................................... 155	  
Figure 5.9	    Drug Effects Upon Traffic Light Task Saccade Distributions .................................. 156	  
Figure 5.10	    Reverse Traffic Light Mean STOP anticipation ........................................................ 159	  
Figure 5.11	    Reverse traffic Light Saccade distributions .............................................................. 160	  
Figure 5.12	    Interaction of drug and session effects upon rewarded saccades ......................... 163	  
Figure 6.1	    Drug/Placebo & Session order effects on the SRT task ............................................ 178	  
Figure 6.2	    Drug Effects on the SRT task ........................................................................................ 179	  
Figure 6.3	    Traffic Light Task Performance: Saccadic Distributions ........................................... 182	  
Figure 6.4	    Traffic Light Task Performance: Sessional and conditional effects ......................... 183	  
Figure 6.5	    Traffic Light Task Learning by Session ....................................................................... 184	  
Figure 6.6	   Traffic Light Task Learning by Drug/Placebo condition .......................................... 186	  
Figure 6.7	    Reward and Error Effects in Reverse Traffic Lights .................................................. 188	  
Figure 6.8	    Reverse Traffic Light Task Anticipatory Response Effects ...................................... 189	  
Figure 6.9	    Lateral Reward Task Training and Drug Effects ....................................................... 191	  
Figure 7.1	   SRT Task performances across groups ......................................................................... 209	  
Figure 7.2	    PD Probability densities for saccadic latencies in the Traffic Light task: ............... 211	  
Figure 7.3	    Traffic Light Saccade Distributions and Performance Analysis. ............................. 212	  
Figure 7.4	    PD-ICD Probability densities for saccadic latencies in the Traffic Light task ....... 214	  
Figure 7.5	    PD-ICD Saccade distributions in response to the Traffic Light Task ...................... 215	  
Figure 7.6	    PG Probability densities for saccadic latencies in the Traffic Light task ................ 217	  
Figure 7.7	    Saccade distributions for Gamblers compared to age-matched controls on the 
traffic Light Task. ......................................................................................................................... 218	  
Figure 7.8	    Traffic Light Response Distributions – Age & Disease Effects ................................ 219	  
Figure 7.9	    Traffic Light Task Performance .................................................................................... 219	  
Figure 8.1	    Hypothesised Traffic Light Task Saccadic Probability Distribution Effects .......... 233	  
Figure 8.2	    Functionally Distinct Dorsal and Ventral frontostriatal circuits ............................. 236	  
Figure 8.3	    Ventromedial to dorsolateral direction of information flow through frontostriatal-
nigral circuitry. ............................................................................................................................. 236	  
 19 
Figure 8.4	    Schematic diagram of a reward modulated oculomotor circuit in the basal ganglia 
(BG). 238	  
Figure 8.5	   Hypothesised sites of disruption of oculomotor reward learning ........................... 239	  
Figure 8.6	   Separate cortical and subcortical loops ........................................................................ 239	  
Figure 8.7	   Structure of a model which predicts early response distributions. ......................... 240	  
 
Tables 
Table 1.1	    Tasks used to measure various cognitive processes relevant to impulsive behaviour.
 39	  
Table 1.2	    Possible Site of Striatal Dopamine Dysfunction Causing Different Motor and 
Cognitive Symptoms in Parkinson’s Disease ............................................................................. 58	  
Table 3.1	    BIS-11 Scores ..................................................................................................................... 103	  
Table 3.2	   TPQ scores from UCL Students ...................................................................................... 106	  
Table 3.3	   Significant correlations between BIS-11 subscores (columns) and oculomotor task 
scores. ............................................................................................................................................. 107	  
Table 3.4	   Significant correlations between oculomotor task performance indicators ............. 109	  
Table 3.5	   Significant correlations between BIS-11 subscores (columns) and TPQ subscores 
(rows). ............................................................................................................................................ 111	  
Table 5.1	    Modelling Data from the SRT Task ............................................................................... 147	  
Table 5.2	    Traffic Light Task Parameters ........................................................................................ 157	  
Table 6.1	    SRT Raw Data and modelled distributions .................................................................. 180	  
Table 6.2	    Learning effects within sessions by 100 trial epoch .................................................... 185	  
Table 6.3	    Lateral Reward Task Response Latencies ..................................................................... 192	  
Table 7.1	    Mean BIS-11 Scores for each group ............................................................................... 207	  
 20 
Abbreviations 
ACC  - Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
ADHD  - Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
AER  - Anticipations : Errors Ratio 
AI  - Attentional Impulsiveness (BIS-11 Second Order Factor) 
ANOVA - Analysis of Variance 
BART  - Balloon Analog Risk taking Task 
BOLD  - Blood Oxygen Level Dependent 
BIS-11  - Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Version 11) 
CBGTC  - Cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical loop(s) 
CGT  - Cambridge Gambling Task 
CSF  - Cerebrospinal Fluid 
DA  - Dopamine 
DAg  - Dopamine Agonist 
DaT  - Dopamine Transporter 
DBS  - Deep Brain Stimulation 
DLPFC  - Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex  
DR  - Dopamine receptor {D1,D2,D3} 
EMG  - Electromyography 
FEF  - Frontal Eye Fields 
fMRI  - Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
GABA  - Gamma Amino Butyric Acid 
GDT  - Game of Dice Task 
GP  - Globus Pallidus (GPi, .. Interna; GPe .. Externa) 
HA  - Harm Avoidance (Cloninger TPQ Dimension) 
ICD  - Impulse Control Disorder 
IGT  - Iowa Gambling Task 
L-dopa  - Levodopa, L-dihydroxyphenylalanine 
LATER  - Linear Approach to Threshold with Ergodic Rate 
LED  - Light Emitting Diode 
Lh  - Lateral Habenula 
LIP  - Lateral Intraparietal Area 
LOFC  - Lateral Orbitofrontal Cortex 
MGS  - Memory Guided Saccades 
MI  - Motor Impulsiveness (BIS-11 Second Order Factor) 
MLE  - Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
MPH  - Methylphenidate 
MNI  - Montreal Neurological Institute 
MRI  - Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
NA  - Noradrenaline / Noradrenergic / Norepinephrine 
NPI  - Non-planning Impulsiveness (BIS-11 Second Order Factor) 
NS  - Novelty Seeking (Cloninger TPQ Dimension) 
OFC  - Orbitofrontal Cortex 
PD  - Parkinson’s Disease 
PET  - Positron Emission Tomography 
PFC  - Prefrontal Cortex 
RD  - Reward Dependence (Cloninger TPQ Dimension) 
ROI  - Region of Interest 
RT  - Reaction Time 
SAI  - Stop Anticipation Interval 
SD  - Standard Deviation 
SEF  - Supplementary Eye Fields 
SEM  - Standard Error of the Mean 
SNc  - Substantia Nigra Pars Compacta 
SNRI  - Selective Noradrenaline Reuptake Inhibitor 
SPECT  - Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography 
SPL  - Superior Parietal Lobule 
SRT  - Saccadic Reaction Time 
SSRT  - Stop Signal Reaction Time 
STN  - Subthalamic Nucleus 
TLT  - Traffic Light Task 
TPQ  - Cloninger Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire 
VLPFC  - Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex	  
 21 
1. Introduction 
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1.1  General Introduction 
1.1.1.  Basal ganglia thalamocortical loops and behaviour 
Why do patients with basal ganglia pathology develop problems with motivation and 
behaviour? Diseases of subcortical areas, such as Parkinson’s Disease (PD), have previously 
been oversimplified as “motor” disorders (Chaudhuri et al., 2006; Chaudhuri and Schapira, 
2009; Weintraub and Burn, 2011; Burn et al., 2014) despite longstanding acknowledgment of the 
‘bradyphrenia’ or slowness of thought and cognitive changes associated with the disease (Cools 
et al., 1984; Cummings JL and Benson D, 1984; Rafal et al., 1984). However, the important 
contributions of these areas to behaviour are now increasingly recognised (Dubois and Pillon, 
1996; Middleton and Strick, 2000; Bonelli and Cummings, 2007, 2008; Koziol and Budding, 
2009). There is a great deal of interest in deficits of motivation and decision-making due to PD 
and other conditions affecting the basal ganglia, partly due to the recognition of impulse 
disorders as a complication of the disease and/or its treatment (Weintraub and Nirenberg, 
2012). 
 
How might we predict which patients will develop such problems? Despite a better 
understanding of the dynamic mechanisms of basal ganglia thalamocortical interaction (Frank 
et al., 2007; Doya, 2008; Wiecki and Frank, 2013), related expansions in the study of decision-
making and neuroeconomics (Glimcher, 2009) and increased appreciation of the behavioural 
and neuropsychiatric manifestations of primarily “subcortical” diseases (Ring and Serra-
Mestres, 2002), there remain a lack of useful measures for the assessment and monitoring of 
motivational deficits. Subcortical pathology does not neatly impair discrete cognitive domains 
measured by commonly used cognitive tests (of e.g. language, memory or attention) that are 
helpful to identify focal cortical pathology (Burrell et al., 2014). Instead, basal ganglia disease 
causes non-specific impairments in many or all of these processes (Damasio, 1983; Cummings 
JL and Benson D, 1984; Crosson, 1992; Brown et al., 1997; Booth et al., 2007; Kotz et al., 2009; 
Obeso et al., 2014). The interconnectedness of subcortical structures makes them likely to cause 
dysfunction in multiple “cortical domains”. For example, the basal ganglia have particularly 
strong connections with the frontal lobes. Consequent importance in executive function (Brown 
et al., 1997; Elliott, 2003) is demonstrable in the effects of basal ganglia dysfunction upon 
cognitive tests sensitive to frontal lobe damage (Cummings, 1993).  
 
Such behavioural complexity is better understood when subcortical nuclei are considered as 
part of dynamic “circuits”, with wide ranging influence on cognitive processes (Houk et al., 
1995). Cortical - basal ganglia-thalamocortical (CBGTC) circuits have been anatomically and 
behaviourally described to include motor, oculomotor, dorsolateral prefrontal, lateral 
orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate “loops” (Figure 1.1 (Alexander et al., 1986; Middleton and 
Strick, 2000)). The dorsolateral prefrontal loop is important for the organisation of information 
to facilitate a response, the anterior cingulate circuit is required for motivated behaviour and 
the orbitofrontal circuit allows integration of limbic and emotional information into behavioural 
responses (Bonelli and Cummings, 2007). All of these processes are highly relevant to response 
selection. We might therefore call these three limbic loops “decision-making loops” (Figure 1.1). 
How might we interrogate the cognitive effects of damage to components of these loops?  
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The basal ganglia have a prominent role in influencing action selection through modulating the 
effects of reward learning (Kawagoe et al., 1998). The behavioural salience of this learning is 
reflected in rewarded decision-making (Bogacz and Gurney, 2007). Rewarded decision-making 
tasks might therefore capture the subcortical effects upon motivation. Established tasks include 
relatively complex measures of risk sensitivity and decision-making, such as the Iowa 
Gambling Task (IGT (Bechara et al., 1994, 1998, 2005)) and Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT 
(Rogers et al., 1999)) and simpler measures of willingness to take risk such as the Balloon 
Analog Risk Taking Task (BART) (Lejuez et al., 2002) in addition to a wide variety of 
probabilistic decision making tasks e.g. (Cools et al., 2001; Frank et al., 2004; Pessiglione et al., 
2006) Delay discounting, wherein subjects are forced to choose between a smaller but sooner 
versus a larger but later reward, is also often used as a substrate of impulsive decision making 
(Petry, 2001; Alessi and Petry, 2003; Wittmann et al., 2007; Housden et al., 2010). These tasks, 
though perhaps more representative of “real world” decisions, are naturally more vulnerable to 
misinference, as a result of their complexity. Inferences drawn from experiments using 
gambling tasks such as the IGT have been criticised (Dunn et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2007; Chiu and 
Lin, 2007; Chiu et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2012) and basic predictions and assumptions called into 
question (Horstmann et al., 2012). These tasks are also not generally administered under time 
pressure (urgency) and may therefore index different traits and characteristics to speeded tasks 
such as those described in this thesis. Tasks without time pressure may be more cognitively 
demanding but, by allowing time for self-reflection, fail to capture “in the moment” impulsivity 
and become vulnerable to gambler’s fallacies and other cognitive biases (Aragues et al., 2011). 
 
In Parkinson’s disease, batteries of tasks sensitive to frontal lobe function and probabilistic 
decision making tasks have been extensively employed (Robbins et al., 1994a; Cools et al., 2001, 
2003) but seldom under significant time pressure. Disease-specific questionnaires have also been 
developed e.g. (Weintraub et al., 2009) but are yet to be generally validated, remain subject to 
observer bias and only capture historic traits. Neither current behavioural tasks nor 
questionnaires capture “in the moment” task motivation. The reliance of questionnaires upon 
subjective assessment of past behaviours makes negative responses unhelpful in predicting 
future behaviours. Behavioural tasks may be more useful in this regard, and there is evidence 
that improvement in task performance may mirror relevant clinical changes (e.g. Castrioto et 
al., 2014). Reaction time tasks are used extensively to study both healthy volunteers and 
patients. Saccadic tasks are amenable to use in animal studies that allow direct recording from 
relevant neural substrates and identification of the roles of specific neurotransmitters. This 
thesis considers the use of rewarded oculomotor decision making tasks under time pressure in 
humans as a means of interrogating motivated behaviours in the health and disease. 
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Figure 1.1  Simplified view of pathways connecting prefrontal to 
subcortical structures involved in different aspects of executive control. 
 
There are five brain circuits originating in the frontal lobes and linking them as functional units 
to subcortical structures. Two of these have primarily motor functions and are not shown here. 
The other three (decision making) anatomical structures originate in prefrontal cortex, project to 
the caudate, connect to the globus pallidus and substantia nigra, and from there connect to the 
thalamus. A final link back to the frontal cortex does exist, and each circuit forms a closed loop. 
The dorsolateral cortex receives the majority of its distant afferent inputs by means of the 
superior longitudinal and uncinate fasciculi, and short-range association fibers (U-fibres) 
mediate local prefrontal connections. Medially, the orbitofrontal cortex connects to limbic 
structures by means of the uncinate fasciculus and to the ventromedial cortex through U-fibers. 
The orbitofrontal and ventromedial cortices are reciprocally interconnected, and it is likely that 
both are connected with the anterior cingulate by means of fibers of the rostral cingulum. LOC, 
lateral orbitofrontal cortex; MOC, medial orbitofrontal cortex. Adapted from (Vale, 2008) 
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1.1.2.  Oculomotor performance as measure of loop function 
Components and connections are shared between dynamic CBGTC loops. Despite anatomically 
distinct circuitry, damage to shared components of one circuit is likely to have effects within 
another. Developments in computational neuroscience have enabled the incorporation of 
multiple sources of evidence into models of these dynamic loops - from single cell recordings in 
animals to lesion and functional neuroimaging studies in humans (e.g. Wiecki and Frank, 2013). 
Yet, despite this great advance, we lack simple, rapidly administered and reproducible 
measures (or “biomarkers”) of disrupted loop function. Do commonalities between the 
oculomotor loop and decision-making loops allow the assessment of problems with motivated 
behaviour from oculomotor responses? A proven way to interrogate these loops is through 
“saccadic decisions” (Glimcher, 2003; Frank and Claus, 2006; Kable and Glimcher, 2009). This 
thesis explores the possibility that eye movements allow specific insights into disruptions in 
motivation and behaviour leading to apathy and impulsivity following impairment to CBGTC 
loop function. 
 
1.1.3.  Dopamine modulates loop function for reward learning 
Both disease processes and medication can disrupt loop function (Middleton and Strick, 2000). 
Healthy humans are uniquely advanced in their ability to flexibly modify choices according to 
feedback and thereby select the best adaptive response in particular behavioural, spatial and 
temporal contexts (Frank and Claus, 2006). Dopamine (DA) is important in modulating the 
cortico-basal ganglia circuitry to allow this flexible behaviour (Schultz, 1998; Daw, 2007; 
Robbins and Everitt, 2007). Thus the basal ganglia and DA are important in both action 
selection and reinforcement learning (Frank, 2005; Bogacz and Gurney, 2007; Humphries et al., 
2012). Furthering our knowledge of the effects of disease and drugs upon disrupted basal 
ganglia thalamocortical loops, will increase our ability to both anticipate, prevent, recognise and 
treat cognitive and behavioural dysfunction in neuropsychiatric disease (Aarts et al., 2011; Cools 
et al., 2002; Dagher and Robbins, 2009; MacDonald et al., 2011). 
 
1.1.4.  Parkinson’s Disease as a model of disrupted loop function and 
aberrant motivated behaviour 
Parkinson’s disease (PD) is an important example of a neuropsychiatric disease with high 
incidence and prevalence in the general population (Van Den Eeden et al., 2003). Disrupted 
front-striatal executive function in PD (Robbins and Cools, 2014) may explain the propensity for 
some patients with Parkinson’s Disease to develop disorders of motivated decision-making, 
including apathy and impulsivity (Ahearn et al., 2012; Leroi et al., 2012; Sinha et al., 2013a; 
Aarsland et al., 2014). Studying cognition in patient populations is difficult due to the 
confounding effects of age, medical comorbidities and medications. This thesis attempts to 
address this problem by first describing experiments that investigate the effects of age, focal 
lesions of the basal ganglia and dopaminergic modulation, before consideration of patients with 
Parkinson’s disease with and without recognised severe effects on their motivated behaviour. 
For comparison, I also study pathological gamblers without neurological disease. 
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1.1.5.  Dopaminergic drugs may influence patients’ decisions 
Dopaminergic effects are especially relevant when considering the influence of medications on 
patients’ behaviour (Czernecki et al., 2002; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Brooks and Piccini, 2006; 
Housden et al., 2010). Patients with PD have reduced dopaminergic transmission in the basal 
ganglia and subsequently suffer from impaired ability to learn about correct choices from trial 
and error (Cools, 2006). Optimal dopaminergic treatment of the motor disorder does not always 
correlate with ideal cognitive or behavioural outcomes (Weintraub, 2009). In some PD patients, 
particularly those treated with dopamine agonists, impulse control disorders develop, 
including pathological gambling (Avanzi et al., 2006; Driver-Dunckley et al., 2003; Gallagher et 
al., 2007; Molina et al., 2000; Voon et al., 2011a; Weintraub et al., 2010). We lack simple, clinical 
“biomarkers” to predict, assess and monitor behavioural dysfunction in these patients (Litvan 
et al., 2012; Svenningsson et al., 2012; Mollenhauer et al., 2014). 
 
1.1.6  Saccades can provide an index of motivational behaviour 
Saccadic decisions have demonstrated utility in the assessment of decision-making and are 
consistent with established models of cortico-basal ganglia circuitry and function (Wiecki and 
Frank, 2013; Cavanagh et al., 2014). Furthermore, saccadic decisions have been demonstrated to 
be sensitive to the effects of urgency (Reddi and Carpenter, 2000). This thesis will explore the 
use of rewarded oculomotor tasks to investigate decision-making behaviours in patients with 
impulsivity and/or apathy and attempts to modulate healthy volunteers performance with 
dopaminergic drugs. In this introduction, I first review the use of saccades in cognition (Section 
1.2), the neurobiology of impulsivity (Section 1.3) and apathy (Section 1.4) and current 
understanding of the influence of dopamine on these constructs (Section 1.5). Latterly, I review 
what is known of the influence of age (Section 1.6) and disease, including Parkinson’s Disease 
(Section 1.7) and Pathological Gambling (Section 1.8) on rewarded decision-making. 
 
1.2  Saccade latencies as a cognitive measure 
Much insight into the neurophysiological basis of perceptual decision-making in non-human 
primates derives from research on decisions about where and when to move the eyes e.g. 
(Glimcher, 2003; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Schall, 2001, 2004; Smith 
and Ratcliff, 2009). The neural circuitry of the saccadic system is well described (Wurtz and 
Goldberg, 1989; Wurtz, 1996; Sweeney et al., 2007; McDowell et al., 2008). This circuitry is 
influenced by both basal ganglia and neocortical input and therefore its output (saccades) may 
reflect changes in brain areas important in rewarded decisions (Pierrot-Deseilligny et al., 1995; 
Hikosaka et al., 2000a; Pierrot-Deseilligny et al., 2004). This allows mechanistic inference about 
the human brain (Glimcher, 2003; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Hutton, 2008; Kable and Glimcher, 
2009). The importance of dopaminergic signalling in rewarded saccadic decisions is 
demonstrated by a number of landmark experiments in macaques (Ljungberg et al., 1992; 
Schultz, 1998, 2000; Schultz et al., 1997, 2000). Work by Hikosaka et al. on the anatomy of 
oculomotor decision making has shown the importance of neural substrates in the basal ganglia 
(Hikosaka and Sakamoto, 1986; Hikosaka et al., 1989a, 1989b). Combining this neurochemical 
and anatomical evidence has led to a more informed understanding of the neurobiology of 
saccadic decision making (Glimcher, 2001, 2003). 
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Eye movements have relatively few degrees of freedom, allowing fairly direct links between 
neurophysiology and behaviour to be established (Fuchs et al., 1985; Scudder et al., 2002). 
Saccades are ballistic, with stereotyped action depending on the direction, starting point, and 
distance the eyes need to move (Liversedge et al., 2011).  The saccadic system is also a robust 
system which continues to function in spite of disease and drugs, making study of patients with 
motor disorders possible (Jones and DeJong, 1971; Lueck et al., 1990; Vidailhet et al., 1994; 
Mosimann et al., 2005; Rivaud-Pechoux et al., 2007). Saccades have previously been used to 
study cognitive processes in both health (e.g. Hutton, 2008; Kennard et al., 2005; Liversedge and 
Findlay, 2000) and disease (e.g. Braun et al., 1992; Mostofsky et al., 2001; Bagary et al., 2004; 
Michell et al., 2006; Golding et al., 2006; Hodgson et al., 2007; Antoniades and Barker, 2008; 
Blekher et al., 2009; Huddy et al., 2011; Jung et al., 2014). They have also been used to 
investigate the effects of drugs on both experimental volunteer subjects, patients and chronic 
substance abusers (Morgan et al., 2009).  Furthermore, saccadic latency response distributions 
are well described in a variety of tasks e.g. (Carpenter and Williams, 1995; Carpenter, 2001; 
Reddi et al., 2003; Oswal et al., 2007; Story and Carpenter, 2009; Carpenter et al., 2009). 
 
1.2.1  Cortical and subcortical areas interact to drive and control 
saccade production 
The saccadic system is a useful candidate for study because common neural substrates are 
involved in both visual perception, motor production, and cognitive control (Schall, 1995a, 
2001) (Figure 1.2). Cortical regions providing the “drive” for saccades include FEF, lateral 
intraparietal area (LIP) and supplementary eye field (SEF) (Wurtz and Goldberg, 1989). This 
drive encodes basic physiologic parameters including saccade direction and reaction time: In a 
“gap” paradigm, Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) blood-oxygen level dependent 
(BOLD) activation in the human FEF correlates with saccadic reaction time (SRT): Activity 
predicted both the type of eye movement (whether pro- or anti-saccade) and when the saccade 
would occur (Connolly et al., 2005). 
 
1.2.2  The neural basis of oculomotor decisions 
What about higher, “decision-making” processes requiring a saccadic response? By comparing 
prosaccades, antisaccades and Nogo trials, Brown et al. found that cortical areas (FEF, SEF, 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), intraparietal sulcus, and precuneus) exhibited similar 
activation patterns for prosaccadic and Nogo responses, suggesting that BOLD signal in these 
regions might reflect visual detection and attention processes rather than those required for 
saccade generation or inhibition. By contrast, right superior frontal sulcus, right supramarginal 
gyrus, and posterior cingulate sulcus activations were greater for Nogo versus pro-saccadic 
responses, suggesting that these areas are more important in saccade inhibition (Brown et al., 
2006). 
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Figure 1.2  Neural circuitry controlling saccadic eye movements. 
Schematics demonstrate: 
A The anatomical substrates of oculomotor control, including inhibitory and excitatory 
connections between cortical and subcortical structures. 
B An overview of cortical and subcortical structural roles 
 
CN  Caudate Nucleus 
DLPFC  Dorsolateral Prefrontal 
 Cortex   
FEF  Frontal Eye Fields 
GPe  Globus Pallidus externa LGN
  Lateral Geniculate Nucleus 
LIP Lateral Intraparietal Cortex 
RF Reticular Formation 
SC Superior Colliculus 
SEF Supplementary Eye Fields 
SNpr Substantia Nigra pars reticulata 
STN Subthalamic Nucleus 
 Adapted from  (Munoz and Everling, 2004) 
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fMRI in macaques performing an ocular “baseball task” [a Go/Nogo task in which subjects 
decide whether make to ocular pursuit of a moving spot target after deciding whether the target 
will cross a distal line segment] demonstrated task-related activity in the SEF, the FEF, the 
superior parietal lobule (SPL), and the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC). The SPL 
and right VLPFC showed heightened activity only during ocular baseball, despite identical 
stimuli and oculomotor demands in the control task, implicating these areas in the decision 
process. Furthermore, the right VLPFC (but not the SPL) showed the greatest activation during 
Nogo decision trials. This suggests both a functional dissociation between these areas and a role 
for the right VLPFC in rule-guided inhibition of behaviour. In the SEF and FEF, activity was 
similar for ocular baseball and the control task. This suggests that SEF & FEF are tightly linked 
to motor commands whereas the SPL and VLPFC are implicated as cortical substrates of the 
decision process (Heinen et al., 2006). 
 
Such discrete roles are almost certainly an oversimplification and reflect task specificity. For 
example, the SEF also has a demonstrable direct role in rewarded saccadic behaviour: In 
recordings from monkeys performing an oculomotor gambling task, SEF neurons were found to 
encode both the reward prediction error and the components necessary for its computation (i.e. 
expected and actual outcome). This suggests that the SEF has a role in the evaluation of value 
based decisions in the oculomotor domain (So and Stuphorn, 2012). Furthermore, a patient with 
a focal lesion of the SEF demonstrated specific deficits in switching from pro-saccadic to anti-
saccadic responses (Parton et al., 2007): In an arbitrary stimulus-response associative learning 
task, the patient demonstrated a similar impairment in selecting the appropriate saccade from 
conflicting response choices, suggesting that SEF has a role in implementing control under 
conflict (Husain et al., 2003). 
 
This plurality and task dependence of cortical effects is consistent with cortical regions not 
acting in isolation, but as part of dynamic circuits. There are well-recognised anatomical links 
with subcortical structures, which together form functional loops (Figure 1.1 (Alexander et al., 
1986)). At the heart of these loops, the basal ganglia are involved in action selection, primarily 
by exerting powerful tonic inhibition that can be selectively reduced (Redgrave et al., 1999; 
Kropotov and Etlinger, 1999; Houk et al., 2007; Redgrave et al., 2011). The basal ganglia have 
two output pathways implicated in the movement control: the thalamocortical parallel 
pathways (Alexander et al., 1986) and the brainstem motor networks (Fawcett et al., 2005). The 
oculomotor circuit of the thalamocortical pathways projects back to the FEF and the SEF, thereby 
allowing reciprocal modulation. The action of these brainstem networks on saccadic eye 
movement has been demonstrated both anatomically, physiologically and pharmacologically 
(Hikosaka et al., 2000a). The superior colliculus acts as a final pathway for controlling saccadic 
eye movements, receiving projections from both the basal ganglia–superior colliculus pathway 
and the corticotectal pathways (Figure 1.2). 
 
Saccades therefore reflect the output of the basal ganglia and may be a good indicator of their 
function (Yugeta et al., 2010). Both animal and human studies suggest that the basal ganglia are 
important in both the initiation and suppression of saccades in complex behavioural contexts, 
particularly by modulating the effects of reward (Tanaka et al., 2004).  Both eye tracking and 
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pupillometry have shown that latent decision making processes can be interrogated through 
both eye movements and pupil size. For example, eye gaze dwell time and pupillometry 
correlated with drift rates toward targets and decision thresholds (Cavanagh et al., 2014). 
Through thoughtful experimental and task design, we hoped to establish oculomotor measures 
of rewarded decision-making sensitive to impairments including impulsivity and apathy. This 
requires consideration of known task designs and the expected corresponding responses. 
 
1.2.3  Choice of Saccadic Task Design 
The experiments in this thesis use both established and novel saccadic tasks. Straightforward 
eye movement tasks commonly used in cognitive experiments (Figure 1.3) generate reactive 
saccades with a unimodal distribution of saccadic latencies or reaction times (SRT) (Carpenter 
and Williams, 1995). In these tasks, saccades are driven by a stimulus (“Go” signal) at fixation 
or are provoked by the appearance of the target itself. Electrophysiology suggests that the 
latency of a saccadic response should be of the order of 70ms (Schall, 1995b). However, saccadic 
latencies in humans are much longer, at around 200ms. This ‘oculomotor procrastination’ 
(Carpenter, 1981) is explained by the interaction (braking) of the basic saccadic circuitry by 
higher order “decision makers”. This interaction and its variability allow interrogation of 
saccadic latency for the purposes of cognitive research: Assuming that the basic saccadic 
circuitry has a fixed minimum latency, we infer that further delays (saccades at longer latency) 
are due to these higher order interactions (e.g. (Duka and Lupp, 1997; Hardin et al., 2007; Jazbec 
et al., 2006). Among other variables, the pattern of saccadic latencies is determined by the 
predictability of both the timing and spatial position of the cue (Engelken et al., 1991). 
Increasing the complexity of the task and/or modulating reward also modulate the pattern of 
saccadic responses (Sheliga et al., 2002; Stritzke et al., 2009).  
 
1.2.4  Anticipatory Saccadic Responses 
In some tasks, an earlier distribution of saccades is generated at shorter latencies than the 
standard reflexive saccades (Findlay, 1981; Bronstein and Kennard, 1987). This early 
distribution of saccadic responses (or “express saccades”) is observed in “gap” tasks wherein 
the fixation target briefly disappears in advance of a saccade to the new target position (Fischer 
and Boch, 1983; Fischer and Ramsperger, 1984). Analysis of this effect shows that the majority of 
these earlier, express saccades occurred for trials where the target of the current trial was on the 
opposite side to the previous one (Carpenter, 2001). This suggests that in order to exploit 
anticipatory eye movements, saccadic task designs should employ alternating target directions. 
The more predictable the target location, the greater the number of express responses produced 
(Dickov and Morrison, 2006). These short latency responses enable probing of individual ability 
to anticipate targets/cues. Importantly, it does not appear that prior temporal (as opposed to 
spatial) knowledge of target onset in unrewarded tasks generates more express saccades 
(though such knowledge does reduce reactive saccade latencies (Gagnon et al., 2002)). By using a 
task that rewards short latency responses to predictable targets, alternating left and right (The 
Traffic Light Task, Chapter 2), we encouraged individuals to take risks in order to exploit their 
own anticipatory skill for increased task reward. 
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Figure 1.3  Saccadic Tasks Commonly Used in Cognitive Research  
The four standard classes of saccadic task used in cognitive research. The arrow indicates the 
direction in which the eyes move in order to make a correct response.  
 
   Indicates an auditory “Go!” signal. 
 
1) Prosaccade - the fixation target is extinguished simultaneously with the 
onset of a new, peripheral target to which a saccade is immediately made. 
2) Delayed Prosaccade  - the fixation target is extinguished simultaneously with 
the onset of a new, peripheral target to which a saccade is made immediately following a delay, 
the end of which is signalled by an auditory tone. 
3) Remembered Saccade - the fixation target is extinguished simultaneously with 
the onset of a new, peripheral target that then disappears. On the presentation of an auditory 
“Go!” signal, the saccade is made to the remembered location 
4) Antisaccade - the fixation target is extinguished simultaneously with the 
onset of a new, peripheral target. Saccades are made in the opposite direction to a target 
equidistant from the point of initial fixation. 
 
Adapted from (Hutton, 2008) 
Prosaccade
Delayed
Prosaccade
Remembered
Saccade Antisaccade
TIME
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1.2.5  Accumulator models describe multiple task-driven oculomotor 
latency distributions 
The saccadic reaction time (SRT) to a new onset stimulus is short (200-250ms) and varies within 
a ‘recinormal’ distribution. That is to say that when histograms of SRT are plotted upon 
orthodox time and probability density axes, the distribution resembles a positively skewed 
Gaussian curve. This “skew” can be removed by plotting time (latency, SRT) using a reciprocal 
axis, rendering a normal shaped distribution. A simple statistical model which neatly replicates 
simple saccadic latency distributions (and possibly the underlying “neural representation” of 
likelihood) is described by LATER (Linear Approach to Threshold with Ergodic Rate) 
(Carpenter and Williams, 1995) (Figures 1.4A & B).  In LATER, Log likelihood is used to predict 
saccade distributions on a reciprocal timescale, rendering the distribution linear on a 
“reciprobit” plot. The linear variables (µ, σ) for mean latency and variance can then be used for 
comparison between individuals and groups. 
 
Carpenter has suggested that the bimodal distribution of saccadic latencies in more complex 
eye movement tasks (such as gap, step and appearance tasks) might also be represented by a 
combination of two LATER “units” (Story and Carpenter, 2009). Furthermore, this type of 
accumulator modelling has been successfully applied to explain the competing directional 
demands in both countermanding and antisaccade tasks (Munoz and Everling, 2004; Noorani 
and Carpenter, 2014). Two opposing processes form the basis of a “race model” as also 
proposed by other authors (Band et al., 2003; Boucher et al., 2007). Most significantly for the 
novel designs used in experiments described in this thesis, the effects of a “maverick” LATER 
unit might explain the occurrence of short latency anticipatory responses (Roos et al., 2008) 
(Figure 1.4C). Could the presence and activity of such a “maverick” oculomotor decision-
making process index impulsivity in rewarded behaviour? Impulsive subjects might have a 
maverick unit that fires earlier or reaches threshold more quickly. Apathy might mean a late 
firing or high threshold unit, or none at all. We used a combination of LATER units to model 
the responses to our novel, rewarded oculomotor task (Chapter 2). 
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Figure 1.4 The LATER model can explain simple saccadic tasks and complex tasks that generate multiple latency distributions. 
Carpenter’s LATER (Linear Approach to Threshold with Ergodic Rate) model applies an accumulator model of decision making to saccade generation. At the time 
of target onset a decision signal starting from a baseline level (S0) begins to rise at a constant rate (r) until it reaches a threshold (ST) at which point a saccade towards 
the target is initiated. The rate of rise is assumed to vary randomly from trial to trial, with a mean and variance. Manipulations that result in changes in the baseline 
level of activity, the rate of rise or the threshold could all result in changes in saccade latency. Factors such as expectancies and the level of activation of the intention 
would presumably influence baseline levels of activation (Hutton, 2008). A On presentation of a stimulus, a decision signal starts to rise at a rate r from its initial 
value S0 until it reaches the threshold level ST for initiating action; on different trials, r varies randomly with a Gaussian distribution (�, σ). As a result, a distribution 
of reciprocal latency over a number of trials is Gaussian. B Consequently, when a cumulative histogram is plotted using a probit axis and a reciprocal timescale (a 
reciprobit plot), they usually fall on a straight line, making an intercept I with the t = infinity axis. However, particularly under conditions of increased 
predictability, a small subsidiary population of aberrantly early saccades may sometimes be seen (blue), generating short-latency points lying on a different straight 
line, that typically has an intercept of zero. C A conventional LATER unit, with mean rate of rise � and variance σ acts in parallel with a “maverick” unit having a 
greater variance but a rate of rise that on average is zero. Whichever unit reaches threshold first triggers the saccade. 
 
Adapted from (Oswal et al., 2007 and Roos et al., 2008) 
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1.2.6  Using risk and reward to modulate anticipatory saccades  
We hoped to generate a greater number of anticipatory responses in our task by 
disproportionately rewarding them. Others have previously demonstrated significant effects of 
reward upon saccadic preparation, by reducing the latency of reactive saccades in both animals 
(Hong and Hikosaka, 2008) (Figure 1.5) and humans (Milstein and Dorris, 2007). The role of 
subcortical brain areas in modulating such reward sensitivity has been demonstrated in 
animals. Studie s including direct recording of monkey brain neurophysiology have enabled 
investigation of the neural substrates of saccadic reward (McCoy et al., 2003; Hikosaka et al., 
2006; Hong and Hikosaka, 2008; So and Stuphorn, 2010). Animal studies using memory guided 
saccades with an asymmetric reward schedule have demonstrated that visual and memory 
responses of caudate neurons are modulated by reward expectation (Kawagoe et al., 1998). 
 
The relevance of dopaminergic projections from subcortical regions has been shown in an 
experiment which demonstrated projection of reward sensitive neurons from the internal 
segment of the pallidum (GPi) to the lateral habenula (Lh) (Hong and Hikosaka, 2008). Onward 
dopaminergic projections of Lh explain the role of this area in modulating cortico-striatal 
circuitry to allow reinforcement learning (Hong and Hikosaka, 2011). Pallidal projections to the 
lateral habenula and subsequent inhibition of dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain are also 
important in modulating saccadic reward learning (Hong and Hikosaka, 2008, 2013; 
Stephenson-Jones et al., 2013; Tachibana and Hikosaka, 2012). Other studies implicate 
dopaminergic, parietal, reward-sensitive cells (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 2007). Hong and 
Hikosaka’s task (Figure 1.5) was adapted as a measure of reward sensitivity for the experiments 
described in Chapters 3-7. Reward sensitivity has previously been demonstrated in human 
subjects with a reduction in latencies in both pro- and antisaccade tasks (Ross et al., 2011). 
Another study in humans found a negative correlation between expected value (reward 
probability × reward magnitude) and saccadic latency (Milstein and Dorris, 2007). Recent 
experiments suggest that short latency saccades are influenced by visual salience whereas longer 
latency saccades are affected by value (Schütz et al., 2012).   
 
Two of our rewarded tasks examine risk aversion related to the timing of saccadic responses. 
The neural substrate of subjective risk preferences has only rarely been investigated using 
oculomotor tasks (McCoy and Platt, 2005a) and the risky element of the tasks used has not 
related to the timing of the eye movement nor has timing been related to the reward outcome 
e.g. (Ackermann	  and	  Landy,	  2013;	  McCoy	  and	  Platt,	  2005a;	   Stritzke	  and	  Trommershäuser,	  2007;	  
Stritzke	  et	  al.,	  2009).  
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Figure 1.5 The Lateral Reward Task  
Macaque monkeys fixated at the centre of screen (F). A visual target appeared either to the right 
or to the left of the fixation. They then made saccadic eye movements to the target. Saccades to 
one position were rewarded, but saccades to the other position were not. The relation between 
saccade position and reward was fixed for 24 consecutive trials and was then reversed in the 
next block of trials. (b) Habenula neurons showed a large increase of firing rate after saccade 
request for no reward and a decrease of firing after the request for rewarding saccade, whereas 
dopamine neurons were the opposite: increase of firing after request for rewarding saccade and 
decrease of saccade after request for unrewarding saccade. (c) Anatomical locations of primate 
lateral habenula (LH) and dopamine neurons (DN), and the flow of neural signals. 
 
(Hong and Hikosaka, 2008) 
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Perhaps longer latency saccades (as produced by cognitively complex tasks) are more amenable 
to modulation by higher cognitive centres under the influence of reward? Support for this 
hypothesis comes from the differing effects of reward upon anti-saccades: In a study where the 
target indicated whether a saccade was to be rewarded or punished, both high rewards and 
punishments prolonged antisaccade latencies (Blaukopf and DiGirolamo, 2006) indicating that 
reward sensitivity and punishment avoidance can both increase cognitive “effort”. However, in 
another study where the reward condition was known in advance, higher incentives reduced 
antisaccade errors without affecting latencies (Duka and Lupp, 1997). We designed rewarded 
oculomotor tasks sensitive to both saccadic latency and error rates in order to capture the effects 
of disease or drugs on either outcome measure. For example, impulsive oculomotor decisions 
might incorporate fast responses and anticipation but with excessive errors. In contrast, apathy 
might be manifest as few errors but little anticipatory behaviour and/or slow responses. The 
next two sections consider these constructs. 
 
1.3 Impulsivity 
Impulsivity is the tendency to act without adequate forethought (Broos et al., 2012). It is a 
complex personality trait that is characterized by an inclination to act hastily or inappropriately 
upon environmental stimuli or inner impulses without taking the consequences of these 
behaviours into account (Aichert et al., 2012). It is observed in the general population 
(Chamorro et al., 2012) but may be increased in patients suffering from a number of 
neurological and psychiatric disorders (Antonucci et al., 2006; Floden et al.; Djamshidian et al., 
2012). These conditions include Parkinson’s Disease (PD) (Ahearn et al., 2012; Leroi et al., 2011; 
Sinha et al., 2013b), Alzheimer’s Disease (Lerner et al., 2007; Starkstein et al., 2006), frontal 
cortical lesions (Berlin et al., 2004; Floden et al., 2008) and fronto-temporal dementia (Chow et 
al., 2009; Eslinger et al., 2012). Impulsive decision-making is seen as part of the spectrum of 
healthy behaviour (so called “Functional Impulsivity” (Dickman, 1990)). Excessive 
(“Dysfunctional”) impulsivity is a negative trait, however, leading to disruption and damage to 
the lives of patients and their families (Plutchik and Van Praag, 1995; Antonucci et al., 2006; 
Chamorro et al., 2012; Phu et al., 2014). Impulsive traits are a cause of significant morbidity (Phu 
et al., 2014; Smulders et al., 2014) and carer burden (Leroi et al., 2012). 
 
1.3.1  Impulsivity is difficult to define and measure 
Impulsivity is difficult to define (Dick et al., 2010; Evenden, 1999b), it comprises a cluster of 
lower order personality traits that include sensation seeking, risk taking, novelty seeking, 
boldness, adventuresomeness, boredom susceptibility, unreliability and unorderliness (Depue 
and Collins, 1999). No single personality trait underlies rash or impulsive action (Eysenck and 
Eysenck, 1977; Smith et al., 2007a; Whiteside and Lynam, 2001). This leads to poor correlations 
between measures (Evenden, 1999a; Meda et al., 2009). A lack of distinctive syntax and the 
tendency for the conflation of impulsivity with behavioural disinhibition (Goudriaan et al., 
2008) generates further ambiguity and difficulty in making valid comparisons between reports. 
Furthermore, multiple modes of impulsivity are demonstrated to occur in the same individual 
or disease state, which makes independent assessment of each mode more troublesome (Huddy 
et al., 2013; Mackillop et al., 2014; Nombela et al., 2014). 
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It would therefore be useful to develop measures that might predict the need for (or measure a 
response to) treatment of this aspect of the conditions. For example, dopaminergic therapies are 
implicated in the development of impulse control disorders in patients with PD or restless leg 
syndrome (Voon et al., 2007; Voon and Fox, 2007; Cornelius et al., 2010; Voon et al., 2011b, 
2011c; Leroi et al., 2013). Why do dopamine agonists cause impulsivity in some, but not all? 
Could a behavioural measure predict who might respond in this way?  
 
1.3.2 Current Measures of Impulsivity 
Current measures of impulsivity include self-report questionnaires and laboratory based, 
behavioural tasks. Despite being used interchangeably, the relationship between these measures 
is limited, suggesting that they may measure disparate aspects of impulsive behaviour (Keilp et 
al., 2005; Dalley et al., 2008; Cyders and Coskunpinar, 2011; Aichert et al., 2012; Cyders and 
Coskunpinar, 2012; Huddy et al., 2013). Self-reported indices of impulsivity include sensation 
seeking, risk-taking, lack of planning, perseverance, and acting on impulses (Whiteside and 
Lynam, 2001). Behavioural measures include inhibitory control tasks which assess the ability to 
suppress a prepotent response (response inhibition) or a conflicting, competing response 
(interference control), impulsive choice tasks (e.g. delay discounting) and time estimation 
measures (Dougherty et al., 2005; Friedman and Miyake, 2004; Nigg, 2000; Robbins et al., 2012). 
There is poor correlation between different behavioural measures and with self-report 
questionnaires (Aichert et al., 2012).  
 
1.3.2.1  Self-Report Questionnaires of Impulsivity 
Impulsivity is a multidimensional construct, and different questionnaires have been developed 
to assess different aspects of the trait (Flory et al., 2006). Most focus on dysfunctional impulsivity, 
which is related to ineffective information processing and failure to inhibit inappropriate 
responses, whereas functional impulsivity is adaptive in being related to a rapid style of 
information processing (Dickman, 1990; Brunas-Wagstaff et al., 1994). One such measure, the 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11, see Chapter 3 and Appendix (Patton et al., 1995; Stanford et 
al., 2009)) was chosen for the assessment of trait impulsivity in subjects of the experiments 
described here as it is widely used and validated (Congdon and Canli, 2005; Stanford et al., 
2009). The questionnaire measures impulsiveness through items such as “I act on impulse” and 
“I consider myself always careful”. Participants indicate how frequently each statement applies 
to them on a 4-point Likert scale (never, occasionally, often, and almost always). The scale has been 
applied in combined behavioural and neuroimaging studies e.g. (Horn et al., 2003) enabling 
inference about relevant brain areas. Furthermore, associations with oculomotor behaviour 
have been demonstrated (Roberts et al., 2011; Aichert et al., 2012) and sum scores have 
correlated with behavioural measures of impulsivity such as Go/Nogo commission errors and 
antisaccade error rates (Aichert et al., 2012). 
 
Cloninger defines impulsive behaviour as the coexistence of four heritable temperamental 
traits: high novelty seeking (NS), low harm avoidance (HA), low persistence and high reward 
dependence (RD) (Cloninger, 1986). The Tri-dimensional Personality Questionnaire (TPQ, C R 
Cloninger 1987, see Appendix) contains 100 true/false items assessing three of these higher 
order dimensions of personality (NS, HA and RD). It is suggested that variation in each 
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dimension correlates with activity in a specific mono-aminergic pathway: Novelty seeking 
correlates with low basal dopaminergic activity, harm avoidance is due to high serotonergic 
activity and reward dependence is due to low basal noradrenergic activity (Cloninger, 1986). 
These links to monoaminergic neurotransmission led to the selection of this questionnaire for 
use in the chapters on dopaminergic modulation (Chapters 5 & 6). 
 
1.3.2.2  Performance-based measures of Impulsivity 
Although these self-report measures of impulsivity measure a broad range of cognitive and 
behavioral styles in different social contexts, they are liable to subjective bias and are only 
capable of measuring stable traits. In order to assess further components of impulsivity, a 
variety of experimental paradigms have been developed to assess the ability to inhibit 
impulsive or inappropriate responses. These paradigms assess cognitive, motor, and emotional 
disinhibition (Dillon and Pizzagalli, 2007), delay-discounting in reward choices (Hariri et al., 
2006), decision-making processes (Bayard et al., 2011) or time estimation biases (Davidson and 
House, 1978; Lennings and Burns, 1998). Behavioural measures are multifaceted - different tasks 
index various aspects of inhibitory function (Nigg, 2000; Friedman and Miyake, 2004; Dillon 
and Pizzagalli, 2007).  A proposed categorisation (Table 1.1) includes five task types that 
measure variability in cognitive processes that contribute to impulsive behaviour (Dougherty et 
al., 2002; Marsh et al., 2002; Friedman and Miyake, 2004; Dougherty et al., 2005): 
 
 1. Prepotent response Inhibition 
This refers to the ability to inhibit an already initiated response or to suppress dominant, 
automatic or prepotent responses. Tasks include Go/Nogo, Stop Signal Tasks, Continuous 
Performance Tasks and Antisaccade tasks. 
 
2. Resistance to distractor interference 
Tasks in which subjects must avoid interference from irrelevant distractors, such as the Eriksen 
Flanker Task, Stroop Task and Shape Matching Task. 
 
3. Resistance to proactive interference 
These tasks involve resisting memory intrusions of information, which was previously task 
relevant but no longer is. These include the Brown-Peterson task and Cued Recall Task. 
 
4. Delayed response tasks 
Impulsive subjects are thought to be less able to delay responding in order to obtain a larger 
reward in tasks including the two choice impulsivity paradigm and single key impulsivity 
paradigm. 
 
5. Time discrimination tasks 
Tasks wherein impulsive subjects demonstrate distorted judgments of elapsed time, such as in 
the TIME paradigm and the temporal discrimination task. 
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Type Example Tasks Description References 
Prepotent 
response 
Inhibition 
Go/Nogo 
 
Stop Signal Task 
 
Continuous 
Performance task 
 
Antisaccade task 
Suppress the inclination to make a previously reinforced 
response 
 
Various modalities, inhibit previously entrained response when 
indicated by stop signal. 
 
Respond as quickly as possible to target stimulus, refrain from 
responding to rarer non-target 
 
Suppress a reflexive saccade toward a cue and instead make a 
saccade away from the cue direction. 
(Marczinski and Fillmore, 2003; Kertzman et al., 2008) 
 
(Dimoska and Johnstone, 2007; Lipszyc and Schachar, 2010; Roberts et 
al., 2011; Fauth-Bühler et al., 2012) 
 
(Klee and Garfinkel, 1983) 
 
 
(Lueck et al., 1990; Duka and Lupp, 1997; Butler et al., 1999; Brown et 
al., 2006; Hood et al., 2007; Ross et al., 2011) 
Resistance to 
distractor 
interference 
Eriksen Flanker task  
 
 
Word naming task  
(Stroop) 
 
Shape matching task  
 
Identify target letter presented by itself or flanked by 
incompatible letters or symbols. 
 
Name target word, presented in green, alone or with distracter 
red word 
 
Same as above, but with shapes instead of words 
(Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974) 
 
 
(Stroop, 1935; Kane et al., 1994; Kertzman et al., 2006) 
 
 
(DeSchepper and Treisman, 1996) 
Resistance to 
proactive 
interference 
Brown–Peterson 
task 
 
 
Cued recall task 
Learn and later recall successive lists made up of words taken 
from same category 
 
View one of two lists of words, then recall word on most recent 
list, ignoring previous list words 
(Kane and Engle, 2000) 
 
 
(Tolan and Tehan, 1999) 
Delayed 
response 
tasks 
Two choice 
impulsivity 
paradigm 
 
Single key 
impulsivity 
Paradigm 
Choices between smaller reward more quickly, and larger 
reward with delay 
 
Respond as desired, size of reward related to length of delay 
between responses 
(Dougherty et al., 2005) 
 
 
(Dougherty et al., 2005) 
Distortions in 
elapsed time 
TIME paradigm 
 
Temporal 
discrimination task 
Estimate how much time has elapsed 
 
(Dougherty et al., 2005) 
 
(Bueti et al., 2008) 
Table 1.1  Tasks used to measure various cognitive processes relevant to impulsive behaviour. 
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1.3.2.3  Current oculomotor measures of impulsivity 
One way to measure impulsivity is by quantifying individual’s inhibitory control (Bachorowski 
and Newman, 1985; Horn et al., 2003; Goudriaan et al., 2008; Roberts et al., 2011; Aichert et al., 
2012). Prepotent response inhibition, defined as “the ability to deliberately suppress dominant, 
automatic, or prepotent responses”, is a widely used measure of such inhibition (Friedman and 
Miyake, 2004). Prepotent response inhibition can be assessed with the antisaccade task (Hallett, 
1978), the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) (Stroop, 1935), the stop signal task (Logan et al., 1984) and 
the Go/Nogo task e.g. (Kertzman et al., 2008; Marczinski and Fillmore, 2003; Trommer et al., 
1991). Prepotent response inhibition may also be dopaminergically modulated. In an ¹⁸F-
fallypride fMRI study of the stop signal task (Ghahremani et al., 2012), striatal dopamine D₂/D₃ 
receptor availability was negatively correlated with speed of response inhibition (SSRT) and 
positively correlated with inhibition-related activation in frontostriatal neural circuitry. 
Correlations were strongest in the dorsal regions (caudate and putamen) of the striatum 
suggesting that D₂-like receptor function in humans plays a major role in the neural circuitry 
mediating behavioural control.  
 
Oculomotor studies of impulsivity have used antisaccades and stop-signal reaction time in 
saccadic countermanding tasks e.g. (Boucher, 2007; Hanes and Carpenter, 1999). In antisaccade 
tasks (Figure 1.3), participants suppress a highly automated, reflex-like prosaccade to a sudden 
onset peripheral target and instead initiate a saccade of the equivalent magnitude in the 
opposite direction. Latencies (of pro- and anti- saccades) and numbers of pro-saccadic errors are 
performance indicators. Impulsive subjects make more errors and/or generate longer latency 
antisaccade responses (Hutton et al., 2004). This relationship is so reproducible among 
conditions associated with impulsive behaviour and fronto-striatal executive dysfunction, that 
poor antisaccade task performance has been used as evidence that other conditions (such as 
Tourette syndrome) are due to impairments of similar circuitry (Dursun et al., 2000; Jackson et 
al., 2011). However, task response is not easily predictable in such conditions: Patients with 
ventrolateral frontal cortical damage made more errors on an oculomotor rule switching task 
(Hodgson et al., 2007) whereas patients with Tourette’s were more controlled in switching than 
healthy subjects, despite slowed prosaccadic latencies – suggesting that the task may detect 
adaptive behaviours (i.e. increased cognitive regulation (Jung et al., 2014)). 
 
Stop-signal tasks cue a response using a visual or auditory stimulus. “Respond” trials are 
interleaved with “Stop” trials. In the latter, a stop-signal is presented shortly after the cue and is 
intended to prevent the cued response. Measurement of the latency with which the stop-signal 
remains effective provides another index of impulsivity. Iterative task designs are used to find 
the shortest stop signal interval that successfully inhibits the response.  This stop signal reaction 
time (SSRT) is used as an index of subjects’ ability to inhibit a previously initiated motor 
command. The longer the effective SSRT, the less impulsive that individual is thought to be. 
Animal recordings and human functional imaging studies suggest that stop-signal inhibition is 
implemented by interactions between frontal (cortical) and subcortical regions (Aron and 
Poldrack, 2006; Li et al., 2006; Schall and Boucher, 2007; Verbruggen and Logan, 2008). 
Countermanding saccade tasks employ a similar design, wherein most trials require a saccade 
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to a sudden onset peripheral target, but others display a stop-signal at variable delays following 
the target onset. Performance in both tasks has been simulated by a race model in which the 
process driving a response can be interrupted by a ‘stop signal’ if received before that process 
reaches a certain threshold (Hanes and Carpenter, 1999; Noorani and Carpenter, 2014). 
 
In Go/Nogo paradigms, subjects respond with a fast motor response when a frequent “Go!” 
stimulus appears but withhold their response when an infrequent “Nogo” stimulus is 
presented. Responding to the go-stimulus is made prepotent by presenting more Go stimuli 
than Nogo stimuli. The key indicator of impulsivity is the frequency of commission errors — i.e. 
failure to suppress the response to the Nogo stimulus (Trommer et al., 1991; Rubia et al., 2001; 
Horn et al., 2003). Similar neural substrates to those implicated in stop-signal tasks have been 
demonstrated in a meta-analysis (Simmonds et al., 2008). Both manual and saccadic cued 
inhibition tasks of this type have been compared: Roberts et al. employed both behavioural 
inhibitory control tasks (Cued Go/Nogo task [manual], manual stopping task, visual stopping 
task [saccadic countermanding] and a delayed ocular response task  [DORT]) and impulsivity 
measures (BIS, UPPS & Impulsiveness Questionnaire) to compare adults with ADHD with age 
matched controls. They found that eye movement tasks (but not manual ones) related to specific 
domains of self-reported impulsivity in the ADHD group (but not the control group) (Roberts et 
al., 2011).  
 
Cirilli and others used an oculomotor pursuit task that evoked anticipatory saccades. They 
compared basic characteristics such as latency and velocity with UPPS scores, finding 
correlations between distinct UPPS factors and oculomotor anticipation parameters (Cirilli et 
al., 2011). Behavioural and self-report correlations are also reported between BIS-11 impulsivity 
and commission errors and directional errors on an antisaccade task (Aichert et al., 2012).  
 
1.3.3 Summary 
We aimed to design and adapt oculomotor tasks which indexed reward related impulsivity by 
attempting to modulate anticipatory saccades in particular. To our knowledge, no one else has 
previously explored this potential index of rewarded decision-making. The outcomes of these 
tasks are compared with the results of established (self report) measures of impulsivity - the 
BIS-11 and the TPQ  in Chapter 3. 
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1.4 Apathy 
Although many advances have been made in understanding how rewards – both extrinsic and 
intrinsic – influence behaviour (Berridge, 2004; Dreher and Tremblay, 2009; Schultz, 2000), one 
area that has been relatively neglected until recently is the study of apathy (Starkstein and 
Leentjens, 2008). Apathy is a reduction in self-generated, purposeful behaviour (Levy and 
Dubois, 2006). It is a common behavioral symptom of aging, in people with or without 
dementia (Ishii et al., 2009; Brodaty et al., 2010) and is widespread in mild forms in many 
people (Lampe et al., 2001). Apathetic persons lack the drive to explore and exploit their 
environment and, as a result, do not contribute or engage, either socially or in the work place. 
Such a state is sometimes considered to be simply one extreme of normality. It is clear, though, 
that apathy can be a severe, pathological behavioral state in degenerative brain disorders such 
as Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s disease where it can be a major contributor to disease burden 
(Marin, 1991; Starkstein and Leentjens, 2008; Leroi et al., 2012).  
 
1.4.1  Apathy, like impulsivity, is poorly defined and quantified 
Apathy is caused by both primarily neocortical pathology (Starkstein et al., 2001; Levy and 
Dubois, 2006; Chow et al., 2009) and is seen in focal lesions of the basal ganglia (Mendez et al., 
1989; Caplan et al., 1990; Bhatia and Marsden, 1994) as well as primarily subcortical 
neurodegenerative disorders including Parkinson’s disease (Drapier et al., 2006; Czernecki et 
al., 2008; Leroi et al., 2011; Ahearn et al., 2012; Sinha et al., 2013a). It is associated with cognitive 
decline (Starkstein et al., 2006; Onyike et al., 2007) and it is also seen in depression (from which 
it is dissociable (Levy et al., 1998; Oguru et al., 2010; Butterfield et al., 2010; Kirsch-Darrow et al., 
2011)) where it has been associated with frontal (executive) dysfunction. The syndrome is 
therefore attributable to diffuse and disparate changes in the brain. As such, it is difficult to 
develop a biological model. Nonetheless, apathy is emerging as a cognitive state that can be 
manipulated experimentally to understand the neurobiology of motivation (Schmidt et al., 
2008). Apathy, like impulsivity, is not a unitary construct but is rather a multifaceted condition 
arising from dysfunction in several candidate decision-making mechanisms (Levy and Dubois, 
2006). A number of rating scales exist for the measurement of apathy (Marin et al., 1991; Sockeel 
et al., 2006; Clarke et al., 2007; Leentjens et al., 2008; Pedersen et al., 2012; Radakovic and 
Abrahams, 2013), however, behavioural measures have rarely been employed. Here I propose 
the use of oculomotor, rewarded, decision-making tasks as additional valid measures of low 
motivational states. 
 
1.4.2  The roles of the frontostriatal circuits and dopamine in apathy 
Although many brain regions are activated by reward, a wide range of studies have now 
demonstrated that the basal ganglia, orbito-frontal cortex (OFC), and ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (vmPFC) make a particularly important contribution to value-based decision-making 
(Haber and Knutson, 2010). Corticobasal ganglia circuitry is strongly implicated in the 
functional anatomy of apathy (Levy and Dubois, 2006) with dopamine playing a critical role in 
modulating behavioural sensitivity to reward (Schultz, 2007). Damage to the medial frontal 
cortex in humans leads to apathy: Patients demonstrate ‘abulia’: reduced initiation of 
behaviour, lack of interest in their surroundings and loss of spontaneous emotional expression 
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(Starkstein and Leentjens, 2008). Recent functional imaging in healthy humans implicates 
medial frontal and striatal regions in effort-based decision-making (Croxson et al., 2009).  It is 
perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that a similar state to that in frontal patients occurs after focal 
lesions of the basal ganglia (Bhatia and Marsden, 1994; Laplane and Dubois, 2001; Schmidt et 
al., 2008). I report on such a case in Chapter 4. 
 
In a previous report (Schmidt et al., 2008), 13 patients with apathy (or “auto activation deficit” 
(AAD)) secondary to bilateral striato-pallidal lesions were compared with 13 Parkinson’s 
disease (PD) patients. Though the 2 groups did not differ in their externally instructed grip 
strength or skin conductance responses for monetary rewards, the AAD patients failed to 
differentiate between monetary incentives in their grip strength. The authors concluded that 
bilateral striato-pallidal lesions specifically disconnect motor outputs from the patients’ 
evaluation of potential reward. In the absence of other human studies, we might look to the 
animal literature: Research in animal learning has suggested that a useful framework for 
understanding goal-directed actions might be in terms of how animals value action outcomes 
(Dickinson and Balleine, 1994). From this perspective, obtaining valued rewards is the ultimate 
driver of behavior. But what happens if the system for valuing outcomes no longer operates? 
One consequence might be lack of motivation to act, or apathy. 
 
There is good evidence for such a theory: Lesions of the medial frontal lobe, involving the 
anterior cingulate cortex, affect how much effort rats are willing to invest for rewards 
(Rudebeck et al., 2006; Schweimer and Hauber, 2005; Walton et al., 2002, 2003). Rats are also 
rendered ‘anergic’ – employing less effortful feeding behaviour – by disruption of 
dopaminergic transmission in the nucleus accumbens (Font et al., 2008) or the GABAergic* 
system in the ventral pallidum (Farrar et al., 2008a). Apathy also correlates with the degree of 
atrophy of the nucleus accumbens in patients with PD (Carriere et al., 2014). Moreover, 
functional imaging in healthy humans implicates medial frontal and striatal regions in effort-
based decision making (Croxson et al., 2009), consistent with the view that frontostriatal 
dysfunction might be a key component of apathy in human diseases (Cummings, 1993; Levy 
and Dubois, 2006), specifically by rendering patients unwilling to make efforts for rewards. 
Behavioural support for such a view comes from the finding of impaired Iowa Gambling task 
performance in brain injured patients with apathy (Njomboro et al., 2012) and, similarly in PD 
patients with apathy compared to those without (Martínez-Horta et al., 2014). 
 
These results also point to the possibility that apathy might be susceptible to modulation by 
dopamine (see Section 1.5). However, no previous study has reported on the effects of 
dopaminergic medication on focal basal ganglia lesion patients with apathy. In Chapter 4, I 
discuss the results of attempts to improve the motivational state of a patient who suffered from 
apathy following bilateral ischaemic lesions of the GPi. Internal globus pallidus (GPi) neurons 
have been shown to demonstrate reward-related activity on oculomotor tasks (Hong and 
Hikosaka, 2008; Shin and Sommer, 2010) thus the use of oculomotor tasks to monitor 
impairment and improvement in this case is theoretically and empirically justified. 
 
*GABA  – γ-Amino Butyric Acid 
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1.4.3  Apathy and oculomotor behaviour 
To our knowledge, oculomotor tasks have not previously been used to study apathy in human 
subjects. However, in non-human primates, rewarded behaviour has frequently been studied 
using eye movements. Recordings from the globus pallidus have demonstrated reward-related 
activity when macaque monkeys perform eye movement tasks (Hong and Hikosaka, 2008; Shin 
and Sommer, 2010). Oculomotor paradigms have shed light upon both brain regions and 
neurotransmitters, such as dopamine, that play a key role in making choices and learning from 
their outcomes (Hikosaka, 2007; Hikosaka et al., 2000a; Schultz, 2007, 2002). It is therefore 
proposed that oculomotor tasks are suited to the study and potential modulation of apathy in 
humans. One means of modulating rewarded oculomotor behaviour is through dopaminergic 
medication. 
 
1.5  Dopaminergic roles in rewarded decision-
making 
A wide range of studies has demonstrated that dopamine might play a central role in 
modulating sensitivity to reward (Wise, 2004; Schultz, 2007) with the basal ganglia, medial and 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), often implicated in value-based decision making, forming part of a 
‘reward circuit’ (Haber and Knutson, 2010; Pessiglione et al., 2007). Dopaminergic 
neurotransmission is also integral to two major theories of impulsive personality: Gray’s 
reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (Gray, 1970) and Cloninger’s Psychobiological model of 
personality (Cloninger et al., 1993). Dopaminergic neurons encode reinforcement prediction 
errors (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 1998; Maia, 2009) which are important in many 
reinforcement learning models. Dopaminergic neurotransmission is critical in many parts of the 
CBGTC loops (Alexander et al., 1986). It has been proposed that these loops integrate action 
selection by the basal ganglia with action plans generated in the cortex (Frank, 2005; Mink, 
1996). Correlations are observed between impulsive personality traits and dopamine dependent 
changes in fronto-striatal activity during a working memory task (Cools et al., 2007). Latterly 
more specific roles have been established in effortful decision making, overcoming the cost of 
making efforts to obtain desired goals (Niv et al., 2007; Kurniawan et al., 2011). There is 
increasing evidence that dopaminergically innervated striato-nigro-striatal connections form the 
basis for functionally specific effects of appetitive motivation on cognition. This appetitive 
motivation can induce cognitive improvement or impairment depending upon task demands 
(Aarts et al., 2011).  
 
1.5.1  Dopamine modulates both apathy and impulsivity 
There is strong evidence that dopaminergic medications play a role in the provocation of 
impulse control disorders in patients with Parkinson’s Disease and Restless Leg Syndrome 
((Weintraub, 2009; Cornelius et al., 2010; Voon et al., 2011a; Grosset et al., 2011); see section 1.7). 
Evidence for dopaminergic modulation of apathy is weaker and relies upon limited reports of 
the efficacy of dopamine agonists and other agents which modulate dopamine levels (Roth et 
al., 2007; Ishizaki and Mimura, 2011). We might therefore try to infer further information from 
experiments in the animal literature. 
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1.5.2  Dopamine and reward: evidence from animal experiments 
Both drug effects and lesion studies that target dopaminergic circuitry in animals inform the 
reward literature. Lesions of the medial frontal cortex affect how much effort rats are willing to 
invest for rewards (Rudebeck et al., 2006; Walton et al., 2002, 2003; Schweimer and Hauber, 
2006). Rats are rendered ‘anergic’- employing less effortful feeding behaviour by disruption of 
dopaminergic transmission in the nucleus accumbens  (Farrar et al., 2008a). Receptor specific 
effects and differing effects in high and low baseline performers have also been demonstrated. 
A five choice serial reaction time task was employed to investigate the role of D1 and D2-like 
receptors in rat medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Sulpiride (a D2 receptor antagonist) had no 
effects on task performance, whereas a D1 antagonist and a D1 agonist had opposing effects on 
rats classed as pre-treatment ‘high’ and ‘low’ performers: The antagonist impaired the accuracy 
of attentional performance in baseline high performers (but did not in those animals who 
performed poorly at baseline) whereas the agonist enhanced accuracy in poor baseline 
performers (but did not in the high performers) (Granon et al., 2000). There is evidence, also 
from rat experiments, that this baseline performance is reflective of endogenous, baseline DA 
levels. That is to say that low DA levels accompany poor performance, which is improved by 
DA agonists. High levels of DA are associated with good performance, which is impaired by the 
same agonists (Phillips et al., 2004). Both excessive and insufficient DA levels in the PFC impair 
rat performance in delayed alternation tasks (a measure of spatial working memory) (Zahrt et 
al., 1997). There are, therefore, multiple pieces of evidence for an optimal dopamine “level” for 
various task demands. This lends itself to the so-called “inverted U-shape” relationship 
between subjects’ performance modulated by drugs (Figure 1.6). 
 
1.5.3  Bidirectional effects: evidence from human experiments 
Studies in humans (both healthy volunteers and patients) also suggest that dopaminergic 
modulation can either improve or impair cognitive function, depending upon the task and 
endogenous DA levels in the cortico-striatal circuitry (Cools, 2006). In human subjects 
performing working memory tasks, high baseline performance was impaired by bromocriptine 
(a D2 agonist) whereas those subjects who performed poorly at baseline seemed to improve 
after drug administration (Kimberg et al., 1997). These effects were task specific. It is also 
possible that there was an interaction with training effects. The study did not train the subjects 
prior to the drug/placebo sessions and no analysis of order effects is presented. Moreover, the 
authors admit that their attempts to rule out regression to the mean were not completely 
successful. In the drug effect experiments reported in Chapters 5 and 6, we avoided training 
effects by using a 3-stage protocol, with a training session before subjects took either drug or 
placebo. 
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Figure 1.6 The inverted U-shape relationship between neurotransmitter 
levels and performance. 
Noradrenaline (NA) and dopamine (DA) neurotransmission in the prefrontal cortex and 
executive function. NE and DA in arrows represent increasing levels of stimulation. 
 
  Adapted from (Blier and Briley, 2011) 
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In a study of spatial working memory, beneficial effects of methylphenidate (MPH, see section 
1.5.6 and Chapter 6), which has dopaminergic effects, were greatest in those subjects who had 
lower baseline working memory capacity (Mehta et al., 2000). Similarly, MPH improved 
performance in working memory, visual search and attentional set shifting in children with 
ADHD. However, the working memory effect was most prominent in those with worst baseline 
performance (Mehta et al., 2004). Multiple pieces of experimental evidence therefore point to an 
“inverted-U-shape” function relating DA levels and performance (Arnsten, 1998). In other 
words, there may be an optimal DA level for specific cognitive functions: Too little endogenous 
DA leads to poor performance, which may be improved by medication. Conversely, having DA 
levels further increased might impair those with optimal DA levels at baseline for the same 
cognitive task. 
 
1.5.4  Apathy in PD is modulated by Dopamine 
There is some evidence that apathy improves following dopaminergic therapies. Young, drug-
naïve PD patients were compared to another PD group, recently medicated with dopamine 
agonists, and healthy controls (Bodi et al., 2009). They performed a feedback-based probabilistic 
classification task. Unmedicated patients had selective deficits in reward processing and 
novelty seeking – personality traits associated with apathy (Pluck and Brown, 2002; Shulman, 
2007). Introduction of dopamine agonists ameliorated these deficits but also diminished the 
correlation between punishment processing and harm avoidance in a feedback based 
probabilistic classification task. The authors concluded that this might explain the development 
of impulse control disorders in the PD population, particularly those treated with agonists. Can 
these drugs be used to overcome apathy in other conditions, such as patients with focal basal 
ganglia lesions? 
 
Little consensus exists in the treatment of apathy. A review of the treatment of 7 patients with 
apathy from a variety of underlying causes included almost as many different agents 
(amantadine, amphetamine, bromocriptine, bupropion, methylphenidate, and selegiline) 
(Marin et al., 1995). The commonality between these agents is activity upon dopaminergic 
transmission – either by acting at the receptor or on preventing reuptake. It is widely suggested 
that alterations in dopaminergic neurotransmission are responsible for decision making 
impairments in Parkinson’s disease (e.g. (Cools, 2008)). Furthermore, it is thought that the 
relative preservation of the ventral striatum (compared to the dorsal striatum, which is affected 
early in the disease) in concert with the therapeutic use of levodopa and/or dopaminergic 
agonists leads to the behavioural changes in discussion (Cools, 2006). This theory is supported 
by current knowledge of dopaminergic circuitry, behavioural and neuroimaging experiments in 
both patients and healthy volunteers (Funkiewiez et al., 2006) and is consistent with 
computational models which explain performance in some tasks (e.g. (Frank et al., 2007)). 
Performance is poor in those with low endogenous levels, and therefore increasing availability 
might improve the task outcome. However, supplementation of already optimal performers 
causes deterioration in performance.  
 
In chapters 5 and 6, I investigate the effects of two drugs known to have dopaminergic effects – 
levodopa (L-dopa) and methylphenidate (MPH). 
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1.5.5  The cognitive effects of levodopa (L-dopa) 
Levodopa is the laevo optical stereoisomer of the L-configurational form of dopa and is used for 
the symptomatic treatment of Parkinson’s disease (Brogden et al., 1971). Though cognitive 
effects of dopaminergic modulation have been recognised experimentally (Cools et al., 2002; 
Dolan et al., 1995; Goldman-Rakic et al., 2004), cognitive effects have not been the main 
treatment aim of dopaminergic drugs in Parkinson’s disease where levodopa is primarily used 
to treat motor symptoms of the disorder. Nevertheless, there are well-recognised cognitive and 
psychiatric effects (Choi et al., 2000; Molloy et al., 2006). Furthermore, levodopa has been 
implicated in development of impulse control disorders in Parkinson’s patients (Weintraub et 
al., 2010; Grosset et al., 2011; Voon et al., 2011c). This suggests that levodopa can modulate 
decision-making. That suggestion is supported by experiments which demonstrate changes in 
risk evaluation in healthy volunteers (Pessiglione et al., 2006; Pleger et al., 2009) and reward-
based decision making in patients (Graef et al., 2010).  
 
1.5.5.1  L-dopa effects upon reward learning 
Human experiments using behavioural tasks and fMRI have begun to reveal the extent of L-
dopa’s wide-ranging effects. These include “bottom-up” effects upon low-level somatosensory 
decisions (Pleger et al., 2009). L-dopa enhanced the effects of higher anticipated reward, which 
then improved tactile decisions, in contrast to Haloperidol (a DA antagonist), which impaired 
task performance. These reward and DA effects correlated with changes in striatal and 
orbitofrontal BOLD signal, demonstrating a clear association between drug administration, task 
dependent learning and corticostriatal circuitry. L-dopa appears to enhance reward expectation 
e.g. (Sharot et al., 2009) and can restore reward prediction errors, which decline with age 
(Chowdhury et al., 2013). It also increases preference for earlier rewards, increasing temporal 
discounting, for example (Pine et al., 2010). This demonstrates evidence for dopamine 
enhancing temporal impulsiveness. Notably, L-dopa had no effect upon the time taken to decide 
in these studies. However, in a study in healthy volunteers which used repeated dosing of L-dopa 
for 5 days, it was found that L-dopa led to enhanced speed, overall success and long term 
retention of novel word learning, in a dose-dependent manner (Knecht et al., 2004). Novel word 
learning was faster in subjects who had received L-dopa than those who had received placebo. 
Remarkably, the L-dopa induced improvements in word learning were maintained 1 month 
after the study. L-dopa has also been associated with more frequent choice of a high-probability 
gain choice compared to haloperidol (Pessiglione et al., 2006). There was no effect on the 
frequency of choosing a low probability loss. This meant that L-dopa treated subjects won more 
money in the task overall. The drug induced behavioural differences were correlated with 
changes in BOLD response of opposing direction in the striatum, suggesting it as an anatomical 
substrate for the L-dopa induced heightened reward sensitivity. 
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1.5.5.2  L-dopa effects upon risk, time perception, reaction times and 
saccades 
In addition to learning to associate optimal saccadic performance with reward, the oculomotor 
tasks in this thesis require subject assessment of risk, optimal time perception and saccadic 
performance. What is known of L-dopa effects upon these parameters? 
 
In the only reported study of risk found, L-dopa had no effect on subject’s risk evaluation. The 
authors propose that the main dopaminergic effect upon decision-making is therefore through 
modulation of the response to reward (Symmonds et al., 2013). There is evidence to suggest that 
the role of the basal ganglia in producing internal representations of time is dopaminergically 
mediated (Rammsayer, 1993) by regulation of an internal ‘pacemaker’ (Buhusi and Meck, 2002). 
L-dopa reduced variance in the responses and shortened latencies in a key press task (Rihet et 
al., 2002). L-dopa has also been found to affect time interval estimation - lengthening estimates 
in the ‘seconds’ range without changing reaction time (Rakitin et al., 2011). One study in healthy 
volunteers found fewer correct anti-saccades following L-dopa administration, but no effects on 
reflexive saccades (Duka and Lupp, 1997). The authors noted that this effect was directly 
opposed to the effect of incentive (monetary reward) on the task, which increased accuracy.  
 
There is more extensive evidence of L-dopa effects in the patient literature. Electro-oculographic 
data demonstrated improved saccade amplitudes following a single dose of L-dopa given to PD 
patients but no significant changes in latency (Rascol et al., 1989). A more recent study has 
found that L-dopa slowed reactive saccades (pro-saccades) in a PD patient population (Michell 
et al., 2006) compared to baseline measurements ‘off drug’. This effect was not uniformly 
present in all patients, and the group effect appears to have been driven by a few individual 
responses. Another group have replicated this finding, however, and also found that L-dopa (at 
the patient’s usual doses) improved the accuracy (reduced the error rate) of voluntary anti-
saccades (Hood et al., 2007). 
 
1.5.5.3  L-dopa and cognition in Parkinson’s Disease 
In the PD patient population, there is a large degree of inter-individual variability in the 
response of cognitive symptoms to L-dopa. The cognitive effects of dopaminergic drugs in PD 
are both task specific and vary with motor “on”/”off” states (Leroi et al., 2013). L-dopa 
withdrawal studies have demonstrated that the drug improves cognition (on a conditional 
associative learning task) in some patients, but causes deterioration in others (Gotham et al., 
1988). Consistent with the inverted U-shape hypothesis (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011), patients 
who performed particularly poorly off the drug gained the most benefit from L-dopa, whereas 
those who performed well off drug were impaired by its administration. This and similar 
findings have lead to the so-called “Dopamine overdose” hypothesis ((Kwak et al., 2010; 
Colzato et al., 2012; Cilia, 2012) Figure 1.7). This suggests that the doses of L-dopa required to 
replace endogenous neurotransmitter in damaged brain areas lead to an overdose of other 
(intact) brain areas (Gotham et al., 1988; Swainson et al., 2000; Cools et al., 2001; Frank et al., 
2004; Frank, 2005; Cools et al., 2006; Cools, 2006). 
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Figure 1.7 Dopaminergic Effects in Healthy Patients and PD patients 
 
(A) Physiological effects of tonic and phasic dopamine release on cortical connections with 
the direct and indirect pathways of the basal ganglia in healthy subjects. In a majority 
of the patients with PD, dopaminergic depletion decreases tonic D2-receptor 
stimulation in the ventral striatum/Nacc. 
 
(B) In a minority of susceptible patients, a constitutionally increased tonic dopamine level 
leads to relatively normal levels of tonic D2-receptor stimulation in the ventral 
striatum/Nacc. Dopamine agonists may further increase D2-receptor stimulation 
possibly leading to an ‘overdose’ situation, where a hampered engagement of top–
down inhibitory control cortical areas and increased influence of bottom–up appetitive 
drive areas predispose to behavioral disturbances. 
 
Abbreviations: GPe, external globus pallidum; GPi, internal globus pallidum; Nacc, nucleus accumbens; 
vmTha, ventro-medial thalamus; VTA, ventral tegmental area. Adapted from (Cilia and van Eimeren, 
2011) 
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An alternate theory is a “Dopamine denervation” model: De novo (drug naive) patients seem to 
respond well, cognitively, to the introduction of L-dopa. In contrast, stable L-dopa medicated 
patients obtain no benefit. Furthermore, those patients already experiencing “on/off” (motor) 
fluctuations seem to be cognitively impaired by an acute L-dopa challenge (Kulisevsky J., 2000). 
This variation in response to L-dopa may be due to enhanced sensitivity to alterations in plasma 
concentrations of L-dopa – possibly due to reduced storage, reuptake and regulated release 
mechanisms. Chronic L-dopa administration might thereby lead to ‘supersensitivity’ of striatal 
neurons to a dopaminergic stimulus. L-dopa cognitive effects are therefore not straightforward 
and may have opposing effects both between individuals and within individuals on different 
tasks. These cognitive effects may also vary in an individual over time as a result of both disease 
progression (Williams-Gray et al., 2009) and receptor changes due to prolonged drug 
administration (Antonini et al., 1997). 
 
1.5.6  The cognitive effects of Methylphenidate (MPH) 
MPH is approved for the treatment of attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), where it 
is used to reduce impulsivity. It has also been demonstrated to reduce disinhibition in 
frontotemporal dementia (Rahman et al., 2006). In contrast, MPH has otherwise been used to 
increase motivation in the treatment of apathy (Marin et al., 1995; Galynker et al., 1997; Jansen et 
al., 2001; Hardy, 2009) and has become one of a handful of drugs taken as ‘cognitive enhancers’ 
by whose who are medically well (Husain and Mehta, 2011; Repantis et al., 2010; Swanson and 
Volkow, 2008). Whether MPH improves performance when endogenous neurotransmitter 
levels are optimal, or if its use is better restricted to those with abnormal baseline levels, 
remains unclear. 
 
Much evidence of the cognitive effects of MPH comes from the ADHD literature, where 
speeding and attentional effects are common (Knights, 1969; Sprague et al., 1970). 
Improvements in higher level cognition (such as decision-making) are less certain (Adams, 
1982; Advokat, 2010; DeVito et al., 2008a; Swanson et al., 2010). Persistent abnormal regional 
cerebral blood flow in the brains of ADHD patients treated with MPH (Schweitzer et al., 2004) 
supports the absence of higher level cognitive effect. Several studies, however, suggest that 
MPH can improve decision-making in ADHD. Children and adults showed improvements in 
executive function and neuropsychological test performance, respectively (Riordan et al., 1999). 
MPH led to a reduction in risk-prone betting, and improved performance, in the Cambridge 
Gambling Task (CGT) (DeVito et al., 2008b). MPH also improved time discrimination (Rubia et 
al., 2009) - highly relevant for the speeded tasks described in this thesis. 
 
Such improvements in ADHD might be due to up-regulation of an hypofunctional anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC (Bush et al., 2008)), an area implicated in risk-evaluation in healthy 
volunteers (Christopoulos et al., 2009). Similarly, MPH has been shown to restore the 
(previously hypoactive) ACC of cocaine addicted patients to normal levels of BOLD activity in a 
salient cognitive task (Goldstein et al., 2010). The normalised imaging findings were associated 
with reduced errors of commission and improved task accuracy. Other studies show that 
ADHD patients demonstrate similar slowing of SSRT to that seen in lesions of the right inferior 
frontal cortex. This impairment is also ameliorated by MPH (Aron et al., 2003). Whether these 
 52 
effects are due to improvement of a system that is impaired at baseline, or can be replicated in 
healthy volunteers remains to be determined. 
 
1.5.6.1 MPH effects upon decision-making in healthy human subjects 
A review and meta-analysis of 46 studies of MPH looked for effects upon motivation, 
wakefulness, attention and vigilance (Repantis et al., 2010). It found no consistent evidence for 
any “neuroenhancing” effect of MPH. As in ADHD, beneficial effects of MPH are reported in 
both reaction-time and response inhibition tasks: “Low-level“ effects such as speeding of simple 
reaction time are reported – particularly for more complex responses (Fitzpatrick et al., 1988; 
Naylor et al., 1985) - perhaps due to effects on attention (Camp-Bruno and Herting, 1994). MPH 
increases digit span but had no effect upon decision-making (Agay et al., 2010). However, 
performance improvement has been demonstrated in tasks sensitive to frontal lobe damage 
(Elliott et al., 1997). Go-trial reaction time was reduced by MPH in a stop-signal reaction time 
(SSRT) task (Eagle et al., 2007) without changes in the SSRT or error rate. However, an fMRI 
study using two versions of the stop-signal task found that MPH improved inhibitory 
performance (Pauls et al., 2012) in association with reduced activation of regions within the 
right inferior frontal gyrus/insula.  An imaging study suggests that MPH exerts (dopaminergic) 
effects on the speed of processing of uncertainty but failed to demonstrate any influence over the  
choice outcome in decision-making tasks (Schlösser et al., 2009).  
 
1.5.6.2  MPH effects upon reward learning in animals and humans 
demonstrate task-dependence and an inverted U-shaped relationship 
This inconsistency in effects may reflect the existence of an optimal dopamine “level” for 
particular tasks. Rats demonstrated improved overall attention, in a 5 choice serial reaction time 
task, with methylphenidate but the highest dose also increased impulsivity (Navarra et al., 2008). 
In contrast, reduced impulsivity was found following MPH administration in a delayed reward 
task. There is also evidence of dose-and baseline performance-dependent effects in rats: In a 
stop-signal task, MPH led to both a reduction in the go-trial reaction time and differential 
effects dependent upon baseline SSRT (Eagle et al., 2007): MPH decreased SSRT in slow 
responders but increased SSRT in fast responders – consistent with the “optimal DA” level or 
“inverted U-shaped” hypothesis (Figure 1.6). Non-human primates demonstrate similar effects 
(Gamo et al., 2010). Optimal doses of MPH improved spatial working memory in monkeys 
whereas excessive doses did not. Dose-dependent effects are also found in oculomotor delayed 
response tasks sensitive to working memory, impulsivity, response accuracy, precision and 
attentional performance (Rajala et al., 2012). In humans, this inverted U-shape relationship 
between cognitive performance and dopaminergic activity in frontostriatal circuits has been 
investigated using [11C]-raclopride labelled PET imaging (Clatworthy et al., 2009).  Performance 
on a reversal-learning task was predicted by the MPH-induced change in D2/D3 receptor 
availability in the post-commisural caudate. Spatial working memory task performance related 
to similar changes in the ventral striatum. Reversal-learning performance was predicted by 
subject trait impulsivity (BIS-11 score): The most impulsive individuals benefitted most from 
the drug. 
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1.5.6.3  MPH effects upon eye movements 
When administered to boys with ADHD, MPH was found to reduce both pro- and anti-saccadic 
reaction times, error correction times and the proportion of direction errors in an anti-saccade 
task (Klein et al., 2002). A study using oculomotor tasks in ADHD patients found that MPH 
improved performance in both motor planning and response inhibition (O’Driscoll et al., 2005). 
Given the paradoxical effects of stimulant medications in ADHD (Robbins and Sahakian, 1979), 
these results must be interpreted with caution. No saccadic or other eye movement effects of 
MPH upon healthy volunteers are reported to date.  
 
1.5.6.4  Summary 
Both L-dopa and MPH have been demonstrated to show task and subject dependent effects on 
rewarded behaviour. Some of these effects are dependent upon baseline performance and show 
an “inverted U-shape” relationship: Poor baseline performance is improved but optimal 
performance is worsened by drug administration. Both drugs have varying effects upon time 
estimation and reaction time, both of which are important in the tasks performed in the 
experiments described in chapters 5 and 6.  
 
1.6 The effects of Age upon rewarded decision-making 
Healthy aging brings about many changes in cognition (Cabeza et al., 2004) reflected in altered 
structure, function and biochemistry (Marschner et al., 2005; Alichniewicz et al., 2013) that 
generally cause slowing of cognitive performance (Der and Deary, 2006; Verhaeghen and 
Salthouse, 1997). Specific mechanisms of cognitive aging and their impacts upon impulsivity 
and decision-making are uncertain (Brown and Ridderinkhof, 2009; Deary et al., 2009; Mohr et 
al., 2010) but age-related decrements in performance on a variety of attention-related tasks, 
including sustained attention, selective attention, and inhibition tasks have been shown 
(Heuninckx et al., 2005; Mani et al., 2005; Wu and Hallett, 2005; Voelcker-Rehage and Alberts, 
2007). These changes have led to the development of a “frontal aging hypothesis” (Isella et al., 
2008), driven by dopaminergic (and serotonergic) changes in the aging brain accompanied by 
structural change in the striatum and prefrontal cortex (PFC, (Marschner et al., 2005)). Some 
experiments demonstrate that risk-taking behaviour in healthy volunteers changes with age 
(Deakin et al., 2004) and that the ability to make profitable choices declines in some older people 
(Denburg et al., 2005, 2007). Increased risk aversion can appear to specifically contribute to 
poorer decision-making (Boyle et al., 2012), but may otherwise reflect a more global cognitive 
decline (Albert and Duffy, 2012). Both increased risk seeking and risk aversion are found in older 
adults, depending upon the task design employed (Mather et al., 2012). 
 
1.6.1  Age alters dopaminergic function in frontostriatal circuitry, 
leading to changes in reward-motivated behaviours 
Theories of declining cognition implicate reduced dopaminergic activity in frontostriatal 
networks with age (Bäckman et al., 2006, 2010; Erixon-Lindroth et al., 2005; Kaasinen and Rinne, 
2002; Kaasinen et al., 2000; Klostermann et al., 2012; Li et al., 2010). One proposed mechanism 
for the “rise and fall” in optimal decision making ability with age is that the development of 
dopaminergic frontal inhibitory control (particularly by the PFC) which occurs during 
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adolescence is selectively impaired by the aging process (Braver et al., 2001). Younger subjects 
tend to outperform older ones in tasks requiring a high degree of frontal cortical activity. 
However, there is evidence that older subjects recruit other brain regions to replace these age-
related frontal deficiencies (Park et al., 2001). Interpretation is not straightforward: younger 
subjects may use different strengths (e.g. learning and memory) to older subjects (who may 
more accurately represent valence) in order to achieve similar task outcomes (Wood et al., 
2005). Apparent decision-making differences may be attributed changes in processing speed 
and memory rather than changes in risk/reward sensitivity (Henninger et al., 2010) and some 
authors report age-related changes in bias-susceptibility rather than decision-making ability per 
se (Kovalchik et al., 2005). 
 
In a study of probabilistic reward-based stimulus association tasks, the older group showed 
poorer overall acquisition and impaired reversal learning (Weiler et al., 2008). Older subjects 
also required greater reward magnitudes to exhibit steep learning curves. There is increasing 
evidence that specific frontal D2 and D3 dopaminergic degeneration leads to these changes in 
reward sensitivity (Volkow et al., 1996, 2000; Kaasinen et al., 2000).  Functional imaging during 
a slot machine task demonstrated a correlation between midbrain dopamine synthesis and 
reward-related pre-frontal activity (Dreher et al., 2008). There was an age-related change in the 
direction of the relationship, from a positive to a negative correlation. Furthermore, dopamine 
(L-dopa) has been shown to restore reward prediction errors to youthful levels in healthy older 
volunteers (Chowdhury et al., 2013). Recent experiments suggest that there are age-related 
differences in fronto-striatal representations of prediction errors as opposed to reward outcome 
(Samanez-Larkin et al., 2014). 
 
There is also evidence for specific subcortical differences in aging and reward. Using a Go/Nogo 
task, correlations between MRI volumetric measures in the caudate and putamen/globus 
pallidus (PGp) and age have been demonstrated (Langenecker et al., 2007). Multiple task 
performance measures correlated with activation in the left PGp, thereby implicating this 
structure in mediating age related task performance differences. Similarly, in another response 
inhibition task (Coxon et al., 2012), functional anisotropy demonstrated that cortico-subthalamic 
(preSMA-STN)  connection strength predicted stopping performance, thereby linking an age-
related decline in in inhibitory control with structural decline in STN projections. 
 
1.6.2  Are older people more or less impulsive or just apathetic? 
Poorer IGT and antisaccade task performance suggests that frontostriatal networks work less 
effectively in older people (Olincy et al., 1997; Butler et al., 1999; Fein et al., 2007) and implicates 
aging of this system (Raemaekers et al., 2006) in the impaired inhibition of action (Sweeney et 
al., 2001). Conversely, improving antisaccade task performance is attributed to frontal lobe 
development during adolescence (Munoz et al., 1998). As a result, older adults are more 
susceptible to oculomotor capture and exhibit deficient selective suppression of the responses 
captured by the task irrelevant distracters in a saccadic task (Ridderinkhof and Wijnen, 2011). 
These changes in frontal executive function would lead us to expect impulsivity to increase with 
age. However, a study in older people found that “stimulation seeking” decreased with age 
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(Giambra et al., 1992). Age-related reductions in delay discounting have also been related to 
lower ventral striatal activations to immediate reward using fMRI (Eppinger et al., 2012). 
 
Reaction time studies demonstrate that older subjects have a preference for accuracy over speed 
(Rabbitt, 1979; Welford, 1988; Smith and Brewer, 1995). Behavioural task success requires 
anticipation of actions that need to be executed - a capacity that specifically appears to be 
negatively affected by aging (Falkenstein et al., 2006; Roggeveen et al., 2007; Sterr and Dean, 
2008). This may be, in part, due to changes in motivation. Apathy is common in aging and 
manifests as lack of interest and initiative, and emotional blunting (Ishii et al., 2009; Brodaty et 
al., 2010; Esposito et al., 2014). Nevertheless, there is an association with cognitive impairment 
(Starkstein et al., 2006; Onyike et al., 2007) which suggests that apathy should not always be 
considered a ‘normal’ part of aging. Moreover, a recent study suggests that, rather than apathy, 
age may cause a specific deficit in the acquisition of goal-directed action (Wit et al., 2014). 
 
1.6.3  Age affects saccadic performance 
Though robust compared to other motor measures (Pratt et al., 2006), SRT increases above 50 
years of age (Irving et al., 2006; Pitt and Rawles, 2009) with an associated increase in variability 
in latency (Abel and Douglas, 2007), reduced velocity and accuracy (Schik et al., 2000; Sharpe 
and Zackon, 2009). Older participants are more susceptible to saccade disruption than young 
adults (Gottlob et al., 2007) and exhibit more hypometric and multi-step saccades (Litvinova et 
al., 2011), rendering their responses less reliable. Voluntary (as opposed to reflexive) saccades 
seem particularly vulnerable to the effects of age (Peltsch et al., 2011). A “global slowing” 
phenomenon (Golob et al., 2009) is manifest in differences in “gap” effect saccade latency 
benefit (Pratt et al., 1997): Though the absolute benefit is reduced in older people, it is of a similar 
proportion of the saccade latency when compared with younger individuals  suggesting that 
though overall processing is slowed, the fundamental mechanisms of saccade 
production/inhibition are intact. 
 
In Chapter 2, I introduce a novel, rewarded oculomotor task in which subjects must make 
speeded oculomotor decisions under risk for reward. I compare the performance of young 
healthy volunteers with an older group. This older group later serves as an age-matched control 
group for patients with Parkinson’s Disease. 
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1.7 Parkinson’s Disease is associated with apathy and 
impulsivity 
Parkinson’s disease (PD) is associated with degeneration of the dopaminergic neurons in the 
substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) and the surrounding area (Braak et al., 2003). This  leads to 
a triad of movement abnormalities (tremor, rigidity and bradykinesia (Parkinson, 2002)) and 
various effects upon cognition and mood (Aarsland et al., 2009a, 2009b; Burn et al., 2014; 
Weintraub and Burn, 2011). Parkinson’s Disease (PD) is associated with both apathy (Starkstein 
et al., 1992; Isella et al., 2002; Robert et al., 2002; Pluck and Brown, 2002; Dujardin et al., 2007) 
and impulsivity (Nombela et al., 2014; Voon et al., 2011a; Weintraub and Nirenberg, 2012; 
Weintraub et al., 2010). Dopaminergic dysfunction has been proposed as the origin of this 
aberrant motivated behaviour (Volkmann et al., 2010; Voon et al., 2011d). In some PD patients, 
impulse control disorders develop, including pathological gambling (Avanzi et al., 2006; Driver-
Dunckley et al., 2003; Gallagher et al., 2007; Molina et al., 2000; Voon et al., 2011a; Weintraub et 
al., 2010). This propensity may reflect a gradient pattern of dorso-ventral striatal degeneration 
and/or differential dopaminergic treatment effects upon those structures (Lawrence et al., 2013; 
Macdonald and Monchi, 2011; Steeves et al., 2009). It is proposed that impulsivity may reflect 
excessive dopaminergic transmission while apathy is reflective of reduced corticostriatal 
dopaminergic activity. The situation is clearly more complex/multidimensional than this (Sinha 
et al., 2013a) but it is a useful starting point. Parkinson’s is a useful model for the development 
of the ideas in this thesis for a number of reasons: 
 
1. Parkinson’s patients often demonstrate apathy (Oguru et al., 2010). 
2. Some PD patients may otherwise develop problems with impulse control (Voon et al., 
2011c), leading to impulse control disorders (ICDs) 
3. PD disrupts the corticostriatal networks which are implicated in the pathophysiology of 
both of these constructs (Balleine et al., 2007). 
4. “Orbitofrontal” and “cingulate” striatofrontal loops and the mesolimbic dopaminergic 
system that modulates their function are implicated in motivation and sensitivity to 
reinforcement in animals. Parkinson’s disease (PD) provides a model to assess the implications 
of damage to these structures in humans in humans (Czernecki et al., 2008) . 
 
1.7.1  Disordered Decision-Making occurs in PD 
Cognitive deficits are a recognised consequence of PD (Burn et al., 2014), even early in the 
disease and in younger patients (Aarsland et al., 2003; Collins, 1998; Lewis et al., 2003). PD 
causes similar disorders of executive function to frontal lobe brain lesions (Rogers et al., 1998; 
Taylor et al., 1986). Executive dysfunction in non-demented PD patients may impair decision-
making and/or change patients’ risk sensitivity (Robbins and Cools, 2014). PD patients are less 
able to make profitable choices in the Iowa Gambling Task (Mimura et al., 2006), and are 
impaired on the Game of Dice Task, another measure of decision-making under risk (Brand et 
al., 2004). 
 
Both PD and the drugs used in its treatment may contribute to impulsive behaviour. A screen 
for ICDs, impulsivity and compulsive behaviours in a large cohort of PD patients before 
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initiating dopamine replacement therapy showed that a significant proportion of PD patients 
demonstrated ICDs (Antonini et al., 2011). These patients had higher Attentional Impulsiveness 
(AI) compared to ICD subjects (without PD) on the BIS-11. In treated and untreated PD patients, 
those with ICDs demonstrated found higher “motor impulsiveness” and total BIS-11 scores 
(Bentivoglio et al., 2013). There was also a trend toward worsened performance in the PD-ICD 
group on neuropsychological tasks sensitive to frontal lobe dysfunction. However, some 
evidence suggests that IGT performance deficits emerge only following treatment with 
dopamine agonists (Poletti et al., 2010). Subsequent overstimulation of orbito-fronto-striatal 
networks may disrupt reward processing and harm avoidance (and hence decision-making) 
such that impulse control disorders occur (Brand et al., 2004, 2005). 
 
Impulsiveness in PD patients (without diagnosed ICDs) has been attributed to four principal 
factors (Nombela et al., 2014): 1. Tests of response conflict, interference and self-assessment of 
impulsive behaviours on the Barratt Impulsivity Scale; 2. Tests of motor inhibitory control, and 
the self-report behavioural approach system; 3. Time estimation and delay aversion; 4. 
Reflection in hypothetical scenarios including temporal discounting. 
 
1.7.2  Dopaminergic effects upon decision-making in PD relate to a 
dorso-ventral gradient of degeneration 
Cognitive effects of PD have been shown to relate to altered dopaminergic function within basal 
ganglia structures and frontal cortex (Rinne et al., 2000; Sawamoto et al., 2008). Investigators 
have shown both 1) improvement in some cognitively demanding tasks and 2) impaired task 
performance in other kinds of test when comparing PD patients on and off dopaminergic 
medication (Cools et al., 2003). In particular, it seems that DA strengthens associations between 
reward processing and novelty seeking but disrupts the links between punishment processing 
and harm avoidance (Frank et al., 2004; Bodi et al., 2009). The ventral striatum is critical in 
effecting the impulsive and apathetic behaviours due to high and low dopaminergic levels 
(Dagher and Robbins, 2009) (Table 1.2). In early PD, there is greater dopaminergic loss in the 
dorsal striatum than in ventral areas (Kish et al., 1988). Clinically effective dopaminergic 
therapy for the dorsal striatum may therefore “overtreat” the relatively intact ventral striatum 
and cause cognitive side effects (Gotham et al., 1988). This may be due to sensitized D2/D3 
receptors in the striatum (Evans et al., 2006; Steeves et al., 2009) and/or decreased dopamine 
transporter availability (Cilia et al., 2010, 2011). PD patients with Impulse Control Disorders 
(ICD) seem to overvalue immediate rewards despite intact reward learning (Housden et al., 
2010). Functional imaging studies suggest that this is due to altered striatal activation and 
corticostriatal connectivity (Rao et al., 2010; Voon et al., 2010). 
 
 
In Chapter 7, I investigate the oculomotor decision making in patients with PD with and 
without ICD. 
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Cortical Origin of the 
Cortico-Striatal Loop 
Striatal Region Effect of 
Low Dopamine 
Effect of 
High Dopamine 
Primary Motor putamen bradykinesia, 
clumsiness 
dyskinesia 
Accessory Motor rostral putamen Akinesia stereotypies, tics 
Limbic ventral 
striatum 
“Parkinsonian 
personality,” mental 
rigidity, neophobia 
“addictive 
personality,” 
impulsivity, 
novelty seeking, 
impaired reversal 
learning 
Prefrontal caudate Dysexecutive 
syndrome, impaired 
planning, working 
memory and cognitive 
flexibility 
Compulsive 
disorders, punding 
 
Table 1.2  Possible Site of Striatal Dopamine Dysfunction Causing 
Different Motor and Cognitive Symptoms in Parkinson’s Disease 
 
(This model ignores cortical dopaminergic dysfunction in PD, for simplicity.) 
 
 Adapted from (Dagher and Robbins, 2009). 
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1.7.3  Dopaminergic agents increase risk taking in PD 
Treatment with dopamine agonists (DAg) is the main risk factor for impulse control disorders 
(ICDs) in PD (Driver-Dunckley et al., 2003; Grosset et al., 2006; Voon et al., 2006; Weintraub, 
2006). Pramipexole (a DAg) causes altered orbitofrontal fMRI BOLD activity in association with 
increased risk taking (van Eimeren et al., 2009). Differential effects of apomorphine (a DAg) on 
corticobasal ganglia circuitry have been demonstrated in patients with PD with and without 
ICDs (van Eimeren et al., 2010). H215O PET during a card selection game with probabilistic 
feedback performed both on and off medication found that the direction of change in brain 
activity differed in lateral OFC, rostral cingulate, amygdala and external pallidum. DAg reduced 
activity in PD gamblers whereas DAg increased activity in the same areas in PD controls. 
 
L-dopa therapy may also influence ICD development independently (Weintraub et al., 2010) 
but this is less reliably demonstrated (Grosset et al., 2011). For example, withdrawal of L-dopa 
impaired performance on tests previously shown to be sensitive to frontal lobe dysfunction 
(Lange et al., 1992) but the drug worsened rewarded decision making in the Cambridge 
Gambling Task (CGT) (Torta et al., 2009). PD patients were unable to choose an optimal betting 
strategy and were impulsive in their choices relative to the control group. There was a 
detrimental, dose-dependent, effect of dopaminergic drugs including L-dopa. This is in contrast 
to other tasks, for example a probabilistic learning task, in which dopaminergic medications 
improved (previously impaired) PD patients’ abilities to predict stimulus-action-reward 
relations (van Wouwe et al., 2012). 
 
1.7.4  Parkinson’s Disease has effects upon saccades that reflect 
cognition 
PD causes hypometric, slow saccades with long onset latencies (Corin et al., 1972; DeJong and 
Jones, 1971; Jones and DeJong, 1971; Shibasaki et al., 1979; Teräväinen and Calne, 1980; Shimizu 
et al., 1981; White et al., 1983; Vidailhet et al., 1994; Jankovic, 2008). Reflexive saccades are 
relatively spared from impairment (White et al., 1983; Rascol et al., 1989; Vidailhet et al., 1994; 
Briand et al., 1999), but there are exceptions that also demonstrate increased latency (Bronstein 
and Kennard, 1985; Shibasaki et al., 1979). Latencies correlate with (diminished) executive 
function rather than motor severity (Perneczky et al., 2011). In reports of oculomotor prepotent 
response inhibition, latencies of antisaccades (AS) are increased and PD patients commit more 
pro-saccadic errors (Briand et al., 1999; Chan et al., 2005; Kitagawa et al., 1994; Lueck et al., 1990; 
White et al., 1983). 
 
With regard to anticipatory responding, PD patients made more ‘express saccades’ of latency 
90-140ms in one study (Chan et al., 2005). However, another found that patients were less likely 
to make anticipatory saccades (Bronstein and Kennard, 1985). The earlier finding was thought to 
be due to their over-reliance on visual input. In a study of manual and saccadic responses, the 
authors concluded that, though capable of predictive hand and eye movements, PD patients tend 
to avoid them due to greater inaccuracy (Crawford et al., 1989). Motivational incentives have 
been shown to improve antisaccade performance to a similar degree in PD patients, age 
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matched controls and younger patients, despite the PD patients having relatively poor baseline 
performance (Harsay et al., 2010). 
 
1.7.5  Summary 
In Parkinson’s disease, both the disease and its treatment affect rewarded decision-making. 
Degeneration along a dorsoventral gradient in the striatum may partly explain these 
contributions, which are both task and dose dependent. Correlations between saccadic 
performance and executive function in PD suggest that oculomotor performance is independent 
of motor deterioration. This is explored in Chapter 7, where PD patients with and without ICDs 
are compared with pathological gamblers and age matched controls. 
 
1.8  Pathological Gambling in otherwise healthy 
people may result from different mechanisms. 
Pathological Gambling (PG) is recognised as a problem for both individuals and society. Studies 
demonstrate a lifetime prevalence of up to 2% (Cox et al., 2005; Welte et al., 2002). Diminished 
cognitive control and increased impulsivity are present in problem gamblers compared to 
healthy controls (Goudriaan et al., 2014). Increased impulsivity is demonstrated on measures of 
self-report such as the BIS-11 and Eysenck’s Impulsiveness Questionnaire (Eysenck et al., 1985) 
and in behavioural measures such as delay discounting, response inhibition and cognitive 
interference tasks (Goudriaan et al., 2004; Verdejo-García et al., 2008; van Holst et al., 2010). 
However, research to date has failed to explore the differential effects of functional and 
dysfunctional impulsivity in gambling (Maccallum et al., 2007). Furthermore, PG has been 
otherwise conceived as a primary problem with addiction (Clark, 2010). This allies the 
pathology with that of substance use disorders where impulsivity is also found to be important 
(Leeman and Potenza, 2012) but also suggests that there may be different mechanisms for the 
impulse control disorder than in PD-ICD. 
 
Dopaminergic activity contributes to the rewarding effects of addictive substances (Schultz, 
2011), gambling behaviours (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2011) and impulsivity (Buckholtz et 
al., 2010). Proposed biochemical dysfunctions in PG implicate altered responses to 
dopaminergic activity in the ventral striatum (Linnet et al., 2011, 2012). Such findings support 
the hypothesis of a “reward deficiency syndrome” wherein gamblers persistently seek reward 
due to a tonically underactive dopaminergic reward system (Blum et al., 2000) which is also 
under-responsive to rewards when obtained (Reuter et al., 2005). This contrasts to theories of 
ICD in PD, where excessive dopaminergic states (with overtreatment of a relatively spared 
ventral striatum) are blamed for impulsive decision making (MacDonald and Monchi, 2011; 
Leeman and Potenza, 2012; Vriend et al., 2014). 
 
1.8.1  Cognitive control and impulsivity in Pathological Gambling 
Only seven specific neuropsychological experimental reports involving gamblers were found 
by a 2004 review (Goudriaan et al., 2004). Gamblers show poor performance on simple tests like 
the Wisconsin card sorting task, embedded figures task and Porteus mazes (Rugle and 
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Melamed, 1993), suggesting deficits in planning and attention. Experiments since that review 
have demonstrated that pathological gamblers performed poorly in tasks requiring inhibition, 
time estimation, cognitive flexibility and planning (Goudriaan et al., 2006a). As a result of these 
deficits, gamblers exhibit poor decision-making: Delay discounting, probability discounting and 
decision-making impairment on the IGT are consistently found to be impaired in PG (Petry, 
2001; Cavedini et al., 2002; Alessi and Petry, 2003; Goudriaan et al., 2005, 2006b; Kertzman et al., 
2011; Wiehler and Peters, 2014). 
  
Behavioural investigation of pathological gamblers under time pressure has focused on tasks of 
prepotent response inhibition, such as stop-signal reaction time (Lipszyc and Schachar, 2010) 
and Go/Nogo tasks (Kertzman et al., 2008): A (poorly controlled) study found that pathological 
gamblers’ performance was impaired versus other groups in a stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) 
task (Odlaug et al., 2011). Gamblers had slower response latencies on “go” trials and made 
more errors on a cognitive flexibility task. The major confound in this study was that subjects in 
the pathological gambling group were significantly older than controls. This may account for 
some (or all) of the differences found. A better controlled study using both SSRT and delay-
discounting tasks found greater delay-discounting in all gamblers, but SSRT impairment only in 
the most severely affected (Brevers et al., 2012). Another study found no relationship between 
the impaired IGT performance of gamblers and their Stroop or Go/Nogo performance, 
suggesting that PG is not due to failure of inhibition (Kertzman et al., 2011).  
 
1.8.2  Pathological Gambling has both corticostriatal lesion and 
imaging correlates 
Similarities between IGT performance in PG groups and those with vmPFC lesions suggest a 
role for pathophysiology in this brain area in the development of PG (Cavedini et al., 2002). This 
is supported by imaging and lesion studies in patients: Substance abusers with and without 
gambling problems were compared with healthy volunteers performing the IGT.  Reduced 
fMRI BOLD activity was found in the vmPFC, right frontopolar and superior frontal cortex 
during decision-making (Tanabe et al., 2007). Similarly, impaired performance by gamblers in 
the Game of Dice Task is suggestive of a role for the dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) (Brand et al., 
2005). These frontal areas connect to striatal regions as part of limbic/decision-making loops. 
An fMRI study using a guessing game found that gamblers’ reduced ventral striatal and 
ventromedial prefrontal activation negatively correlated with gambling severity (Reuter et al., 
2005). Imaging in healthy volunteers also suggests that these brain areas (in addition to the 
PFC) are important in modulating loss aversion in decision-making under risk (Tom et al., 
2007). 
 
To our knowledge, no one has previously used saccadic tasks to study problem gamblers. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of reports of fundamental psychophysical measures (such as a 
reaction time) in this group. In Chapter 7, oculomotor tasks are used to compare decision 
making in 3 patient groups: PD patients, PD patients with ICD and pathological gamblers. 
These subjects are also compared with age-matched control groups consisting of healthy 
volunteers. 
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1.9  Summary & Thesis Synopsis 
In this thesis I will develop the hypothesis that motivated decision-making in humans can 
successfully be studied using rewarded oculomotor tasks. Furthermore, disruption of the 
limbic, corticobasal ganglia circuitry that causes aberrant rewarded decision-making might be 
interrogated successfully in this way. 
 
I first investigate the effects of age and the consequent dopaminergic, frontal degeneration that 
might impact on rewarded oculomotor decision-making (Chapter 2). In Chapter 3, I explore 
additional oculomotor tasks and correlations between task performance and established, 
questionnaire-based self-report measures of impulsivity. Chapter 4 describes experiments 
involving a patient with focal lesions causing apathy and the effects of therapy with 
dopaminergic medication upon oculomotor task performance. Experimental chapters 5 & 6 
concern the administration of drugs known to modulate dopaminergic transmission and their 
effects on oculomotor decision making in healthy volunteers. Chapter 7 reports the results of 
investigation of oculomotor task performance in patients with Parkinson’s disease, with and 
without impulse control disorders, and pathological gamblers. 
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2. Rapid decision making under uncertainty: 
The effects of age 
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2.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces a novel behavioural paradigm designed to study decision-making 
under risk. It also describes exploration of the effect of subject age upon the task. 
 
2.1.1  Task Design 
The study of decision-making has become the focus of intense research efforts in cognitive 
neuroscience. However, it is appreciated that there might be limitations associated with existing 
naturalistic tasks used to identify abnormal decision-making (Schonberg et al., 2011). For 
example, delay discounting (Bickel et al., 1999) or gambling tasks (Bechara et al., 1998; Clark et 
al., 2008; Murphy et al., 2009) have been extraordinarily useful in identifying departures from 
normal behaviour. However, they may encourage probabilistic fallacies or may not permit 
behaviour to be dissected easily into its contributory components (Aragues et al., 2011). They 
also allow participants to reflect upon the decision and consider possible outcomes without 
time pressure or urgency. 
 
Conversely, impulsive behaviour in pathological groups is often characterised by rapid 
decision-making under risk (Moeller et al., 2001). Impulsivity may be conceptualised as the 
willingness to decide before all the required information is available. Some existing tests probe 
this in patient groups, albeit for decisions made in the order of many seconds rather than in 
milliseconds e.g. (Clark et al., 2006). But even in healthy humans, under certain circumstances, 
early decisions can carry a survival advantage, as when deciding quickly might be life saving 
even if associated with a risk of making the wrong choice. Such an ability to make rapid 
decisions and negotiate risk early might be termed functionally impulsive cf. (Dickman, 1990). 
However, in other scenarios a “wait and see” approach is better, particularly if early decisions 
repeatedly lead to poor outcomes. 
 
We designed a new paradigm – the “traffic light task” – deliberately to provide a measure of 
decision-making under time pressure. The task encourages functionally useful anticipation but 
also punishes erroneous decisions made too early. Saccades were used as our response measure 
(see Introduction, Section 1.2): Subjects were asked to make horizontal eye movements as quickly 
as possible in response to a green traffic light, “Go!” signal.  Risk was introduced by varying the 
amber light duration and so that the green, “Go!” signal was not predictable. The rules 
encouraged participants to make functional anticipatory responses by disproportionately 
rewarding fast decisions that led to saccades soon after the “Go!” signal. However, saccades 
made too soon, which were before “Go!” onset, were punished. Ideal performance incorporated 
fast reaction times based upon an anticipatory strategy. Individuals performed badly if they 
were either persistently too early (despite the negative feedback) or too slow. 
 
2.1.2  Age Effects 
Traffic Light Task performance might vary with age due to changes in saccadic reaction time 
(SRT), reward sensitivity (or risk aversion) or both. Ideally, these effects might be dissociable 
from the saccadic distributions produced. Slower SRTs would cause a rightward shift in the 
 65 
reactive response distribution, whereas reward insensitivity should reduce anticipatory 
responding. 
 
Risk taking behaviour in healthy volunteers changes with age (Deakin et al., 2004) and the 
ability to make profitable choices declines in some older people (Denburg et al., 2005, 2007). 
This risk aversion appears to contribute to poorer decision-making (Boyle et al., 2012), but may, 
in fact, reflect a more global cognitive decline (Albert and Duffy, 2012). Indeed both increased 
risk seeking and increased risk aversion are found in older adults, dependent upon the task 
design (Mather et al., 2012). However,  these effects can otherwise be attributed to individual 
differences in processing speed and memory (Henninger et al., 2010) rather than changes in 
risk/reward sensitivity. 
 
With respect to eye movements, this “global slowing” phenomenon is manifest in differences in 
“gap” effect saccade latency benefit. Though the absolute benefit is reduced in older people, it is 
of a similar proportion of the saccade latency when compared with younger individuals (Pratt 
et al., 1997) suggesting that though overall processing is slowed, the fundamental mechanisms 
of saccade production/inhibition are intact. 
 
Though robust compared to other motor measures (Pratt et al., 2006) SRT increases slightly, and 
gradually, above 50 years of age (Irving et al., 2006; Pitt and Rawles, 2009) with an associated 
increase in variability in latency (Abel and Douglas, 2007), reduced velocity and accuracy (Schik 
et al., 2000; Sharpe and Zackon, 2009). Older participants are also more susceptible to saccade 
disruption than young adults (Gottlob et al., 2007) and exhibit more hypometric and multi-step 
saccades (Litvinova et al., 2011), rendering their responses less reliable. Voluntary (as opposed 
to reflexive) saccades seem particularly vulnerable to the effects of age (Peltsch et al., 2011). 
Declining antisaccade task performance (Butler et al., 1999; Olincy et al., 1997) implicates an 
aging fronto-striatal system (Raemaekers et al., 2006) in the impaired inhibition of action 
(Sweeney et al., 2001). This mirrors the improvement in antisaccade task performance attributed 
to frontal lobe development during adolescence (Munoz et al., 1998) and fits with general 
theories of declining cognition in association with reduced dopaminergic activity in 
frontostriatal networks with age (Bäckman et al., 2006, 2010; Erixon-Lindroth et al., 2005; 
Kaasinen and Rinne, 2002; Kaasinen et al., 2000; Klostermann et al., 2012; Li et al., 2010). 
 
Do older, slower subjects display similar task responses to young controls in the Traffic Light 
Task? Does lack of reward sensitivity or inaccuracy/variability in timing lead to a risk-averse 
avoidance of anticipatory responding? Alternatively, might impaired inhibition lead to 
increased anticipation in spite of a higher error rate? I sought to answer these questions using 
our newly designed traffic light task. 
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2.2 Methods 
Young subjects consisted of 45 healthy volunteers (mean age = 20; 22 females) recruited by 
email and from the University College London Psychology Subject Pool (Soma Systems). Older 
participants comprised 15 healthy volunteers (mean age = 64; 9 female) recruited by 
email/telephone/posters in local libraries and adult education centres. All subjects were naive 
to eye movement tasks generally and to our task in particular. They were also screened for 
neurological or psychiatric conditions by direct questioning of known past medical history. 
Ethical approval was sought and obtained from the local committee. 
 
2.2.1  Traffic Light Task (Figure 2.1) 
In the main experimental task, participants were told that their main aim was to win as much 
money as possible. They were asked to make rapid eye movements from a ‘traffic light’ 
(coloured disc 3 degrees in diameter) to a target cross (3x3 degrees), both presented on a 
computer monitor (60cm from the chin rest/plane of the eye). The traffic light and target were 
10 degrees either side of the screen center (Figure 2.1). Subjects were requested to fixate the 
traffic light stimulus while it turned from red (duration 1000 ms) through amber to green. They 
were asked to make their 20 degree saccade to the target cross as quickly as possible and as soon 
after the GO signal as possible. They had a maximum of 1000ms in which to respond. 
 
The reward (R) for a successful saccade was calculated by an exponentially decaying 
discounting function in the form: 
 
 
 
Where a = 150, k1=100 and t represents the saccade onset time relative to green onset (t0 , 
milliseconds). 
 
This steep discounting function (Figure 2.1C) generated disproportionately high rewards for 
short saccadic reaction times (SRTs). Saccades with latencies of 400ms after green light onset 
were rewarded with only 2.8 pence; SRT=300ms made 7.5 pence while SRT=200ms generated 
20.3 pence. Saccades with shorter latencies than this were far more highly rewarded: a response 
with SRT=100ms made 55.2 pence and 50ms led to a reward of 91.0 pence. But note that to make 
these high rewards, subjects would have to anticipate green light onset because saccades 
typically take ~200 ms to programme (White et al., 1962). In other words, they would have to 
make a decision – take a risk – to programme a saccade before the onset of the GO! signal. Such 
saccades, with latency <200ms and reward >20 pence were signalled by a reinforcing 
“Kerching!” sound whereas slower correct responses resulted in a simple “Ping”. 
 
Saccades that were actually made before the green light incurred a small, fixed penalty of 10 
pence. Error trials were accompanied by an unpleasant audible beep and a visual warning, 
‘STOP POLICE! Fine £0.10.’.  
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The timing of the GO signal (green light) onset was not absolutely predictable from trial to trial. 
Instead, the duration of the amber light (Figure 2.1B) was randomly selected on each trial from a 
normal distribution (mean 750ms, SD 125ms). To perform optimally, participants therefore 
needed to make as many rewarded anticipations as possible, while keeping errors to a 
minimum. They had to make a choice of whether to stay (wait longer) or go and risk a small 
penalty versus the possibility of a large reward. 
 
On gaze arriving at the target cross (fixation tolerance 2o), subjects received both aural and 
visual feedback on their performance. They were shown the reward (in pence) on the trial just 
completed, and a running total beneath (in pounds). The target cross was then replaced by a red 
light (circle) and a target cross now appeared on the opposite side of the screen to begin the next 
trial. To perform optimally, subjects should therefore make as many anticipations as possible, 
but as few errors as possible. Subjects performed ten blocks of fifty trials, the first trial in each 
block started from a left sided stimulus (rightward saccade) and then alternated.  
 
Subjects sat on a height adjustable chair under a height adjustable table in a dimly lit room. 
They placed their forehead on a rack mounted EyeLink 1000 infra-red video-based eye tracker 
(SR Research Ltd, Ontario, Canada) recording eye position at 1000 Hz. A chin rest was then 
adjusted to provide comfortable support. The task stimuli were displayed on a flat-screened 22” 
CRT monitor (Dell P1230, 507.7mm viewable, displaying 1024x768 pixels, refresh rate 150 Hz) at 
60cm from the vertical plane of the subject’s eye. Eye position was calibrated to a 9-point 
rectangular matrix before testing began. 
 
The task stimuli were programmed in C/C++ and run on a personal computer ((PC), Dell 
Optiplex 755 running Windows XP SP3). The eye tracker was controlled by a separate PC (Dell 
Precision 380) networked to the stimulus/display PC. This allowed real-time task feedback 
responses to eye movements. Eye position and pupil area data were acquired in real time and 
exported into Matlab R2008a (The Mathworks, Massachusetts, USA) for analysis. 
 
Eye position data was used to detect fixations during each trial. Saccadic latencies were 
calculated from the onset of the second fixation in each trial (i.e. arrival at target) and referenced 
to time stamps produced by the onset of the traffic light stimuli. Saccades made in advance of 
the amber light were excluded from the analysis. All saccades made from amber onset until 
1000ms following green onset were included in the analysis. Though blink errors were 
unavoidably included in the real-time feedback to the participant, blink trials were excluded 
from our post hoc analysis. 
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Figure 2.1  The Traffic Light Task 
A Subjects were instructed to move their eyes as quickly as possible from a traffic light 
stimulus to a target cross. Saccades made after the green light were rewarded but those 
executed before the green light incurred a small penalty. B Amber duration was randomly 
selected on each trial from a normal distribution (mean 750ms, SD 125ms). C Reward was 
computed by a steep discounting function of saccadic reaction time. The biggest reward was for 
saccades that coincided with green light onset, but such saccades would have to been 
programmed before the green light. 
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2.2.2  Control saccadic reaction time (SRT) task (Figure 2.2) 
In addition to the traffic lights task, young participants were also tested on a control, non-
rewarded saccadic reaction time (SRT) task (Figure 2.2). In this paradigm, the red light was 
followed immediately by green, with no amber light between these. Red light duration varied 
between 500-1000ms (rectangular probability distribution, mean 750ms). Data acquisition was 
as above. This task allowed us to obtain response distributions for ‘reactive’ saccades – those 
programmed in response to green onset, without any need to anticipate the GO signal. 
 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1  Saccadic distributions in young controls 
Typical saccadic reaction time tasks produce saccadic latency distributions with a single ‘quasi-
normal’ distribution that is positively skewed. Since the skew can be removed by re-plotting on 
a reciprocal time axis, the distribution is given the name ‘recinormal’ (Carpenter and Williams, 
1995). Performance on the control SRT task produced such a distribution (Figure 2.3A) with a 
mean reaction time of 335ms (SD 148ms) and median of 300ms for young volunteers. 
 
On the traffic light task, however, the overall distribution saccades plotted with respect to green 
onset was bimodal (Figure 2.3B), consisting of two distinct distributions: a ‘late’ distribution 
which corresponded well to the distribution of saccades on the SRT task (cf. Figure 2.3B) and an 
‘early’ distribution of saccades. Plotting saccadic distributions as a function of amber duration 
revealed an important feature of performance: as amber duration increased, the frequency of 
early saccades increased while that of late saccades reduced (Figure 2.4). Note also that the peak 
latency of the later distribution remained invariant across amber durations. 
 
Given that saccades take ~200 ms to programme and execute (White et al., 1962), the early 
population of saccades might be considered anticipatory in nature while the later population 
(which matches well with the distribution in the SRT task) might be considered reactive – 
responses triggered by the onset of the green light. However, for any given saccade it is not 
possible definitively to determine whether it arose from the early or late population of 
responses. We therefore modelled our data to enable us to choose an appropriate ‘cut-off’ time 
for counting the number of ‘anticipatory’ responses.  
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Figure 2.2  The Saccadic Reaction Time (SRT) Task 
Subjects were asked to attend a red light, which turned green after a variable period of x ms 
(500-1000ms, mean 750ms, rectangular distribution. They then made a saccade to a target cross 
on the opposite side of the screen (20 degrees lateral deviation) as quickly as possible. Upon 
arrival, the target-cross turned red to confirm the completed saccade before a new red traffic 
light was shown at the new location. Trials therefore alternated left to right, right to left. 
Subjects completed 100 trials. Saccades made erroneously, before the green light, were excluded 
from the analysis. 
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Figure 2.3  Saccadic Reaction Time task and Traffic Light Task Results for Young Subjects 
A Saccadic reaction time (SRT) task response distribution (probability density function, pdf) for young controls. 
Participants showed a typical, positively skewed, “recinormal” distribution of saccadic latencies. 
B Traffic Light Task response distributions for young controls.  
A bimodal distribution was apparent consisting of a population ‘early’ (anticipatory) saccades and ‘late’ (reactive) saccades. The latter were of similar latency 
to those seen in the SRT task. 
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Figure 2.4 Saccadic response distributions varied with amber 
duration. 
Displaying the probability density function (pdf) according to the amber duration in each 
trial reveals two important features of the task response. First, the longer the amber 
duration, the more likely an early, anticipatory saccade will be generated. Second, the 
latency of the reactive distribution appears constant for all amber durations. 
Zero refers to green light onset. 
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2.3.2  A linear rise-to-threshold model predicts likelihood of saccades 
arising from reactive and anticipatory distributions 
 
The positively skewed, ‘recinormal’ distribution of saccades in various, simple, reactive tasks 
has been well modelled by Carpenter’s LATER (Linear Approach to Threshold with Ergodic 
Rate) model (Carpenter and Williams, 1995). Moreover, in tasks in which the saccade target 
might be anticipated – as here, but also in gap paradigms where the fixation point is 
extinguished prior to target onset – the distributions have been modelled well by two LATER 
units competing in a ‘two horse race’ (Story and Carpenter, 2009). 
 
Such models assume that a decision threshold must be reached to initiate a saccade (Figure 2.5). 
Reaching that threshold depends upon the accumulation of evidence in favour of making the 
decision. In the traffic lights task, as time passes following amber onset, there is increasing 
expectation of the green light. This form of evidence is accrued slowly. Once the green light 
comes on, however, there is 100% evidence of the requirement for a saccade, and the GO signal 
therefore would be expected to lead to rapid accumulation of evidence in favour of generating a 
saccade.  
 
To model the data from the traffic light task, we assumed two processes, one triggered by the 
amber light and the other by the green light. A rapid, rise-to-threshold, process that is evoked 
by the appearance of the green light would describe the distribution of reactive saccades. We 
further hypothesised that anticipatory saccades, driven by an increasing expectation of the GO 
signal, would be described by a separate, slower and independent rise-to-threshold triggered by 
the amber light onset. Thus we have two rise-to-threshold processes competing to reach decision 
threshold: an early (anticipatory), slow one evoked by amber onset and a later (reactive), fast 
one triggered by green onset. According to this model, a saccade is generated by whichever 
process is first to reach threshold (Figures 2.5 & 2.6). 
 
The likelihood of the first, slow-rising anticipatory process reaching the threshold increases as 
amber duration lengthens. For very short amber durations, therefore, there is not sufficient time 
for an anticipatory saccade to be generated, and the green light triggers a rapidly rising reactive 
process, which reaches threshold first.  Nearly all the saccades, for short amber durations, 
would therefore arise from the reactive distribution. By contrast, in trials with the long amber 
durations many anticipatory saccades occur because there is sufficient time for the anticipatory 
process to reach threshold before the reactive process is triggered. There is a ‘two-horse-race’ 
between the anticipatory process, which starts earlier but rises to threshold slowly and a later 
starting but more rapidly rising reactive process. 
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Figure 2.5  How two LATER Units might describe the observed data. 
It is assumed that a certain “decision   threshold” must be reached to initiate a saccade. This 
threshold may be reached through two forms of ‘evidence’. As time passes following the amber 
onset, there is increasing expectation of the green light. This form of evidence is accrued slowly 
and produces anticipatory saccades of mean onset �a. Once the green light is lit, there is 100% 
evidence of the requirement for a saccade, so a faster decision process is initiated, producing 
reactive saccades of mean onset �r. Depending upon the amber duration and prior knowledge 
of the amber duration distribution, one process will win the race on any given trial. As these are 
biological systems, there is also noise (variability) in the rate of rise of each process. This gives 
rise to variance in each distribution, σa & σr. 
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Formally, the probability that a saccade has occurred by time t following amber onset (i.e. the 
cumulative probability distribution) is given by: 
 
 
 
Where  and  indicate cumulative inverse Gaussian distributions describing 
anticipatory and reactive processes, respectively. 
 
2.3.3  Anticipations, Rewards and Errors 
 
We used maximum likelihood estimation (Myung, 2003) to obtain best-fitting mean and 
variance parameters for each distribution (Figure 2.6D). The model therefore used four 
parameters: the gradient and variance of the rise-to-threshold process triggered by the amber 
onset and similarly the gradient and variance of the process triggered by the GO signal. 
Maximum likelihood parameter estimates were obtained by Nelder-Mead simplex method 
(fminsearch in MATLAB). 
 
Population data for all saccades are shown in the left panels of Figure 2.7, while the 
corresponding distributions produced by the model are shown on the right. The data are 
further decomposed into distributions for different amber durations in Figure 2.8, with real data 
again on the left and model performance using four parameters shown to the right.  
 
Note that if the distributions are plotted with respect to amber onset, one might get the 
impression there was only one distribution. However, plotting all the data with respect to green 
onset or decomposing the results as a function of amber duration (even when plotted with 
respect to amber onset) reveals the bimodal distribution. 
 
In the case of the young subject group, the model estimated a mean for the reactive distribution 
of 289ms (SD 32ms; median = 289 ms) from green onset. We decided to use a cut-off of less than 
200 ms SRT to classify saccades as being from the anticipatory distribution (Figure 2.9). This 
value corresponds to 2.5 SDs from the reactive distribution mean.  When modelled individually, 
200ms was a minimum of two standard deviations below the modelled reactive mean for each 
control subject. The group mean for the anticipatory distribution, now computed from amber 
onset, was 1344ms (SD 52ms; median = 1157ms).  
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Figure 2.6 Young volunteer data modelled as two linear rise-to-threshold 
processes. 
 
(A) Linear rise-to-threshold models predict simple saccadic response distributions. (B) We used 
a model which incorporates two LATER units to estimate means and variances for both reactive 
and anticipatory response distributions. In this case, saccadic latency depends upon the slope of 
each linear rising process (and the variability of the slope of each process from trial to trial). For 
short amber durations, the reactive process, which is steep, will usually reach threshold first 
(denoted by green line). For longer amber durations, however, the anticipatory process (amber 
line) triggered by amber onset may reach threshold before the reactive process does. In this 
example an error occurred because the amber-triggered process reached threshold before green 
onset. (C) Plotting responses on reciprobit axes demonstrates the existence of the two linear 
rise-to-threshold processes, one starting at amber onset (anticipatory), the other in response to 
green onset (reactive). (D) The gradients and variabilities of these processes were estimated 
using maximum likelihood estimation and used to parameterize two separate LATER units to 
model the distributions.  
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Using the 200ms cut-off, a total of 30.2% of young volunteers’ saccades were computed using 
this model to be from the anticipatory process. Just over two-thirds of these saccades occurred 
between green onset and 200ms following it, comprising 21.1% (SD 11.1) of all saccades. Thus 
these saccades were highly rewarded. Overall reward correlated highly with the percentage of 
anticipatory responses (R2=0.419, p<0.05). A weaker but still strongly significant negative 
correlation between overall mean reaction time and reward was also found (R2= - 0.296, p<0.05). 
Percentage errors were not significantly correlated with overall reward (R2=0.041, p=0.184) but 
recall that errors were all penalised by a small, flat loss of 10p, regardless of how early they 
were made with respect to the GO signal onset. Overall, young volunteers made on average 17p 
per trial (min 7p, max 28p, SD 45). 
 
2.3.5  Saccadic distributions in older controls 
In contrast to the younger test subjects, older participants did not produce very many 
anticipatory responses (Figure 2.10). The saccade response distribution for this group did not 
show a bimodal distribution when plotted with respect to green onset. Of course, not all 
individuals anticipate equally, but the lack of an early distribution was consistently uniform 
(Figure 2.11). Instead the shape of the overall distribution for older subjects was very similar to 
the reactive part of the younger subject distribution. Indeed, if we consider only responses of 
young controls made after 200ms (the ‘reactive’ distribution), then the mean RT (319 ms, SD 73 
ms) was almost identical to the older volunteers (mean 320ms, SD 80ms). 
 
Due to the lack of an anticipatory saccade distribution in older participants, overall they earned 
less reward on the task. They made considerably less reward per trial than the young group, 
with a mean of 10p per trial (min 4p, max 20p, SD 4.1). The correlation between the number of 
anticipations and reward was not significant (R2=0.191, p>0.05), unlike in younger participants. 
However, reward correlated well inversely with mean latency (R2= - 0.499, p<0.05). Similarly to 
the younger group, errors did not correlate significantly with reward (R2=0.002, p>0.05). 
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Figure 2.7  Saccadic response distributions and model distributions. 
Raw data (left panels) and modelled probability distributions (right panels) derived from four 
parameters (gradient and variance for two rise-to-threshold processes) estimated by maximum 
likelihood estimation. Plotted with respect to amber onset (a & b), there is a single 
homogeneous distribution of saccades. However, plotted with respect to the green light onset, 
the true bimodal distribution is revealed (c & d). 
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Figure 2.8  Saccade distributions as a function of amber duration: 
data and model findings. 
 
Using maximum likelihood estimation to estimate means and standard deviations for two 
recinormal distributions, the data (A & C) is well modelled (B & D).  Note how the anticipatory 
component increases with amber duration.  
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Figure 2.9  Traffic Light Task Early Responses 
Early responses in the traffic light task occur between the amber light onset and 200ms 
following the green light. These can be subdivided into errors (early responses occurring in 
advance of the ‘go’ signal) and highly rewarded anticipatory responses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10 Traffic Light Task saccadic distributions in older volunteers 
Older controls (dashed line) showed little or no anticipation despite similar reactive distribution 
latency to young controls. The distribution more closely resembles that generated by young 
controls in the SRT task. The solid line shows data for young controls on the traffic lights task. 
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Figure 2.11 Older Healthy Volunteers: Traffic Light Task 
14 Older healthy Volunteers (Subjects A:N) and the group as a whole. X axes: Response latency 
(milliseconds), Y axes: Probability Density (no units). 
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2.4 Discussion 
We developed a simple saccadic task that can measure decision-making when participants are 
required to make rapid choices (stay or go) under risk. The task generated two groups of 
responses in young, healthy volunteers: a reactive distribution and an anticipatory distribution. 
Separately parameterised linear rise-to-decision threshold processes can model the two 
distributions. The earlier process is triggered by the amber light and rises slowly to decision 
threshold whereupon a saccade is triggered. In trials with shorter amber durations, the green 
light onset (GO signal) triggers the fast rising reactive process that reaches threshold before the 
anticipatory process can trigger a saccade (Figure 2.5). By contrast, trials of longer amber 
duration allow the anticipatory process to rise to threshold and generate a saccade before the 
green light onset. There are therefore increasing numbers of anticipatory responses with 
increasing amber durations (Figure 2.8).  
 
Task performance, measured as reward obtained, correlated strongly with the percentage of 
anticipatory, correct responses (i.e., those which fall in the range 0-200 ms after the GO signal). 
These are programmed before the onset of the green light because it takes ~200 ms to execute a 
saccade (White et al., 1962). Thus participants had to take a decision about whether to stay and 
wait longer, or make a response before the green light, risking the possibility of a small penalty 
against a potentially large reward. Young adults, therefore, made what might be called 
functionally useful anticipations. They were willing to take a risk and make early responses 
because overall this would optimize overall reward. However, in older subjects, we found little 
evidence of anticipatory behaviour. Instead, the vast majority of their responses were triggered 
after the GO signal and, for them, reward simply correlated inversely with reaction time. 
 
Elderly participants seemed to adopt a more cautious approach on this task, deciding not to 
make very many risky decisions, perhaps because they were less motivated by the potential 
rewards and/or more sensitive to the penalty of going too early. 
 
In later life, dopaminergic modulation declines markedly (Li et al., 2010). Imaging of the striatal 
dopamine transporter (DAT) has been used to demonstrate clear age-related losses of striatal 
DAT binding from early to late adulthood (Erixon-Lindroth et al., 2005). More specifically, there 
is a faster rate of D2-like receptor loss in the frontal cortex (11–14% per decade) compared to 
regions in the temporal cortex (9–12%) and the thalamus (5–6%) (Kaasinen et al., 2000, 2002).  
This senescent decline has been linked to deficits in processing speed, processing robustness, 
episodic memory, working memory, cognitive control/executive function and fluid intelligence 
(Volkow et al., 2000; Erixon-Lindroth et al., 2005; Bäckman et al., 2006, 2010). 
 
An event-related fMRI study comparing pro- and anti-saccades found an age-related shift in 
activity from posterior to frontal brain regions after young adulthood (Raemaekers et al., 2006). 
Older adults demonstrated an overall reduction in the blood oxygenation level dependent 
(BOLD) signal in the visual and oculomotor system. In this study, age did not affect saccade 
inhibition activity but middle aged and older adults demonstrated increased frontal activation 
to maintain performance even during simple pro-saccades. Furthermore, connections between 
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the ventral striatum and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) seem to differ with age in fMRI 
BOLD activity during both task learning and in their reward response, with a reduced ventral 
striatal BOLD response to reward in older subjects (Mell et al., 2009). There is evidence, 
therefore, that older subjects recruit frontal areas more strongly in order to maintain oculomotor 
performance and yet they are less sensitive to task rewards, at the striatal level. This 
deterioration in striatal dopaminergic activity might underlie a decline in goal-directed 
oculomotor control in older people (Harsay et al., 2010). These and other changes in the brain 
with aging are also known to alter patterns of non-oculomotor decision-making (Brown and 
Ridderinkhof, 2009), perhaps related to differential sensitivity to rewards versus losses 
(Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007). Our paradigm appears to be sensitive to detect such changes, 
consistent with such a view. 
 
The task might also be useful in studying decision-making in clinical populations, particularly 
those who appear to be susceptible to making impulsive choices. Pathological impulsivity has 
been characterized as rapid decision-making under risk (Moeller et al., 2001). On this paradigm, 
one might expect many erroneous, early responses would be characteristic of such behaviour. 
Of course, there are many existing measures used to index impulsive decision-making (see 
Chapter 3) (Aragues et al., 2011; Schonberg et al., 2011) but few, if any, examine risky choices 
under tight time constraints.  
 
Paradigms such as the STOP signal task have been employed to assess how rapidly participants 
can cancel an on-going motor plan, and patients with impulsive behaviour are impaired on 
such tasks (Lipszyc and Schachar, 2010). But although the STOP task measures the ability to 
exert inhibitory control it does not involve a choice to take a risky decision, unlike the traffic 
lights paradigm. 
 
One important aspect of this new paradigm is that performance can be modelled using an 
existing framework that has been used to understand the control of saccadic eye movements: 
linear rise-to-decision threshold (Carpenter and Williams, 1995). Neurophysiological recordings 
from monkey frontal cortex have demonstrated that activity within neurons steadily increases 
to prior to saccade initiation and the rate of rise such activity corresponds well to reaction time 
(Hanes and Schall, 1996; Schall et al., 2002). Thus such models have physiological tractability. A 
similar conceptual framework has also been used to model performance on the STOP task, but 
this time with a race between excitatory activity triggered by the early GO cue and inhibitory or 
braking activity evoked by the later STOP signal (Verbruggen and Logan, 2008).  
 
Such a ‘two horse’ race also serves the basis for our modelling, but with activity, or 
accumulation of evidence, rising-to-decision threshold evoked by amber or green light onset 
both leading to the same result: execution of a response. Story and Carpenter have also used 
dual LATER units to predict saccadic reaction times in various oculomotor tasks, but their focus 
was on modelling expectation from fixation offset and response following target onset (Story 
and Carpenter, 2009). The traffic lights task puts participants in a very different context where 
they have to decide whether to take a risk to initiate a response in the absence of a GO signal. 
Embedded within an existing behavioural and physiological framework, it has the potential to 
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be applied in many different circumstances to assess rapid decision-making under risk in health 
and disease. 
 
The remaining chapters of this thesis will use this, other oculomotor tasks and other non-motor 
measures (discussed in Chapter 3) to investigate decision-making differences in patients with 
focal brain lesions (Chapter 4), healthy volunteers under the influence of dopaminergic drugs 
(Chapters 5&6), pathological gamblers and patients with Parkinson’s disease (Chapter 7). 
 85 
3. Reward Sensitivity, Risk Aversion and 
Impulsivity 
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3.1 Introduction 
Saccadic tasks have been extensively employed to study decision-making in both humans and 
monkeys (Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Glimcher, 2001; Gold and Shadlen, 2002; Glimcher, 2003; 
McCoy and Platt, 2005b; Churchland et al., 2008). Studies including direct recording of monkey 
brain neurophysiology have enabled investigation of the neural substrates of saccadic reward 
(McCoy et al., 2003; Hikosaka et al., 2006, 2006; Hong and Hikosaka, 2008; So and Stuphorn, 
2010).  These studies implicate dopaminergic, parietal, reward-sensitive cells (Schultz et al., 
1997; Schultz, 2007). Furthermore, pallidal projections to the lateral habenula and subsequent 
inhibition of dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain are important in modulating saccadic 
reward learning (Hong and Hikosaka, 2008, 2013; Stephenson-Jones et al., 2013; Tachibana and 
Hikosaka, 2012).  
 
3.1.1  Saccadic measures of reward sensitivity and risk 
Reward sensitivity has been demonstrated in human subjects performing oculomotor tasks with 
reward-induced reduction in saccadic latencies in both pro- and antisaccade tasks (Ross et al., 
2011). I adapted a simple saccadic paradigm used in monkeys and shown to induce speeding of 
saccadic reactions to rewarded targets presented to one side of fixation compared to 
unrewarded targets on the other side (Hong and Hikosaka, 2008). Such a lateral reward task, 
could prove sensitive to dopaminergic modulation and/or dopaminergic pathology in humans.  
 
The neural substrate of subjective risk preferences has only rarely been investigated (McCoy 
and Platt, 2005a). Furthermore, the risky element of the oculomotor tasks used has not related to 
the timing of the eye movement nor has that timing been related to the reward outcome e.g. 
(Ackermann	   and	   Landy,	   2013;	   McCoy	   and	   Platt,	   2005a;	   Stritzke	   and	   Trommershäuser,	   2007;	  
Stritzke	  et	  al.,	  2009). It was therefore necessary to develop another novel paradigm in order to 
satisfy such requirements. 
 
I designed the reverse traffic light task in which subjects must overcome the drive to activate 
their saccadic motor plan for as long as possible to obtain the greatest reward. However, waiting 
too long results in a penalty. Conservative subjects might make earlier responses, despite lower 
rewards, while impulsive subjects might also be unable to wait. Since there is no exogenous 
(stimulus driven) saccade initiation, reaction time is irrelevant. The paradigm rather measures 
subjects’ timing and risk aversion. The task is rewarded and therefore reward sensitivity is 
relevant, but this is also assessed and controlled for with the lateral reward task. 
 
In this chapter, I present results of investigations using these measures in healthy volunteers. 
The techniques employed here are used in the analysis of data from later chapters of this thesis. 
In addition, I explore the relationships with established, questionnaire-based measures of 
impulsivity described below.  
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3.1.2  Non-saccadic measures 
3.1.2.1  The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 
An ever-increasing number of personality questionnaires, behavioural measures and other 
indices of impulsivity exist (Webster and Jackson, 1997). The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-
11, [see Appendix]) (Patton et al., 1995; Stanford et al., 2009) was chosen here for the assessment 
of trait impulsivity as it is one of the most widely used impulsivity questionnaires (Congdon 
and Canli, 2005; Stanford et al., 2009). The scale has been applied in combined behavioural and 
neuroimaging studies e.g. (Horn et al., 2003) enabling inference about relevant brain areas. 
Furthermore, for the purposes of these experiments, correlations with oculomotor behaviour 
have also been demonstrated (Roberts et al., 2011; Aichert et al., 2012). BIS-11 sum scores have 
shown correlations with behavioural measures of impulsivity such as Go/Nogo commission 
errors and with oculomotor measures including antisaccade error rates (Aichert et al., 2012).  
 
The 30-item BIS-11 questionnaire measures impulsiveness through items such as “I act on 
impulse” and “I consider myself always careful”. Participants indicate how frequently each 
statement applies to them on a 4-point Likert scale (never, occasionally, often, and almost always). 
Possible score totals range from 30 to 120, with higher scores indicating greater total levels of 
impulsiveness. Analysis of the BIS-11 comprises six first order factors: attention, motor 
impulsiveness, self-control, cognitive complexity, perseverance, and cognitive instability. These 
first order factors are combined to generate three second order factors: attentional 
impulsiveness (inability to focus attention or concentrate), motor impulsiveness (acting without 
thinking), and non-planning impulsiveness (lack of forethought). 
 
3.1.2.2  Cloninger Tri-dimensional Personality Questionnaire  
Eysenck proposed a biologically based model of personality that gave rise to related models 
such as those of Gray, Zuckerman and Cloninger (Acton, 2003).  Cloninger (Cloninger, 1986) 
defines impulsive behaviour as the coexistence of four heritable temperamental traits: 
 
1. High novelty seeking 
2. Low harm avoidance 
3. Low persistence  
4. High reward dependence 
 
The Cloninger Tri-dimensional Personality Questionnaire (TPQ, C R Cloninger 1987 see 
Appendix) contains 100 true/false items assessing three higher order dimensions of personality 
including novelty seeking, harm avoidance and reward dependence (see appendix) (Cloninger, 
1987). Cloninger suggested that variation in each dimension correlates with activity in a specific 
mono-aminergic pathway: Novelty seeking was correlated with low basal dopaminergic 
activity whereas harm avoidance was due to high serotonergic activity and reward dependence 
was due to low basal noradrenergic activity (Cloninger, 1986). 
 
There is biological support for the dopaminergic theory with respect to novelty seeking: PET 
scanning with 18F Fallypride (a D2/D3 ligand) in 34 healthy volunteers found inverse 
 88 
correlation between TPQ novelty seeking scores and D2-like receptor availability in the ventral 
midbrain (Zald et al., 2008). The theory arises, therefore, that high novelty seekers have 
accentuated dopaminergic responses to novelty (and other conditions which induce dopamine 
release) as a result of this low receptor availability. The high novelty-seeking trait 
correspondingly acts as a good predictor of drug use and other risky behaviours (Howard et al., 
1997).  The NS scale in particular, therefore, might be a relevant measure for subjects studied in 
the experiments on dopaminergic modulation in Chapters 5&6. 
 
3.1.2.3  Summary 
Investigations described in this chapter using oculomotor tasks are compared with both the 
Traffic Light Task (Chapter 2) and with established questionnaire measures of impulsivity. 
Correlations between oculomotor measures and personality indices inform the experiments in 
the remainder of the thesis. 
 
3.2 Methods 
All oculomotor task stimuli were programmed in C/C++ and run on a personal computer 
((PC), Dell Optiplex 755 running Windows XP SP3). A separate (Dell Precision 380) PC 
controlled the eye tracker but was networked to the stimulus/display PC. This allowed real-
time task feedback responses to eye movements. Eye position and pupil area data were 
acquired in real time and exported into Matlab R2008a (The Mathworks, Massachusetts, USA) 
for analysis. 
 
Eye position data was used to detect fixations during each trial. Saccadic latencies were 
calculated from the onset of the second fixation in each trial (i.e. arrival at target) and referenced 
to time stamps produced by the onset of the traffic light stimuli. Though blink errors were 
unavoidably included in the real-time feedback to the participant, blink trials were excluded 
from our post hoc analysis. 
 
3.2.1  Saccadic Reaction Time (SRT) Task 
This task probed participant’s simple saccadic reaction time. This enabled assurance that high 
reward outcomes on the traffic light task were not merely related to fast reaction times. 
Moreover, it allowed validation of the putative “reactive” distribution of saccadic responses in 
the traffic light task. 
 
47 young healthy volunteers (mean age = 20 years; 23 females) and 13 Middle aged controls 
(mean age 41 years; all male), recruited from the UCL psychology subject pool, completed the 
SRT task (Chapter 2, Figure 2.2). Subjects were asked to attend a red light that turned green 
after a period of 500-1000ms. The delay varied randomly (with a rectangular probability 
distribution) from trial to trial. When the light turned green, subjects make a saccade as fast as 
possible to a target cross on the other side of the screen. Saccades made before the green light 
incur an error signal and are not included in the analysis. The next trial starts at the point just 
reached such that saccades alternate, rightward then leftward. 
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3.2.2  The Lateral Reward Task  
The lateral reward task (Figure 3.1) was included in order to assess reward sensitivity. 
Macaques performing a similar task demonstrated speeding toward targets where they 
expected a juice reward (Hong and Hikosaka, 2008; Figure 1.5). 
 
21 young healthy volunteers (12 female, mean age 23 years) and 15 middle-aged volunteers (2 
female, mean age 40 years) completed the lateral reward task. 
 
Subjects were asked to fixate a central spot for 1000ms before making a saccade to a target 
appearing 10 degrees to the right or left (50% probability on each trial). The rewarded side 
changed every 10-14 trials, jittered such that 60 leftward and 60 rightward rewarded sides were 
encountered by each subject overall, in a 120 trial block. Rewarded trials were acknowledged by 
the display of a pound coin and a number representing the magnitude of the reward in pence. 
Reward value was dependent on latency using a similar function to that employed in the Traffic 
Light Task (Figure 3.2). The reward function was slightly shifted to accommodate longer mean 
latencies (discovered in piloting) due to the unpredictable target position. A red circle and a 
zero acknowledged unrewarded trials.  
 
Participants performed two blocks of 120 trials. Their reward for participation was scaled to 
their total reward accrued across the tasks presented. The difference between the reaction times 
to the rewarded and unrewarded sides was used as a measure of a subject’s sensitivity to 
reward. 
 
3.2.3  The Reverse Traffic Light Task 
The reverse traffic light task (Figure 3.3) was introduced to assess participants’ willingness to 
take risk. Responses require a saccade, but the task was designed such that the simple saccadic 
latency is largely irrelevant. The task reward is dependent upon when subjects decide to make 
an endogenous saccade rather than their ability to react reflexively to an external stimulus. 
However, their decision to make a saccade is influenced by learning the mean amber duration 
from previous trials. This requires some early exploratory behaviour and willingness to 
experience some punished early trials. 
 
The task was administered to 24 young controls (12 female, mean age 23) and 8 middle-aged 
controls (8 male, mean age 42). In this task, patients were told to fixate a green light that would 
then turn amber (after 1000ms). They were told to make their saccade at some time during the 
amber light. It was explained that the later they made their eye movement, the more highly 
rewarded their response would be. However, were the amber light to turn red before they made 
their eye movement, they lost 10 pence. The amber light duration was varied randomly from 
trial to trial selected at random from a Gaussian probability distribution with a mean of 1500ms 
(SD 500ms). This was intended to force subjects to wait slightly longer on each trial than in the 
traffic light task and also to avoid “cross-over” effects between tasks, within or across testing 
sessions. 
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The closer subjects make their saccade to the red light onset, the greater the reward they 
received. Due to the changing amber duration, the reward calculation had to be slightly more 
complex: Reward was derived as an exponentially increasing value related to the red onset on 
each trial. The reward curve (Figure 3.4) is “fitted” into the variable amber duration on each 
trial. There is, therefore, not a fixed reward for any particular anticipatory gap, however this 
contingency ensures that similarly high rewards are achieved for accuracy on each trial. 
 
Performance on this task was measured both in terms of reward accrued and in terms of the 
mean Stop Anticipatory Interval (SAI), the mean amount of time between subjects’ saccades 
and the programmed onset of the red light. 
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x = 1000, t = saccadic reaction time 
 
Figure 3.1  The Lateral Reward Task 
Subjects attend a central fixation spot. After 1000ms of fixation a target appears to the right or 
left (on average 50% each side, randomly selected). Subjects must make a saccade to the new 
target and receive a reward dependent upon their reaction time when the target is in the 
rewarded location. The rewarded location remains fixed for a jittered number of trials such that 
the side is learned but without the ‘switch’ (to the other location being rewarded) being 
anticipated. The unrewarded side yields a score of zero. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R=reward (pence), A=150, t=saccade onset, t0=target onset, κ = 100, τ=100 
Figure 3.2  Lateral Reward Task Reward Function 
In the lateral reward task, saccades to rewarded targets received a reward according to the 
latency of arrival at the target. The reward declines exponentially with increasing latency. The 
function is similar to that for The Traffic Light Task, but subjects are effectively given a 100ms 
‘head start’ as the unpredictable target position increased mean latencies. 
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R=reward (in pence), A=150, ts = time of saccade, tα = time of amber onset, t� = time of red light onset, 
κ=0.1 
 
Figure 3.3  The Reverse Traffic Light Task 
Participants are asked to fixate a green light, which turns amber (A). The amber duration on 
each trial varies normally (� 1500ms, σ 500ms, C). To achieve a high reward, subjects must wait 
until the amber light is almost finished before making a saccade (A). However, if they wait too 
long the red light onset heralds a fixed penalty of -10p (B). Correct saccades are encouraged by 
an exponentially increasing reward with reduced STOP anticipation intervals (D). 
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Figure 3.4  Reverse Traffic Light Reward Function Varies According 
to Amber Duration 
As the amber duration varies, the exponential reward function is ‘fitted into’ this interval so 
that the same maximal reward (150 pence) can be achieved on each trial. That is to say that the 
calculation of the reward function varies with the amber duration on each trial. For very short 
amber durations, the reward climbs necessarily more steeply than it does for longer durations. 
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3.2.4  Traffic Light Task  
24 young healthy volunteers who had completed the Traffic Light Task (Figure 2.1, see Chapter 
2) were invited to take part in the other tasks described in this chapter. In The Traffic Light 
Task, participants were told that their main aim was to win as much money as possible. They 
were asked to make rapid eye movements from a ‘traffic light’ (coloured disc 3 degrees in 
diameter) to a target cross (3x3 degrees), both presented on a computer monitor (60cm from the 
chin rest/plane of the eye). The traffic light and target were 10 degrees either side of the screen 
center (Figure 2.1). Subjects were requested to fixate the traffic light stimulus while it turned 
from red (duration 1000 ms) through amber to green. They were asked to make their 20 degree 
saccade to the target cross as quickly as possible and as soon after the GO signal as possible. They 
had a maximum of 1000ms in which to respond. 
 
The reward (R) for a successful saccade was calculated by an exponentially decaying 
discounting function in the form: 
 
 
 
Where a = 150, k1=100 and t represents the saccade onset time relative to green onset (t0 , 
milliseconds). 
 
This steep discounting function (Figure 2.1C) generated disproportionately high rewards for 
short saccadic reaction times (SRTs). Saccades with latencies of 400ms after green light onset 
were rewarded with only 2.8 pence; SRT=300ms made 7.5 pence while SRT=200ms generated 
20.3 pence. Saccades with shorter latencies than this were far more highly rewarded: a response 
with SRT=100ms made 55.2 pence and 50ms led to a reward of 91.0 pence. But note that to make 
these high rewards, subjects would have to anticipate green light onset because saccades 
typically take ~200 ms to programme (White et al., 1962). In other words, they would have to 
make a decision – take a risk – to programme a saccade before the onset of the GO! signal. Such 
saccades, with latency <200ms and reward >20 pence were signalled by a reinforcing 
“Kerching!” sound whereas slower correct responses resulted in a simple “Ping”. 
Saccades that were actually made before the green light incurred a small, fixed penalty of 10 
pence. Error trials were accompanied by an unpleasant audible beep and a visual warning, 
‘STOP POLICE! Fine £0.10.’.  
 
The timing of the GO signal (green light) onset was not absolutely predictable from trial to trial. 
Instead, the duration of the amber light was randomly selected on each trial from a normal 
distribution (mean 750ms, SD 125ms). To perform optimally, participants therefore needed to 
make as many rewarded anticipations as possible, while keeping errors to a minimum. They 
had to make a choice of whether to stay (wait longer) or go and risk a small penalty versus the 
possibility of a large reward. 
 
On gaze arriving at the target cross (fixation tolerance 2o), subjects received both aural and 
visual feedback on their performance. They were shown the reward (in pence) on the trial just 
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completed, and a running total beneath (in pounds). There were also aural cues to trial 
performance. For rewards of less than 20 pence, they heard a ‘ping’. For rewards of 20 pence or 
more, they heard a more rewarding ‘kerching!’ sound. The target cross was then replaced by a 
red light (circle) and a target cross now appeared on the opposite side of the screen to begin the 
next trial. To perform optimally, subjects should therefore make as many anticipations as 
possible, but as few errors as possible. Subjects performed ten blocks of fifty trials, the first trial 
in each block started from a left sided stimulus (rightward saccade) and then alternated.  
 
The main performance indicator for subjects was the reward achieved on each trial and the 
cumulative reward at the end of each block of 50 trials. We have established that the number of 
anticipations (responses made with latency <200ms) relative to errors (responses made before 
the green “Go!” signal, <0ms) is a good measure of task performance (Chapter 2). 
 
3.2.5  The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) 
Subjects (n=201) were recruited by email from the staff and students of University College 
London. They were invited by group email to complete an on-line (html) version of the BIS-11 
(Patton et al., 1995) [see appendix], which was then submitted electronically. The resultant text 
string was converted into scores and subscales using a program written in the PERL 
programming language. Ethical approval was sought from and granted by the UCL graduate 
research ethics committee. These results of this survey were used as normative data for 
comparison with studied groups in the experiments described in this and later chapters. All 
subjects recruited to perform oculomotor tests were also administered the BIS-11 prior to eye 
movement testing. 
  
3.2.6  Cloninger Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire (TPQ) 
TPQ (version IV, Cloninger (1987), see Appendix) data was collected from 36 UCL students (17 
male, 19 female, mean age 22.9 years (range 18-33 years, SD 3.83)). The questionnaire contains 
100 short statements that might describe attitudes, opinions, interests or feelings. Subjects were 
asked to read each statement carefully and simply marked whether they agreed or disagreed 
with each statement by marking it true or false. The questionnaire took most subjects 10-15 
minutes to complete but they were able to take as long as they liked. Completed questionnaires 
were scored using Cloninger’s scoring keys and analysed using Matlab R2008a (The 
Mathworks, Massachusetts, USA). The same subjects had also completed the BIS-11 
questionnaire. 
 
3.2.7  Analysis 
Results are reported for each of the new tasks first of all. A cohort of 24 young volunteers was 
selected to perform all of the tasks and measures for the purposes of seeking correlations. 
Questionnaire data is discrete, rather than continuous, and therefore Spearman ranking is 
applied as a non-parametric test of correlation. For continuous data obtained from eye 
movement tasks, Pearson Correlations are reported. 
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3.3 Results 
3.3.1  SRT Task 
Young volunteers (n=47) performing the SRT task produced typical recinormal distributions 
(Reddi and Carpenter, 2000) of saccades with mean 338ms, (SD 68ms, median 315ms) (Figure 
3.5A, see Chapter 2). The middle-aged volunteers (n=13) produced a similar recinormal 
distribution (Figure 3.5B). An F-Test revealed that the two samples did not differ significantly in 
variance  [p(F<=f) = 0.37]. The older group were slower to react, with a mean SRT of 411ms 
(SD 56ms, median 394ms). This difference was statistically significant (2-Tailed Student T-test, 
t(56) = -3.91, p<0.001).  
 
3.3.2  Lateral Reward Task 
On the lateral reward task, the young group (n=21) unrewarded saccade latency was non-
significantly longer (mean 228ms, SD 52ms) than the rewarded latency (mean 221ms, SD 50ms, 
1-Tailed Student T test, t(40) = 1.04, p=0.15). Likewise, the middle-aged group (n=15) 
unrewarded saccade latency was non-significantly longer (mean 235ms, SD 49ms) than the 
rewarded latency (mean 230ms, SD 49ms, 1-Tailed Student T-test, t(28)=0.74, p=0.23). There 
were no significant differences in latency between the two groups in either unrewarded or 
rewarded saccades, but the trend was for the young group to be faster in both conditions. 
 
3.3.3  Reverse Traffic Light Task  
On the reverse traffic light task, I refer to the difference between the programmed time of the 
“Stop!” signal (red light) and the time at which subjects made their saccades as the Stop 
Anticipation Interval (SAI).  
 
Young Volunteers 
Young volunteers (n=24) anticipated the stop signal with a mean SAI of 370ms (SD 149ms, 
median 393ms) (Figure 3.6). This led to a mean reward of 12.9 pence (SD 5.1p) per trial (Figure 
3.7B). The pseudo-normal distribution of saccade onset with respect to the amber light is shown 
in Figure 3.7A. The mean onset was at 1131ms (SD 155ms, median 1089ms), so participants 
responded, on average, earlier than the mean amber duration (1500ms).  
 
Middle Aged Volunteers 
The middle-aged controls (n=13) produced a SAI that was non-significantly greater at 393ms 
(SD 89ms, median 402ms) than the younger group. This generated a lower mean reward of 9.3 
pence per trial (SD 3.1p, Figure 3.8B). The group performance resulted from a similar 
distribution of reaction times with respect to the amber light onset; with a mean of 1088ms 
(SD387ms, median 1072ms) see Figure 3.8A. This is even earlier than the younger group with 
respect to the mean amber duration.  
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Figure 3.5A  Saccade distribution produced by young volunteers 
(n=46) performing the SRT task. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5B  Saccade distribution produced by middle-aged 
volunteers (n=13) performing the SRT task. 
 
x axes: saccade onset latency (milliseconds) 
y axes: probability density 
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Figure 3.6  Stop Anticipatory Interval on Reverse Traffic Light task 
 
The stop anticipatory interval (SAI) is plotted for 24 young volunteers after being multiplied by 
-1 (in order to visually replicate the task where the stop signal occurs at time = 0). SAI is 
calculated by subtracting the saccadic response latency (with respect to amber onset) from the 
stop signal latency (time of red light onset) on each trial. 
 
The red line represents the red light onset. 
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Figure 3.7A  Reaction Times from amber onset for young volunteers
 
Figure 3.7B  Reward Distribution for young volunteers performing 
the reverse traffic light task 
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Figure 3.8A  Reaction Times from amber onset for middle aged 
volunteers performing the reverse traffic light task. 
 
Figure 3.8B  Reward Distribution for middle aged volunteers (n=8) 
performing the reverse traffic light task. 
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3.3.4 BIS 11 
The UCL data (Figures 3.9 & 3.10) is similar to that reported in the Baylor study (see Table 3.1 
and (Patton et al., 1995)). The mean total BIS-11 score was 61.03 (SD 9.17, range 42-92). This was 
not significantly different (using Welch’s T-test (Welch, 1947)) from the Baylor study mean 
(63.82, SD 10.17). There were no significant gender differences for the total or any of the sub-
scores in the UCL group.  
 
There was, however, an effect of age on the UCL BIS-11 data: Subjects indicated their age as 18-
25, 26-35, 36-45 or 46-55 (older categories were available but there were no respondents in these 
categories). The 18-25 year olds (n=111) scored significantly lower than the other age groups 
combined (BIS(18-25) total mean=59.68, SD 8.52; BIS(rest) mean = 62.69, SD 9.70; 2-Tailed Student’s T 
test:  t(198) = -2.33, p=0.02). This total difference was mostly due to a significant differences in 
the motor impulsiveness (MI) factor (MI(18-25) mean= 21.3; MI(rest) mean = 23.0; 2-Tailed Student’s T 
test:  t(199) = -3.18, p<0.01).  
 
Despite being very few in number, the oldest group (46-55, n=6) had a significantly lower mean 
BIS-11 score (BIS total mean=53.00, SD 7.77) than the remainder (BIS(46-55) mean= 53.00; BIS(rest) mean 
= 61.3; 2-Tailed Student’s T test:  t(198) = -2.21, p=0.03). By contrast, the 26-35 year olds (n=65, 
BIS total mean=63.09, SD 9.07) and 36-45 year olds (n=18, BIS total mean=65.00, SD 10.98) both 
scored higher when compared to the remainder. The 26-35 year old group was large enough for 
this result to reach statistical significance: BIS-11(26-35) mean = 63.09; BIS-11(rest) = 60.1, 2-Tailed 
Student’s T test:  t(198) = 2.18, p=0.03); BIS-11(36-45) mean = 65.00; BIS-11(rest) = 60.7; n.s.). These 
differences may reflect sampling differences and/or natural changes in self-report with age as 
well as real differences in impulsivity with increasing age. 
 
The young volunteer group who completed all of the measures were also significantly more 
impulsive as rated on the BIS-11 (mean = 68.83, SD 10.01; 2-tailed Student T-test, t(223)=3.06, 
p=0.002).  
 
Significant differences were found in total scores between both the youngest and the oldest 
groups of subjects when compared with the remaining groups. Both of these groups scored 
lower on the BIS than the two middle-aged groups, who were rated as more impulsive.  
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Figure 3.9  Box and whisker plot of responses to the BIS-11 from the 
survey of 201 UCL students and staff. 
Figure 3.10  BIS-11 scores, factors and sub-factors by age group from 
the UCL survey. 
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Bis-11 totals Males Females Whole Group 
Group Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
 
UCL Respondents 
(m72, f129) 
61.3 8.57 60.9 9.51 61.03 9.17 
 
Young Volunteers 
(m12, f12) 
68.83 10.01 61.15 17.82 67.13* 9.67 
 
Middle Aged 
Controls 
(m11, f3) 
65.82 12.60 64.33 11.02 65.50 11.88 
 
Table 3.1  BIS-11 Scores 
There were no significant differences between the UCL and middle-aged controls. However, the 
young volunteers were also rated significantly more impulsive than the UCL group,. *2-tailed 
Student T-test, t(223)=3.06, p=0.002. 
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3.3.5  Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire (TPQ) 
No significant differences were found between male and female scores on the TPQ (Table 3.2). 
The scores were also similar to previously reported UK data (Otter et al., 1995) see appendix. 
 
3.3.6  Between-Measure Correlations 
A main aim of the experiments described in this chapter was for comparison and validation of 
novel and established measures of rewarded decision making and impulsivity. Correlations 
were sought between performance indicators from each of the oculomotor tasks for 24 healthy 
young volunteers (12 female; mean age 23) and selected BIS-11 and TPQ scores. Such 
correlations have previously been demonstrated with psychometric tasks including those 
studying oculomotor behaviour. I have not reported within task or within measure correlations 
here. The statistical significance of each correlation is first tested individually. I later highlight 
those correlations that withstand Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. 
 
There were no BIS-11 correlations with mean SRT task saccadic latencies. However, there were 
three main points of correlation between the BIS-11 and other oculomotor task performance 
indicators (Table 3.3). 
 
The indicators selected included: 
a) Reward on the Reverse Traffic Light Task (RTL); RTL Stop Anticipation Interval 
(SAI) 
b) Errors on the Traffic Light Task (a putative marker of dysfunctional impulsivity) 
c) Anticipations (correct responses made at <200ms): Errors (incorrect responses 
made at <0ms) ratio (AER) on the Traffic Light Task (a marker of functional 
impulsivity) 
d) Mean saccade latencies to unrewarded (LRU) and rewarded (LRR) targets on the 
Lateral Reward Task. 
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The results of this analysis found that: 
 
1. There was a significant positive correlation between the Attention (first order 
factor) score and reward in the reverse traffic light task (Spearman’s Rho (22df) = 
0.475, p=0.019). This result is consistent with poor attenders (as rated by BIS-11) 
performing better on this task. This may reflect the lack of external stimulus for a 
saccade or perhaps an unintended advantage for those subjects who were prone to 
allowing their minds to wander during the task. 
2. The Motor (BIS-11, first order factor) score correlated significantly and positively 
with reward in the reverse traffic light task (Spearman’s Rho (22df) = 0.445, 
p=0.029). Higher scores in this dimension also negatively correlated with both 
errors on the Traffic Light Task (Spearman’s Rho (22df) = -0.457, p=0.025) and 
saccadic latencies in the Lateral Reward Task (both unrewarded (Spearman’s Rho 
(22df) = -0.412, p=0.046) and rewarded (Spearman’s Rho (22df) = -0.439, p=0.032). 
3. The Attentional Impulsiveness Dimension (second order factor) was significantly 
positively correlated with reward in the Traffic Light Task (Spearman’s Rho (22df) 
= 0.636, p<0.001). This was associated with a negative correlation with Stop 
Anticipation Interval (SAI), as one would expect (Spearman’s Rho (22df) = -0.420, 
p=0.041).  This dimension also positively correlated with a greater 
Anticipations:Errors Ratio (AER) in The Traffic Light Task (Spearman’s Rho (22df) 
= 0.492, p=0.015). It was also negatively correlated with mean saccade latency to 
rewarded targets in the Lateral Reward Task (Spearman’s Rho (22df) = -0.430, 
p=0.036). 
 
TPQ scores did not significantly correlate with any oculomotor task indices. 
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TPQ Scores  UCL Male N=17 UCL Female N=19 
Novelty Seeking Mean SD Mean SD 
NSI 6.00 1.37 4.89 2.11 
NS2 2.88 1.87 4.05 2.20 
NS3 4.12 1.83 3.58 1.84 
NS4 6.18 2.21 5.16 1.89 
Total NS 19.18 5.41 17.68 5.62 
Harm Avoidance Mean SD Mean SD 
HA1 2.82 2.04 3.21 2.46 
HA2 2.29 2.08 3.37 2.17 
HA3 2.24 1.75 2.68 1.95 
HA4 3.29 2.23 3.05 3.05 
Total HA 10.65 6.14 12.32 6.84 
Reward Dependence Mean SD Mean SD 
RD1 3.65 1.17 3.74 0.81 
RD2 4.53 2.00 5.00 2.38 
RD3 6.94 2.77 7.42 2.83 
RD4 2.82 1.38 2.58 1.64 
Total RD 17.94 4.62 18.74 4.63 
 
Table 3.2 TPQ scores from UCL Students 
 There were no significant differences between male and female scores in the UCL data. For 
comparison with normative data, see appendix. 
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Score	   Attention	   Motor	   Self-­‐Control	   Cognitive	  
Complexity	  
Perseverance	   Cognitive	  
Instability	  
AI	   MI	   NPI	   Total	  
RTL	  £	   0.475,	  
p=0.019	  
0.445,	  
p=0.029	  
	   	   	   	   0.636,	  
p<0.001	  
	   	   	  
SAI	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.420,	  
p=0.041	  
	   	   	  
TL	  Errors	   	   -­‐0.457,	  
p=0.025	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
AER	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.492,	  
p=0.015	  
	   	   	  
LRU	   	   -­‐0.412,	  
p=0.046	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
LRR	   	   -­‐0.439,	  
p=0.032	  
	   	   	   	   -­‐0.430,	  
p=0.036	  
	   	   	  
 
Table 3.3 Significant correlations between BIS-11 subscores (columns) and oculomotor task scores. 
Values shown are Spearman’s Correlation Coefficients (Rho), with 22 degrees of freedom, followed by their statistical significance (2-tailed test). 
Value in bold survives Bonferroni correction for multiple (10) comparisons, by adjusting the accepted significance level to p<0.005. 
 
BIS-11: AI= Attentional Impulsiveness; MI = Motor Impulsiveness; NPI = Non-Planning Impulsiveness. RTL £ = Reverse Traffic Light task mean reward; SAI = Mean Stop 
Anticipation Interval; TL Errors = Mean Traffic Light task Errors; AER = Mean Anticipations:Errors Ratio [Traffic Light Task]; LRU = Lateral Reward Task Mean Unrewarded 
Saccade Latency; LRR = Lateral Reward Task Mean Rewarded Saccade Latency.  
  108 
3.3.7 Oculomotor Tasks Correlations  (Table 3.4) 
As one might predict, there was a significant positive correlation between mean SRT and mean 
reaction time on the Traffic Light Task, (Pearson’s r(22) = 0.454, p<0.05). Mean SRT also 
significantly negatively correlated with Anticipations:Errors Ratio (AER) in the Traffic Light 
Task (Pearson’s r(22) = -0.555, p<0.05 (2-tailed)). Thus faster subjects were, on the whole, likely 
to make more correct early responses than slower subjects. Performance on the lateral reward 
task was similarly correlated significantly with Anticipations:Errors Ratio (AER) in the Traffic 
Light Task (LRU, Pearson’s r(22) = -0.512, p<0.02 (2-tailed); LRR, Pearson’s r(22) = -0.627, 
p<0.001 (2-tailed)).  
 
A significant positive correlation was between reward obtained on the Reverse Traffic Light Task 
and the Anticipations:Errors Ratio (AER) in the Traffic Light Task (Pearson’s r(22) = 0.498, 
p<0.02 (2-tailed)).  This suggests that Traffic Light Task performance is dependent upon more 
than simple saccadic speeding (since anticipatory responding is so highly rewarded). The 
correlation between a high Traffic Light Task AER and both fast SRTs and high Reverse Traffic 
Light Task Rewards suggests that there may be common features to optimal performance in 
both tasks, despite marked differences in the strategies required. In support of this notion, Stop 
Anticipation Interval (SAI) was significantly negatively correlated with Anticipation/Error 
Ratio on the traffic light task (Pearson’s r(22) = 0.407, p<0.05). A low SAI requires waiting for as 
long as possible without waiting too long and thereby incurring a penalty. In contrast, a high 
AER demonstrates the ability to anticipate accurately, and go as fast as possible without making 
excessive early responses (thereby generating too many errors). Correlation between these two 
measures suggests that the abilities to “wait” for reward under risk and “anticipate” for reward 
under risk are common traits within individuals. 
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Indicator SRT SAI RTL £ AER 
 
TL RT 
 
0.454, 
p<0.05 
   
 
AER 
 
-0.503, 
p<0.02 
 
-0.407, 
p<0.05 
 
0.498, 
p<0.02 
 
 
LRU 
    
-0.512, 
p<0.02 
 
LRR 
    
-0.628, 
p<0.001 
 
Table 3.4 Significant correlations between oculomotor task performance 
indicators 
 
Values shown are Pearson’s Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient (r) with 22 degrees of 
freedom, followed by their statistical significance (2-tailed test). 
 
Value in bold survives Bonferroni correction for multiple (9) comparisons, which reduces the 
accepted significance level to p<0.005. 
 
RTL £ = Reverse Traffic Light task mean reward; SAI = Mean Stop Anticipation Interval; TL Errors = 
Mean Traffic Light task Errors; AER = Mean Anticipations:Errors Ratio [Traffic Light Task]; LRU = 
Lateral Reward Task Mean Unrewarded Saccade Latency; LRR = Lateral Reward Task Mean Rewarded 
Saccade Latency.  
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BIS-11 correlations with TPQ (Table 3.5) 
 
There were significant positive correlations between dimensions, factors and total BIS-11 score 
with dimensions of the TPQ (see Table 3.5). 
 
1) Positive correlations were found between BIS-11 Factors/Dimensions and TPQ Novelty 
Seeking (NS): The Attention Factor correlated positively with NS (TPQ) (Spearman’s 
Rho (22df) = 0.737, p<0.0001). The Motor Impulsiveness (BIS-11) score showed a weaker 
but still significant correlation with Novelty Seeking (NS(TPQ), Spearman’s Rho (22df) 
= 0.442, p=0.03) as did the Motor Impulsiveness (MI) dimension (Spearman’s Rho (22df) 
= 0.502, p<0.012) and the BIS-11 Total Score (Spearman’s Rho (22df) = 0.470, p<0.021). 
Of these, only the Attention Factor correlation survives adjustment of the accepted 
significance level to p<0.005 (Bonferroni correction for 10 comparisons). 
 
2) Negative correlations were found between BIS-11 Factors/Dimensions and TPQ Harm 
Avoidance (HA):  The Self-Control (BIS-11) Factor negatively correlated with Harm 
Avoidance on the TPQ (HA(TPQ), Spearman’s Rho (22df) = -0.611, p=0.001). Similarly, 
the Perseverance Factor negatively correlated with Harm Avoidance on the TPQ 
(HA(TPQ), Spearman’s Rho (22df) = -0.477, p=0.018) as did the Non-Planning 
Impulsiveness (NPI) dimension (Spearman’s Rho (22df) = -0.510, p=0.011) and the BIS-
11 Total Score (Spearman’s Rho (22df) = -0.596, p=0.002). Of these, the Perseverance 
Factor and BIS-11 Total Score correlations survive adjustment of the accepted 
significance level to p<0.005 (Bonferroni correction for 10 comparisons). 
 
3) No correlations were found with TPQ Reward Dependence (RD). 
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Table 3.5 Significant correlations between BIS-11 subscores (columns) and TPQ subscores (rows). 
 
Values are of Spearman’s Correlation Coefficient (Rho), with 22 degrees of freedom, statistical significances are for a 2-tailed test. BIS-11: AI= Attentional 
Impulsiveness; MI = Motor Impulsiveness; NPI = Non-Planning Impulsiveness. TPQ: NS = Novelty Seeking; HA = Harm Avoidance; RD = Reward Dependence. 
Values in bold survive Bonferroni correction for multiple (10) comparisons, by adjusting the accepted significance level to p<0.005. 
Score	   Attention	   Motor	   Self-­‐Control	   Cognitive	  
Complexity	  
Perseverance	   Cognitive	  
Instability	  
AI	   MI	   NPI	   Total	  
	  
NS	  
	  
0.737,	  
p<0.0001	  
	  
0.442,	  
p=0.03	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
0.502,	  
p=0.012	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
0.470,	  
p=0.021	  
	  
HA	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
-­‐0.611,	  
p=0.001	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
-­‐0.477,	  
p=0.018	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
-­‐0.510,	  
p=0.011	  
	  
-­‐0.596,	  
p=0.002	  
	  
RD	  
	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
-­‐	  
	  
-­‐	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3.4 Discussion 
3.4.1. Findings 
We have developed a battery of oculomotor tasks that assesses various components of 
oculomotor decision-making. The Traffic Light Task (Chapter 2) requires a combination of 
rapid, reactive saccadic responses and the willingness and motivation to make (highly 
rewarded) anticipatory responses. However, this must be tempered by avoidance of excessive 
erroneous responding. The novel and adapted tasks described here allow further exploration of 
these components. 
 
Mean SRT task saccade latency correlated significantly with mean reaction time in the Traffic 
Light Task. The mean SRT was also significantly negatively correlated with the ratio of 
Anticipations to Errors (AER) in the Traffic Light Task, as were mean saccade latencies in the 
Lateral Reward task (both rewarded and unrewarded). That is to say faster subjects were, on 
the whole, likely to make more correct early responses than were slower subjects. SRT task 
performance was not correlated with personality measures (BIS-11 or TPQ), their factors or 
dimensions. 
 
The lateral reward task demonstrated baseline non-significant reward-related speeding of 
saccade initiation in both young and middle aged volunteers. There was a significant negative 
correlation between both rewarded and unrewarded mean saccade latencies and AER in the 
traffic light task. One might expect correlations with SRT task latency, in particular, but this was 
not found to be  statistically significant. These tasks are not identical however: The target in the 
SRT task is entirely predictable, whereas the Lateral Reward Task demands a response to an 
unpredictable target, appearing with 50% probability on each side with each trial. Furthermore, 
saccades are rewarded in the Lateral Reward Task and this may motivate slower responders in 
the SRT task to respond more quickly, thereby reducing the correlation. Faster SRT responders 
may already be “at ceiling”.  
 
Significant negative correlations were also found between mean latencies and two BIS-11 factors 
(the motor factor and Attentional Impulsiveness dimension (Table 3.6) – correlations that did 
not exist for the SRT task. Despite a lack of statistically significant reward-related speeding, it 
would therefore appear that the Lateral Reward task is sensitive to something more than simple 
saccadic reaction time, and may be sensitive to reward-related (functional) impulsivity. 
 
The reverse traffic light task (RTL) allows insight into subjects’ willingness to take risk and is 
not dependent upon simple motor reaction times. There is no exogenous stimulus to initiate the 
saccade. The recinormal distribution typical of “reactive” saccadic tasks is not seen. A positive 
correlation between mean reward in this task and the Anticipation:Error Ratio (AER) in The 
Traffic Light Task suggests that both tasks are sensitive to mechanisms other than those 
governing simple reactive saccade generation. Furthermore, this correlation suggests that 
common qualities, such as sensitivity to reward and willingness to take risk, may be required to 
perform optimally in both tasks. Reward in the RTL task is significantly correlated with the 
Attentional Impulsiveness (AI, second order factor) score of the BIS-11. This may reflect the 
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peculiar task demands that do not require responsiveness to an external saccade-generating 
stimulus. In support of this reasoning, there is a negative correlation between AI and reward on 
the Lateral Reward Task, in which paying attention is more beneficial. In this task, where 
waiting as long as possible is rewarded highly, subjects who are less focused on the task, may 
carry some small advantage. 
 
The inverse relationship between mean SRT and AER in concert with a positive correlation 
between AER and mean RTL rewards neatly fits with a model of successful traffic light task 
performance that depends upon a combination of speed, timing, reward sensitivity and 
willingness to take risk. Oculomotor performance correlations between tasks and with the BIS-
11 support the inference that the tasks might be sensitive to impulsivity. 
 
The Cloninger tridimensional personality questionnaire (TPQ) measured similar personality 
traits and scores correlated with the BIS-11 but not with oculomotor task performance. In light 
of this, the TPQ was used primarily to screen for novelty seeking tendency in participants of the 
dopaminergic studies described in chapters 5 & 6 but it was not used for patient experiments. 
 
3.4.2  Significance of these findings 
Impulsivity can be measured through self-report questionnaires or laboratory based tasks. 
Despite being used interchangeably, the relationship between these measures is generally small, 
suggesting that they may measure disparate aspects of impulsive behaviour (Keilp et al., 2005; 
Dalley et al., 2008; Cyders and Coskunpinar, 2011; Aichert et al., 2012; Cyders and Coskunpinar, 
2012). Self-reported impulsivity measures can include sensation seeking, risk-taking, lack of 
planning, perseverance, and acting on impulses (Whiteside and Lynam, 2001) whereas 
laboratory impulsivity measures can include inhibitory control tasks assessing the ability  to 
suppress a prepotent response (response inhibition) or a conflicting, competing response 
(interference control), as well as impulsive choice tasks (e.g. delay discounting) and time 
estimation measures (Dougherty et al., 2005; Friedman and Miyake, 2004; Nigg, 2000; Robbins 
et al., 2012). 
 
Behavioural measures can be criticised for employing “sanitised” laboratory presentation 
conditions that fails to reflect real world pressures upon an individual’s decision making 
(Enticott et al., 2006). Measures using self-report may reflect more stable personality differences 
and reflect impulsive behaviours over time, whereas lab-based behavioural measures – 
especially of prepotent response inhibition - can necessarily only measure a “snapshot” of 
impulsivity through responses made in a discrete time period (Enticott and Ogloff, 2006). The 
benefit of such behavioural measurement, by contrast, is that it allows quantitative measurement 
of changes in behaviour over time (Keilp et al., 2005), [see also Chapter 4]. Performance 
measures offer the promise of being sensitive to conditional manipulations, for example reward 
and/or drug effects, and of providing a quantitative measure of the elemental behavioural 
tendencies that constitute impulsive traits (Dougherty et al., 2002). We sought to develop a 
battery of oculomotor tasks that could be used in conjunction with self-report measures in order 
that we might better establish task outcomes that might predict unfavourable outcome 
behavaiours in those who might not yet rate themselves as impulsive. 
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Formal psychometric conceptions of impulsivity implicate a number of cognitive factors 
including attention, reward processing, response inhibition, probability and response selection 
(Evenden, 1999b; Tzagarakis et al., 2013). Previous studies have demonstrated that oculomotor 
tasks – particularly those requiring inhibitory control (or prepotent response inhibition) – relate 
more closely to self-report measures of impulsivity than other behavioural measures such as 
manual tasks (Jacob et al., 2010; Roberts et al., 2011). We have therefore designed oculomotor 
tasks that index those cognitive factors thought important in impulsivity.  
 
Ideally outcomes of these tasks would relate to “real-world” behavioural outcomes, better 
assessed by self-report. BIS-11 scores have previously been associated with both Go/Nogo and 
antisaccade performance (Spinella, 2004). Associations between BIS-11 scores and Go/Nogo 
commission errors are frequently reported (Enticott et al., 2006; Keilp et al., 2005; Reynolds et 
al., 2006). Total BIS-11 impulsivity sum scores have been shown to correlate with tests of pre-
potent response inhibition (antisaccade, Stroop, stop-signal and Go/Nogo tasks). However, 
despite a very large number of subjects  (n=504), correlations of second-order factors were not 
found to be significant after correction for multiple comparisons (Aichert et al., 2012). We have 
demonstrated an association between performances on three rewarded, oculomotor tasks and 
BIS-11 first and second order factors, one of which is significant after Bonferroni correction. This 
supports the notion that rewarded oculomotor tasks other than measures of prepotent response 
inhibition (e.g. antisaccades) can be used to index reward motivated behaviour and impulse 
control. Further study with greater subject numbers might lead to demonstration of a greater 
number of significant correlations – including with the BIS-11 total score, as has been 
demonstrated by other studies e.g. (Aichert et al., 2012). 
 
We might speculatively infer something of the relevant neural mechanisms in our tasks by 
comparison with other imaging studies that use the BIS-11 and/or oculomotor tasks. The 
relevance of frontal pathology in diseases known to cause impulsivity is consistent with the 
finding that various grey matter volumes - including frontal regions - have been found to 
correlate with total scores and/or subscales of the BIS-11 (Lee et al., 2011; Matsuo et al., 2009). 
The BIS-11 scale has also been applied in combined behavioural and dynamic (functional) 
neuroimaging studies e.g. (Horn et al., 2003), thereby enabling further inference about relevant 
brain areas. A functional imaging study using a Go/Nogo task found negative correlations 
between the motor impulsiveness subscale of the BIS-11 and Nogo related activation of the right 
DLPFC (Asahi et al., 2004). This result relates a “stable” BIS-11 personality factor related to real 
world decision making with a temporally discrete task-related physiology (fMRI BOLD signal) 
in sanitised laboratory conditions. Furthermore, this finding relates to a brain area thought 
relevant to oculomotor decision-making (Kim	  and	  Shadlen,	  1999;	  Pierrot-­‐Deseilligny	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  
Pierrot-­‐Deseilligny	   et	   al.,	   2003). Moreover, the prefrontal cortex receives reciprocal striatal 
connections which are likely to be modulated by dopaminergic transmission (Alexander	  et	  al.,	  
1986;	  Daw	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Kröner	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Leh	  et	  al.,	  2007).  
 
Our findings of correlations between oculomotor task indices (RTL reward, Stop Anticipation 
Interval (SAI), AER and rewarded saccades in the Lateral Reward task) and the Attentional 
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Impulsiveness (AI) BIS-11 dimension and, similarly, of correlations between the  “Motor” factor 
of the BIS-11 with an overlapping set of oculomotor outcomes (RTL Reward, Traffic Light Task 
Errors and saccadic latencies in the Lateral Reward task) suggest that the oculomotor tasks 
developed here may interrogate important decision-making neural substrates. Further, it 
suggests that our tasks may be sensitive to changes in brain areas relevant to both oculomotor 
decision-making and that dopaminergic modulation, whether deliberate (through drug effects) 
or due to incident pathology, might modulate corticostriatal connections that influence 
oculomotor decision-making. 
 
This possibility is explored in the remaining experimental chapters of this thesis (Chapters 4-7). 
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4. Dopamine reverses apathy due to focal 
globus pallidus lesions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I gratefully acknowledge the work of Bogdan Draganski, who performed the diffusion 
tractography and subsequent imaging analysis described in this chapter, using methods 
described previously (Draganski et al., 2008). 
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4.1 Introduction 
Apathy is a behavioural disorder associated with lack of motivation and reduced 
spontaneous initiation of actions (Dujardin et al., 2007; Marin, 1991). Although present in 
mild forms in some healthy people (Lampe et al., 2001), it is a pathological state in 
conditions such as Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s disease where it can have profoundly 
devastating effects (Chow et al., 2009; Dujardin et al., 2007; Oguru et al., 2010; Starkstein et 
al., 2006). Understanding the mechanisms underlying apathy is therefore of urgent concern 
but this has proven difficult because widespread brain changes in neurodegenerative 
diseases make interpretation difficult and there is no convincing animal model.  
 
Here I present a very rare human case with profound apathy following bilateral, focal 
lesions of the basal ganglia, with globus pallidus regions that connect with orbitofrontal 
(OFC) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) particularly affected. Using two 
measures of oculomotor decision-making I show that apathy in this individual was 
associated with reward-insensitivity. However, initiation of responses for higher reward 
could be established partially with levodopa and more effectively with a dopamine 
receptor agonist. Concomitantly, there was an improvement in the patient’s clinical state, 
with reduced apathy, greater motivation and increased social interactions. 
 
These findings provide a model system to study a key neuropsychiatric disorder. They 
demonstrate that reward-insensitivity associated with basal ganglia dysfunction might be 
an important component of apathy that can be reversed by dopaminergic modulation.  
 
It has long been known that damage to the medial frontal cortex can lead to apathy, with 
patients demonstrating what is sometimes termed ‘abulia’: reduced initiation of behaviour, 
lack of interest in their surroundings and loss of spontaneous emotional expression 
(Starkstein et al., 2008). A similar state can also occur after focal lesions of the basal ganglia 
(Bhatia and Marsden, 1994), with the most severe presentations associated with bilateral 
damage (Laplane and Dubois, 2001; Schmidt et al., 2008). Such cases are relatively rare, 
however, and although many aspects of their behaviour have been reported, there has been 
very little experimental study (but see Schmidt et al., 2008) and none have been studied on 
tests of motivation with dopaminergic modulation. 
 
Here we study one such individual with profound apathy (KD) following focal, bilateral 
lesions largely involving the globus pallidus of the basal ganglia who provides a rare 
opportunity to understand both the neurobiology and pharmacological modulation of the 
condition. We used two oculomotor tasks designed to probe reward-based decision-
making. In non-human primates, such behaviour has frequently been studied using eye 
movements, with globus pallidus neurons demonstrating reward-related activity on such 
oculomotor tasks (Hong and Hikosaka, 2008; Shin and Sommer, 2010).  
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4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Participants 
KD was a 41 year-old male referred nine months after suffering simultaneous, ischaemic strokes 
affecting the internal globus pallidus (GPi) bilaterally 9 months prior to initial testing. KD’s 
lesions involved the GPi on both sides, but with greater involvement on the left where it also 
affected a small part of the external segment (GPe). They included that portion of the ventral 
pallidum considered to be within the medial rostral GPi (Haber and Knutson, 2009), but did not 
extend ventrally below the level of the anterior commissure to affect the subcommissural 
ventral pallidum region. The ventral striatum as defined in recent human studies (Haber and 
Knutson, 2009; Mawlawi et al., 2001) was spared, as was the habenula, although of course 
connections to these regions, including pallidal projections, might well have been 
compromised.  
 
KD recovered physically within days of his strokes but demonstrated reduced spontaneous and 
social activity. He reported that friends complained he had become dull, lacking interest in 
doing anything. He lost his job because of poor performance, but lacked impetus to obtain 
unemployment benefit. A previously exuberant and outgoing type, he became reticent and 
reserved, unmotivated even to maintain personal hygiene. He had to move apartment. Despite 
previously being an earnest music enthusiast, after moving he failed to assemble his hi-fi 
system because he “couldn’t be bothered”. He spent most of his day sitting at home, doing 
nothing. 
 
He did not initiate conversation. Although he was aware of his change in behavior, he seemed 
to show little concern. Despite demonstrating pronounced apathy, he did not complain of low 
mood and was not objectively depressed. He denied biological symptoms of depression and did 
not score within the depressed range on three established scales (Montgomery-Åsberg 
Depression Rating Scale, Beck and Hamilton rating scales (Beck et al., 1988; Hamilton, 1960; 
Montgomery and Asberg, 1979). On the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale or BIS-11 (Patton et al., 
1995)) KD’s score (54) was normal. Verbal and performance IQ were also within the normal 
range. Neurological examination did not reveal any motor deficits. There were no signs of 
Parkinsonism. Neuropsychological testing demonstrated normal verbal and performance IQ. 
KD’s main complaint was of lack of interest in others and reduced spontaneity in everyday life. 
He lost his job and did very little on a day-to-basis, rarely leaving home.  
 
KD’s performance on two oculomotor tasks was compared to age-matched controls: Healthy 
volunteers (13 male, mean age = 41 (SD 5.7); 12 right-handed) completed both behavioural 
tasks.  On the BIS-11 mean total score was 65.3 (SD 11.6). Written consent was obtained from all 
participants, according to the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
4.2.2  Lesion anatomy, DaT scan and probabilistic diffusion 
tractography 
Structural T1-weighted Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) acquisitions were obtained at 1x1x1 
mm resolution (Figure 4.1). Several atlases were used to establish the extent of KD’s lesions 
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(Krauth et al., 2010; Morel, 2007; Prodoehl et al., 2008). Atrophy secondary to degeneration 
means that there is inevitably some distortion of anatomy, in addition to the lesions themselves. 
A method adapted from (Draganski et al., 2008) was used to obtain from 12 healthy, age-
matched male controls probability maps of projections from pallidum to thalamus in separate 
cortico-striato-pallido-thalamo-cortical loops. These were then superimposed on KD’s lesions in 
standard MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute) stereotactic space (Figures 4.2-4.5). Lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex (LOFC) ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and motor cortex (M1) 
were demarcated according to a recently published method (Desikan et al., 2006). 
 
SPECT (single photon emission computed tomography) imaging of the presynaptic dopamine 
transporter, 123I-ioflupane (DaT (Fuente-Fernández, 2012)) revealed good signal bilaterally in the 
caudate and putamen, demonstrating integrity of the nigrostriatal dopaminergic pathway, one 
possible locus at which dopaminergic drugs might be able to modulate behaviour. Although it 
is important to appreciate that dopaminergic receptors are also present in prefrontal cortex 
which was structurally intact in KD: another potential locus of action of dopaminergic 
compounds. 
 
4.2.3 Traffic Light Task 
We used the traffic light task (See Chapter 2) to study KD and his response to dopaminergic 
treatments. Participants have to anticipate when the light will turn green to obtain high 
rewards. They fixate a red light (3 degrees diameter) presented for 1000 ms that successively 
turns amber and then green (See Chapter 2) which is the signal to make a saccade to a target 
cross at 20 degrees horizontal eccentricity. Amber duration is not fixed but drawn 
probabilistically from a Gaussian distribution (mean 750ms, SD 125ms; see Chapter 2). Rewards 
on this task depend upon saccadic latency, with very fast responses given very high rewards 
(according to an exponential discounting function; see Chapter 2). But saccades made before the 
green light were penalized with a small, flat penalty.  
 
Because saccades take ~200 ms to initiate (White et al., 1962), any highly rewarded responses 
(latencies <200 ms) have to be programmed before the amber light turns green. Thus to 
maximize outcome, subjects need to anticipate when the amber will turn green, but not make a 
response beforehand. They need to make a decision about whether to initiate a response before 
the green light – and potentially obtain a high reward, but risk a penalty – or simply wait for the 
green light when they will receive a low reward, without risk of penalties. Participants were 
instructed to make as much money as possible. They performed ten blocks of fifty trials, the 
first trial in each block started from a left sided stimulus (rightward saccade) and then 
alternated. In order to characterize learning effects, a subgroup of six aged matched controls 
performed a further ten blocks of fifty trials in a repeat experimental session.  
  
The reward (R) for a successful saccade was calculated by an exponentially decaying 
discounting function in the form: 
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Where a = 150, k1=100 and t represents the saccade onset time relative to green onset (t0 , 
milliseconds). 
 
Saccades made in advance of the “Go!” signal were punished by a fixed negative reward of -10 
pence (10p). Rewards were displayed at the arrival site on each trial and a cumulative total was 
shown below this. Aural feedback was also given with a pleasant ‘ping’ for rewards of 0-19 p, 
and a more rewarding ‘ker-ching’ for rewards of 20p or more. A punished error trial was 
accompanied by a low-pitched ‘beep’ in addition to a visual cue that read, “STOP Police! Fine 
£0.10”. Eye position was recorded using an EyeLink 1000Hz eye tracker (SR Research Ltd, 
Ontario, Canada). The stimuli were displayed on a 22” CRT monitor (150Hz) at 60cm. 
 
Linear rise-to-threshold modelling  
It is not possible to establish definitively for any individual correct saccade whether or not it 
arose from an anticipatory or a reactive process. Because humans take ~200ms to plan and 
execute saccades in response to a visual cue, ‘reactive’ saccades – those made in response to 
green light onset – would be expected to have latencies of this order. Very early saccades (say 
<50ms after green onset) are likely to have been planned prior to green onset. However, there is 
a ‘grey area’ between these extremes. We therefore need a method to decide how many of the 
saccades were statistically most likely to arise from each distribution. 
 
Saccadic distributions have been well modelled by a linear rise-to-threshold process (Carpenter 
and Williams, 1995). We assumed two such processes, one triggered by the amber light and the 
other by the green. Thus, a rapid rise-to-threshold process elicited by green light onset would 
describe the distribution of reactive saccades. Whereas a slower, independent rise-to-threshold 
process describes anticipatory saccades triggered by amber light onset. According to this scheme, a 
saccade is generated by whichever process is first to reach threshold (Adam et al., 2012).  
 
The probability that a saccade has occurred by time t following amber onset (i.e. cumulative 
probability distribution) is described by: 
 
 
 
 
AΨ  and RΨ  indicate cumulative recinormal distributions describing anticipatory and 
reactive processes, respectively. Each distribution is parameterized by a mean (µ ) and 
variance (
2σ ) of the rate-of-rise, and defined in terms of the standard cumulative 
normal distribution Φ  as follows, for 0t > : 
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We used maximum likelihood estimation (Myung, 2003) to obtain best-fitting mean and 
variance parameters for each distribution. When applied to the combined data from all controls, 
the model estimates a mean for the reactive distribution of 299m, SD 31ms. We used a ’cut off’ 
maximum saccadic RT of 200ms, >3 SDs from the mean of the modelled reactive distribution, to 
count anticipatory saccades. Even when modelled individually, 200ms was a minimum of 2 SDs 
below the modelled reactive mean for each control subject.  
 
4.2.4  Lateral Reward Task 
We also tested participants on the lateral reward task (Chapter 3), a simple tool for assessing 
reward sensitivity. The subject is asked to fixate a central spot for 1000ms before making a 
saccade to a target which appears 10 degrees to the right or left (50% probability on each trial). 
Participants quickly learn that one side is rewarded whereas the other side is not, and normally 
reward sensitive individuals make faster responses to the rewarded side. Rewarded trials were 
acknowledged by the display of a pound coin and a number representing the magnitude of the 
reward in pence. Reward value was dependent on latency using a function similar to that in the 
traffic lights task. A red circle and a zero acknowledged unrewarded trials. The rewarded side 
changed every 10-14 trials. Participants performed two blocks of 120 trials, with a subgroup of 
six aged matched controls performing a repeat of these two blocks in order to investigate 
learning effects. The difference between the reaction times to the rewarded and unrewarded 
sides was taken as a measure of a subject’s sensitivity to reward as it reflects the modulation of 
behavior by reward.  
 
4.2.5  Dopaminergic drug challenges 
To investigate the effect of dopamine, KD received a single dose of levodopa in the form of 
Madopar 125 mg (100 mg L-dopa with a peripheral dopa-decarboxylase inhibitor, benserazide 
25mg), directly after performing the baseline tests. He was reassessed an hour later when peak 
levodopa levels were reached. Control participants also received the same drug dose but in a 
double-blinded, randomized fashion, so on one occasion they received placebo/drug and one 
week later they received the alternative. 
 
KD was then given slowly increasing doses, reaching Madopar CR (long acting preparation) 
125mg three times daily after eight weeks. Although there was moderate improvement in 
apathy, it was decided that there might be better response with a direct dopamine receptor 
agonist. L-dopa was therefore slowly discontinued and KD was off medication entirely for 4 
weeks (‘drug holiday’) before starting on the dopamine agonist ropinirole, initially 0.25 mg 
three times a day for 1 week, then increasing by 0.25 mg every week eventually to reach 1mg 
thrice daily after three weeks. After a further four weeks he was established on 4 mg once daily 
of the long-acting formulation of ropinirole (Requip XL).  
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4.3 Results 
4.3.1  Lesion anatomy and probabilistic tractography data 
KD’s lesions (Figures 4.1-4.3) involved the GPi bilaterally, with greater involvement on the left 
where it also affected a small part of the external segment (GPe). Using a recently validated 
atlas of the pallidum (Prodoehl et al., 2008) we found only modest damage to GPe on the left. 
There was no involvement of the habenula, subthalamic nucleus, septum, medial 
hypothalamus, midline thalamic nuclei, and bed nucleus of stria terminalis, verified using a MRI 
adapted version (Krauth et al., 2010) of the Morel histologically-based atlas (Morel, 2007). 
Probabilistic diffusion tractography was used to examine the topography of pallidal 
connections to cortex, via thalamus (Draganski et al., 2008). Probabilistic diffusion tractography 
(Figure 4.4) was used to examine the topography of pallidal connections to three cortical regions 
(Draganski et al., 2008). The region of GPi which is most strongly connected to lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex (LOFC) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was particularly 
affected, compared with projections to primary motor cortex (M1), more so on the left: vmPFC > 
M1 left Z = 5.41, right Z =3.51; LOFC > M1 Z = 5.33, right Z = 3.52 (all p < 0.001, uncorrected). 
 
4.3.2  Oculomotor baseline performance  
On the traffic lights task saccadic latencies in controls demonstrated a bimodal distribution 
(Figure 4.5). One population of saccades consisted of late responses with a peak distributed 
~280ms after green onset, consistent with eye movements made ‘reactively’ in response to the 
GO Signal. In addition, there was a population of early saccades with a peak at 63ms after green 
onset. These saccades are too fast to have been made in response to green onset and therefore 
correspond to eye movements programmed beforehand. 
 
To demarcate these two populations of saccades – anticipatory and reactive – we used linear 
rise-to-threshold modelling, assuming two independent processes, the first triggered by amber 
light onset and the second by the green light. The early, anticipatory responses can be further 
sub-divided into errors (eye movements before green onset) and correct anticipations (saccades 
after green onset, but planned in advance of it). A criterion of 200 ms was employed as a cut-off 
for correct anticipations (see Methods). Responses after this time were classified as ‘reactive’ 
saccades. 
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Figure 4.1  KD’s Pallidal Lesions 
Coronal T1 weighted Magnetic resonance Images of KD’s brain demonstrate the extent of his 
bilateral GPi lesions. The slice labelled zero corresponds to the anterior commisural plane, with 
positive values anterior to this and negative values showing slices posterior to this level. 
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Figure 4.2  Lesion Mapping 
The patient’s pallidal lesions are shown as 3D volumes in red and have been superimposed on 
connectivity-based probability maps derived from 10 healthy, age-matched male controls. The 
control subjects’ connectivity maps for the pallidum-thalamus-orbitofrontal cortex loop are 
shown in A with the cortical target area shown in red and orange in the inset (figure modified 
from Draganski 2008). Those for the pallidum-thalamus-M1 cortex loop are shown in B (blue 
cortical region in the inset). The jet coloured scale indexes group average connectivity 
probabilities for the two loops, with “hot” colours indicating higher probabilities. The centre of 
mass for pallidum-thalamus connections to orbitofrontal cortex is contained within the lesion 
(A), while those to M1 are not (B). The images are rendered into standard MNI (Montreal 
Neurological Institute) stereotactic space. 
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Figure 4.3 KD’s GPi lesions projected onto anatomical boundaries of basal 
ganglia. 
 KD’s GPi lesion was larger on the left than on the right. The lesions are projected onto 
boundaries of the GPi (orange), GPe (yellow) and putamen (green). 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Lesion 
location in relation to 
pallido-thalamo-
cortico projections. 
a) For DTI analysis, three 
cortical sites are shown: 
LOFC (yellow), VMPFC 
(red) and M1 (blue).  
b) Regression coefficients 
(betas) extracted from the 
voxel of maximum 
intensity within the lesion 
on the left (L) and right 
(R) for the three tracts. 
High values indicate that 
the tract passes through 
the lesion with a high 
probability.  
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Using this cut-off, controls demonstrated a high proportion of early responses (mean 42% 
saccades, SD 18.95). Half of these were correct anticipations (21% saccades, SD  8.64). The rest 
were errors, i.e. early responses before the green light (21% saccades, SD 14.35). Overall the 
mean correct Anticipations: Errors Ratio [AER]) for controls was 1.53 (SD 0.87), with mean 
reward 18p/trial (SD 4.6p). AER correlated well with mean reward obtained (R2=0.77; 
p<0.0001). In contrast, KD’s distribution of saccades was unimodal, with the majority of 
responses being made only after green light onset (Figure 4.5). Nearly all his eye movements 
were reactive, with only 8.0% being early responses, significantly different from controls (Z=2.8, 
p=0.003). Furthermore, the majority of these were errors; correct anticipations formed only 2.2% 
of saccades (Z=2.8, p=0.003). His AER was 0.4 and he obtained only 14p/trial.  
 
Analysis of learning showed that controls gradually increased the proportion of early responses 
such that there was a significant difference between the first epoch of 100 trials (30.5 % early 
responses, SD 25.20) and the third epoch of 100 trials  (44.6 % saccades, 21.24) (p = 0.0271). A 
subset of six aged matched controls performed a second session (a further 500 trials) to check 
whether there is any ongoing learning. The proportion of early responses in these subjects 
remained relatively constant from the end of the first session (45%) to the end of the second 
session (48%) with no significant difference to suggest further learning (p >0.1).  In contrast to 
controls, KD showed no learning with 8% early responses in the first 100 trials to 7% early 
responses in the last 100 trials (Figure 4.6). On the lateral reward task healthy age-matched 
controls showed a small, but significant saccadic reaction time (SRT) advantage to the rewarded 
side (mean RS 206 ms vs. US 219ms; p=0.03). Interestingly, this sensitivity to reward, (difference 
between US and RS) did not change significantly over time (learning analysis of three forty trial 
epochs F(5,66)=0.24, p = 0.9449, additionally six subjects performed a further repeat session 
demonstrating no learning F(11,60) = 0.7, p 0.7349.) By contrast, KD showed no significant 
difference between latencies for rewarded (RS) compared to unrewarded saccades (US) (mean 
US = 236ms vs. RS = 235ms; p>0.5; Figure 4.7, Session 1). KD’s reaction times were longer than 
the control means but within the normal range. Thus, at baseline, on this simple lateral reward 
task, he displayed reward dependent behavioural modulation suggesting indifference to 
rewards. KD also did not show any significant change in his performance within session across 
epochs. 
 
4.3.3  Dopaminergic modulation of oculomotor performance 
On the traffic lights task KD’s performance altered dramatically one hour after a single dose of 
L-dopa 100mg (Figure 4.6). His early responses increased (26%), with a AER of 4.20 ( 6.67 SD 
greater than control mean of  2.20, SD 0. 0.30). There was an overall increase in reward to 
18.4p/trial. The same dose of L-dopa in 12 controls, tested in double-blind fashion, had no 
significant effect on saccadic RTs, AER or reward (See Chapter 5). Thus a single dose of L-dopa 
increased anticipatory saccades in KD but not in healthy people. Learning analysis showed post 
L-dopa, KD sharply increased the proportion of early responses (14% in first one hundred trials 
post L-dopa to 43% in trials four hundred to five hundred). This was the largest increase in the 
percentage of early responses of any subject either at baseline or with L-dopa (Fig 4.6). 
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Figure 4.5  Traffic light task (TLT): saccade distributions. 
(A) Saccades for age-matched controls (n=13) performing the TLT two distinct distributions: an 
early, anticipatory distribution and a later, reactive one made in response to green light onset. 
Early responses were divided into errors (saccades before the green light came on) and correct 
anticipations (saccades with<200 msec latency after the green light). The plot here is for a total 
of 6500 saccades. 
 
(B) Pre-treatment, KD made mostly reactive saccades (461/500 trials [92.2%]) with a median 
latency of 248 msec. He made very few anticipatory saccades. 
 
(C) After treatment with L-dopa 100 mg (Madopar CR 125 mg) three times a day for 12 weeks, 
there was a dramatic increase in early responding in KD. 
 
(D) After 12 weeks treatment with a dopamine agonist (ropinirole XL, 4 mg once a day), KD’s 
distribution of saccades looks most similar to that of control subjects. 
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On the lateral reward task, following L-dopa, KD showed a markedly significant preference for 
the rewarded side (RS 211 ms vs US 238ms; p=0.002). Eight healthy volunteers tested in double-
blind fashion on the same dose of levodopa or placebo demonstrated reward sensitivity, as 
previously but, importantly, there was no further significant modulation by L-dopa. Thus L-
dopa speeded saccades to rewarded targets in KD but not in healthy people.  After eight weeks 
on levodopa, KD showed moderate behavioural improvement in apathy. Concomitantly, the 
difference in saccadic RT to rewarded and unrewarded targets was much larger than in healthy 
controls, a consistent finding across all testing sessions (Figure 4.7). Twelve weeks after 
initiating therapy, the difference between rewarded and unrewarded saccades was 36 ms (RS = 
206ms vs. US = 242ms; p<0.0001). In isolation, these findings might be attributed to practice. 
However, saccadic RTs to unrewarded targets actually increased while those to rewarded ones 
decreased, so the effects cannot be attributed to a simple generalized motor facilitation with 
practice and/or L-dopa.   
 
On the traffic lights task, performance reached a peak by 24 weeks therapy when 33.4% of KD’s 
saccades were now early responses, with 23.6% correct and 9.8% errors (AER=2.41 and mean 
reward now 23.2p/trial). 
 
A clinical decision was made to stop L-dopa and assess instead the effects of a dopamine 
agonist that acts directly at dopaminergic receptors, rather than indirectly by promoting 
dopamine synthesis. Off medication, the difference in SRTs to rewarded and unrewarded 
targets became non-significant (Figure 4.7), providing further evidence that the reward-
sensitivity observed in the previous sessions could not simply be attributed to practice. On the 
traffic lights test, off medication, the effects on L-dopa were also partly reversed with overall 
reward dipping to 13.7p/trial and AER=0.79.  
 
KD was then started on an increasing dose of ropinirole, an agonist acting largely D2 and D3 
dopamine receptors, rather than D1. By contrast, L-dopa would have a balanced effect across all 
these receptors by increasing synaptic dopamine levels. On 4mg ropiniorole daily there was 
marked improvement in KD’s apathy. He was far more spontaneous in conversation, reported 
better social interactions and was more interested in events around him. He managed to secure 
a job. On the lateral reward task, saccades were generally faster, but those to the rewarded side 
were significantly faster than to the unrewarded side (RS = 183ms vs. US =208ms; p<0.001), far 
larger than in controls. 
 
On the traffic lights task, by week four (on 4mg ropinirole daily) KD demonstrated much 
greater early responding (45.2%). However, this was at the expense of greater numbers of errors 
(17.8% vs. control mean = 24.2%) so the AER (1.54) was not as high as on L-dopa (0.96 SD above 
control mean). Despite this, his mean reward exceeded that achieved on L-dopa, with a mean 
trial reward of 27.3p/trial, matching the highest performing individual healthy control. Thus 
KD showing increased willingness to anticipate frequently and take risks, an effect that 
persisted over 12 weeks on ropinirole (Figure 4.7). 
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Figure 4.6  Percentage early responses on traffic lights task (TLT) over time. 
A Over the course of the first session, healthy controls showed increased early responses but KD did not. 
B In the second session, an hour later, controls showed no further change but KD 1 h after receiving L-dopa showed escalating early responses. 
C During the drug holiday period (off L-dopa), KD’s early responses reverted to pre-treatment levels. 
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Figure 4.7  Results from the lateral reward task. 
The control group (n=12, arrows to side) showed a preference for the rewarded target locations, 
with significantly shorter SRTs. KD showed no reward preference at baseline, before treatment 
(Session 1). In Session 2 he was given a single dose (100 mg) of levodopa which led to a 
significant reward preference. This was maintained throughout chronic dopaminergic therapy 
(Session 3 Madopar 125 mg three times daily for 4 weeks, Session 4 Madopar CR 125 mg three 
times daily for 12 weeks). Following a treatment holiday (4 weeks), this reward preference was 
absent (Session 5). However, with subsequent treatment on the dopamine agonist ropinirole (1 
mg three times a day), there was both a re-establishment of reward preference and significant 
decrease in latency to both rewarded and unrewarded targets. Error bars are ±1 SEM (standard 
error of the mean). 
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4.4 Discussion 
4.4.1 Findings 
I have used novel probes of oculomotor decision-making to demonstrate relative insensitivity to 
reward in an individual with apathy following bilateral GPi lesions. The traffic light task (TLT, 
Chapter 2, (Adam et al., 2012)) requires reward sensitivity and motivation or effort to succeed, 
combined with fast reaction times and the ability to update behaviour in response to positive 
and negative feedback. A reactive response - simply waiting for the green light - is less well 
rewarded than an anticipatory response prepared in advance of the green signal. 
 
KD initially made very few anticipatory responses compared with age-matched controls. 
However, dopaminergic therapy, first with levodopa and then with ropinirole, increased 
anticipatory responses to within the normal range. The directional saccade lateral reward task, 
originally developed for the study of reward sensitivity in macaque monkeys (Hong and 
Hikosaka, 2008), demonstrated that KD had SRTs within the normal range but showed no 
speeding to the rewarded side (RS), unlike healthy volunteers. Treatment with levodopa led to 
reward sensitivity, with speeding of responses to the RS and slowing to the unrewarded side 
(US) compared to baseline. Off medication, the difference in SRTs to rewarded and unrewarded 
targets became non-significant, while subsequently on ropinirole, a direct dopamine D2/D3 
receptor agonist, KD again demonstrated reward sensitivity, as well as generalized speeding. 
 
These effects on dopaminergic medication were associated with clinical improvement, 
reduction of apathy and increased motivation to find work and in social interactions – most 
prominently while on the dopamine agonist. The findings demonstrate a causal relationship 
between basal ganglia function and motivation or willingness to make an effort for reward. 
They provide proof-of-concept data for the treatment of apathy which is increasingly 
recognized to be a key component of several neurological disorders (Marin, 1991; Bonelli and 
Cummings, 2008; Chow et al., 2009; Starkstein et al., 2009). 
 
4.4.2  Significance 
Unlike other tasks involving risk, such as the Iowa Gambling Task or the Cambridge Gamble 
Task (Clark et al., 2004), the TLT requires participants to take risks by making anticipatory 
responses. Many other paradigms place certain and risky options on an equal footing with the 
same amount of effort required for both choices. This has the benefit of establishing risk 
preferences independently of effort but tends to favour a careful, deliberative response strategy. 
The traffic lights paradigm imposes time constraints on decisions and rewards behaviour that 
might be considered ‘functionally impulsive’ (Dickman, 1990): on this task, it can be 
functionally useful to make anticipatory responses because these can lead to greater rewards, 
analogous to many situations in real life. 
 
It is possible that KD’s lack of anticipatory responses on this task reflects risk aversion, rather 
than lack of motivation or unwillingness to make an effort for rewards. However, it is less easy 
to explain how such a mechanism might account for behaviour on the lateral reward task, 
where there was no risk of incurring a penalty. How did dopamine reverse apathy and reward 
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insensitivity? Substantial evidence links dopamine to reinforcement learning (Schultz, 2007). 
However a growing body of research also implicates dopamine in effort-based decision-
making, generating the motivation and vigour to overcome costs of initiating actions 
(Kurniawan et al., 2011; Niv et al., 2007). The progressive improvement of KD’s performance on 
the TLT immediately post L-dopa (Figure 4.6B) is suggestive of dopaminergic enhancement of 
learning. However, during the drug holiday period such learning was radically reversed 
(Figure 4.6C), suggesting that if this effect was solely due to a reinforcement learning effect of L-
dopa it had not been completely consolidated. Dopamine was still required to maintain it. 
 
On the directional lateral reward task, L-dopa also had a dramatic effect after its introduction, 
speeding saccades to the RS (Figure 4.7). During the drug holiday, however, there was no 
longer any significant reward-sensitivity but saccades were generally faster than before 
treatment, suggesting there were some general, non-specific effects of practice on the task. The 
time course of action on reward-sensitivity and its reversal during the drug holiday makes it 
unlikely that dopaminergic effects on synaptic plasticity and learning were the only mechanism 
of action. Instead, it might also have had an effect on response vigour or overcoming costs of 
effort actions (Kurniawan et al., 2011; Niv et al., 2007).  
 
Dopamine could act directly on brain systems left intact after stroke, but perhaps disconnected 
because the major outflow from the basal ganglia is via the globus pallidus (GP). Alternatively, 
because the GPi lesions were not complete in KD, it is possible that his lesions led to imbalance 
in cross talk between striatal regions, which could be ameliorated by dopamine therapy. It has 
been demonstrated that parallel corticostriatal loops through the basal ganglia need not operate 
in isolation but can instead communicate with each other, e.g., via spiralling striato-nigro-
striatal connections (Haber et al., 2000) which allow ventral striatal regions to influence more 
dorsal striatal areas. Moreover, the nigrostriatal system is not the only dopaminergic modulator 
of basal ganglia function; the intra-striatal dopaminergic system is complex and can alter with 
denervation (Smith and Kieval, 2000). Finally, it is important also to consider the possibility that 
the effects of dopamine observed in KD might arise from indirect, knock-on effects on other 
neurotransmitter systems, e.g., there is evidence of interactions between dopaminergic and 
noradrenergic systems (Hara et al., 2010) as well as several other neurotransmitters ((Steiner 
and Tseng, 2010)). 
 
In macaques, using the directional reward saccade task, Hong and Hikosaka (2008) found that 
saccades to the RS with shorter latency than to the US, with reward-related speeding being 
associated with activity in GPi neurons which project to the lateral habenula. If a homologous 
circuit operates in the human brain, it is likely to have been partially disrupted in KD in whom 
both GPi were damaged. However, the lateral habenula remained intact, together with the 
caudate and putamen. 
 
Furthermore, SPECT imaging of the DAT demonstrated that the nigrostriatal dopaminergic 
pathway was intact as there was good signal bilaterally in the caudate and putamen of KD. 
Thus one locus of dopaminergic drug action is potentially the intact caudate, putamen or even 
surviving parts of the GP complex. Another potential site of action of dopamine is prefrontal 
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cortex. The OFC, in concert with basal ganglia structures, is considered to have a special role in 
the processing of reward signals (Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004; Schultz, 2000; Schultz et al., 2000; 
Wallis, 2007). Projection of KD’s lesion onto the known topography of the pallidal trans 
thalamic connections to the cortex, determined using diffusion-weighted tractography  
(Draganski et al., 2008), suggests that the connections to the vmPFC and OFC have most likely 
been disrupted (Figure 4.4). OFC neurons not only respond selectively to reward or aversive 
stimuli, but also signal relative preference for rewards and may integrate different types of 
information to compute a representation of value (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Thorpe et 
al., 1983; Tremblay and Schultz, 1999; Wallis and Kennerley, 2010). 
 
Consistent with these neurophysiological findings in macaque monkeys, imaging studies in 
humans have described activations in OFC and vmPFC which correlate with behavioural 
measures of stimulus value (O’Doherty, 2004; Blair et al., 2006; Plassmann et al., 2007; Gläscher 
et al., 2009; Haber and Knutson, 2010; Rangel and Hare, 2010). Lesions of the OFC in humans 
lead to impaired decision-making about the expected outcome of choices (Bechara et al., 1998) 
while alterations in striatal dopamine binding in drug addicts is associated with hypoactivity in 
OFC (Volkow et al., 2009). Dopaminergic neurons are known to innervate prefrontal cortex, 
including OFC (Williams and Goldman-Rakic, 1993). Although these arise from midbrain 
dopaminergic populations, partial disconnection of OFC neurons from trans-thalamic pallidal 
inputs - as is likely in KD -might disrupt dopaminergic reward signals within OFC. This view is 
compatible with recent functional imaging evidence that dopamine agonists might alter 
decision-making and risk-taking in susceptible individuals with Parkinson’s disease via actions 
on OFC (van Eimeren et al., 2009). 
 
Intriguingly, previous work also suggests that a dopaminergic deficit might be an important 
contributory factor to apathy in Parkinson’s disease, which occurs in up to 60% of cases (Oguru 
et al., 2010). Patients who undergo STN deep brain stimulation (DBS) often require reduction or 
withdrawal of dopaminergic therapy because of improvements in motor control following 
surgery. Czernecki et al. reported that apathy occurred after dopamine withdrawal in some of 
these cases, but importantly it could be reversed with ropinirole (Czernecki et al., 2008). 
 
More recently, a PET study has demonstrated greater meso-corticolimbic dopaminergic 
denervation involving the OFC in Parkinson’s disease patients who develop postoperative 
apathy compared to those who do not (Thobois et al., 2010). 
 
Regardless of the precise locus of drug action in KD, it is clear that his lesions rendered him 
apathetic but this could be ameliorated by dopaminergic modulation. Alteration in reward-
sensitivity mirrored clinical changes, suggesting that apathy in this case is associated with lack 
of motivation to obtain rewards. Animal learning theory has proposed that rewards might in 
fact constitute the basic goals of voluntary behaviour (Dickinson and Balleine, 1994). From this 
perspective, the absence of sensitivity to rewards would be expected to have devastating 
consequences for goal-directed action, just as one observes in apathy. But note that although 
this view might account for behaviour in our particular case, apathy is most likely to be a 
syndrome that is multidimensional (Cummings, 1993; Levy and Dubois, 2006). In different 
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clinical contexts, it could potentially result from deficits in other cognitive components of the 
decision-making process. Further studies are required to delineate these components and which 
specific deficits occur in different clinical conditions. Our study represents progress towards 
understanding one component of apathy-namely, relative reward insensitivity. 
 
Although cases such as KD with bilateral GPi lesions are rare, apathy is common in Parkinson’s 
Disease (Oguru et al., 2010; Pedersen et al., 2009a, 2009b; Starkstein, 2009; Starkstein et al., 2009), 
as well as in other neurodegenerative disorders, including Huntington’s and Alzheimer’s 
disease (Bonelli and Cummings, 2008; Chow et al., 2009; Marin, 1991; Starkstein et al., 2006). 
These conditions often involve disruption of cortico-striato-thalamo-cortical loops (Alexander et 
al., 1986) but the mechanisms underlying apathy when there is widespread neuro-degeneration 
has been difficult to study. Focal lesion cases such as KD provide important information about 
the neural substrates underlying apathy and modulation of this behavioural state with 
neuropharmacological intervention. 
 
These investigations show that apathy following basal ganglia lesions is associated with 
indifference to reward that can be modulated by dopamine. I investigate the effects of 
dopaminergic modulation on oculomotor decisions in healthy volunteers in experiments 
reported in Chapters 5 and 6. Studies of Parkinson’s disease patients as a model of apathy 
and/or impulsivity are further reported in Chapter 7. 
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5. The effects of levodopa on oculomotor 
decisions 
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5.1 Introduction 
Though cognitive effects of dopaminergic modulation have been recognised experimentally 
(Cools et al., 2002; Dolan et al., 1995; Goldman-Rakic et al., 2004), cognitive effects have not been 
the usual therapeutic target of dopaminergic drugs in Parkinson’s Disease (MacDonald and 
Monchi, 2011; MacDonald et al., 2011). In Parkinson’s disease, levodopa is primarily used to 
treat the motor symptoms of the disorder, but cognitive and psychiatric effects are often 
reported (Choi et al., 2000; Molloy et al., 2006). Furthermore, levodopa has been implicated in 
development of impulse control disorders in Parkinson’s patients (Weintraub et al., 2010; 
Grosset et al., 2011; Voon et al., 2011c, 2011d). This suggests that levodopa can modulate 
decision-making. That notion is supported by experiments which demonstrate changes in 
timing, probability and risk evaluation in healthy volunteers (Pessiglione et al., 2006; Pine et al., 
2010; Pleger et al., 2009) and reward-based decision making in patients (Graef et al., 2010). The 
experiments described in this chapter investigate potential effects of L-dopa upon oculomotor 
decisions in young, healthy volunteers performing eye movement tasks. 
 
5.1.1  The Cognitive Effects of Levodopa 
5.1.1.1  L-dopa affects reaction time and time perception 
A study measuring key press responses to a visual stimulus found shorter mean RTs in the L-
dopa condition than placebo and also reduced variance in the responses (Rihet et al., 2002). 
There is evidence to suggest that the role of the basal ganglia in producing internal 
representations of time is dopaminergically mediated (Rammsayer, 1993). Dopaminergic 
mechanisms are thought to be involved in the regulation of the internal ‘pacemaker’ (Buhusi 
and Meck, 2002). Most time perception drug studies have used more D2 receptor selective 
dopamine agonists, however L-dopa (200mg) has been found to affect time interval estimation - 
lengthening estimates in the ‘seconds’ range [estimates required were 6 and 17 seconds] by 
0.87s when averaged across target intervals and age groups - without changing reaction time 
(Rakitin et al., 2011).  
 
5.1.1.2  L-dopa has oculomotor effects 
There is only one reported study of the effects of L-dopa upon saccadic latencies in healthy 
volunteers. This experiment found fewer correct anti-saccades following L-dopa (100mg) 
administration, but no effects on reflexive saccades (Duka and Lupp, 1997). The authors noted 
that the L-dopa effect was directly opposed to the effect of incentive (monetary reward) on the 
task. The monetary reward increased accuracy. The same study also found no effect of L-dopa 
upon logical reasoning or on a rapid information-processing task. 
 
With caution, we might seek further evidence from the patient literature: Electro-oculographic 
data demonstrated improved saccade amplitudes following a single dose of L-dopa (200mg) 
given to PD patients but significant changes in latency were not seen (Rascol et al., 1989). A 
more recent study has found that L-dopa (at patient’s usual doses) slowed reactive saccades 
(pro-saccades) in a Parkinson’s patient population (Michell et al., 2006) compared to baseline 
measurements ‘off drug’. However, this effect was not uniformly present in all patients, and the 
group effect appears to have been driven by a few, large, individual responses. Another group 
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replicated this finding however, and also found that L-dopa (at the patient’s usual doses) 
improved the accuracy (reduced the error rate) of voluntary anti-saccades (Hood et al., 2007). 
 
5.1.1.3  Effects upon decisions and reward processing 
The important experimental influence of dopaminergic modulation upon reward learning and 
behaviour in humans, non-human primates and smaller animals is well described (Robbins and 
Everitt, 1996). More recent human experiments using behavioural tasks and fMRI have begun to 
reveal the extent of L-dopa’s wide-ranging effects. These include “bottom-up” effects upon low-
level somatosensory decisions (Pleger et al., 2009). L-dopa enhanced the effects of higher 
anticipated reward, which then improved tactile decisions. This was in contrast to Haloperidol 
(a DA antagonist) that impaired the same task performance. The reward and DA effects were 
found to correlate with changes in striatal and orbitofrontal BOLD signal. 
 
More cognitively complex “top-down” effects are also recognised. In a study that compared the 
effects of L-dopa and haloperidol, a DA antagonist (Pessiglione et al., 2006), L-dopa was 
associated with more frequent choice of a high-probability gain option compared to 
haloperidol. There was no effect on the frequency of choosing a low probability loss. This meant 
that L-dopa treated subjects won more money in the task overall than those taking haloperidol. 
This drug-induced behavioural difference was correlated with changes in BOLD response of 
opposing direction in the striatum, suggesting an anatomical substrate for the heightened 
reward sensitivity induced by L-dopa. Such heightened reward sensitivity may combine with 
impaired temporal evaluation and lead to heightened temporal discounting (Pine et al., 2010). 
Temporal discounting is often used as an index of impulsivity (Wittmann and Paulus, 2008). 
Impulsivity may be associated with impaired risk evaluation (Horvath and Zuckerman, 1993; 
Kreek et al., 2005). However, another study found no effect of L-dopa upon subjects’ evaluation 
of risk, and its authors therefore propose that the main dopaminergic effect upon decision 
making is through modulation of response to reward (Symmonds et al., 2013). A recent study 
shows that L-dopa appears to degrade discrimination of salient loss outcomes (which should 
lead to reversals in a set switching task) in PD patients (Shiner et al., 2014). This degradation is 
associated with reversal in the expected activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). 
This is consistent with patients’ poor learning from punishment in reward tasks (i.e. failure to 
learn from mistakes). 
 
5.1.2  Experimental design 
We decided to investigate the effects of dopaminergic modulation in healthy volunteer subjects 
- both under the influence of L-dopa and without. In order to do this, we designed a 
randomised, double blind, counter-balanced, within-subject crossover design to compare the 
effects of L-dopa with placebo on both measures described in previous chapters. 
 
It was hypothesised that L-dopa would have effects upon reward sensitivity, heightening it and 
thereby causing shorter latency responses in the lateral reward task (Chapter 3). This might also 
lead to greater anticipatory behaviour in the traffic light task (Chapter 2), though perhaps at the 
expense of more errors. To control for saccadic reaction time (SRT) effects in our tasks, we 
included the saccadic reaction time (SRT) task (Chapter 2). In order to extract risk avoidance we 
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also used the reverse traffic light task (Chapter 3), which is not dependent upon reaction time 
effects. In order to compare our experimental subjects with previously tested controls, we 
administered both the BIS-11 and TPQ (Chapter 3). Choice of dose and the details of the 
experimental design are discussed in the methods section. 
 
We wished to extract the effect of the drug compared to placebo independently from influences 
of learning due to training. For this reason we included a training session prior to drug/placebo 
sessions, an additional control measure which frequently absent from many drug intervention 
studies. We hoped that this would serve to eliminate major training effects and allow us to 
focus upon effects genuinely attributable to the drug while remaining cognisant of the 
possibility of an interaction between the effects of the drug and learning. 
 
A randomised, counterbalanced design was used so that, following training, 50% of subjects 
were randomised to a ‘placebo first’ group and the remaining 50% to a ‘drug first group’.  
 
5.1.2.1  Pharmacology 
L-dopa (L-3,4-dihydroxyphenylalanine, levodopa) is synthesized from the amino acid L-
tyrosine in the body and brain. L-dopa is the precursor to the catecholamine neurotransmitters 
dopamine, norepinephrine (noradrenaline), and epinephrine (adrenaline). It is peripherally 
decarboxylated into inactive metabolites. To prevent this, the drug is given with a dopa 
decarboxylase inhibitor, which does not cross the blood brain barrier, thus allowing the drug to 
have effects on the organ intended. Plasma concentration peak is reached quickly (<60 minutes 
in the fasted state (Contin and Martinelli, 2010)) and levels remain high between one and 3 
hours post-dose (Crevoisier et al., 1987). A previous eye movement study found significant 
effects of L-dopa 1 hour post administration were no longer present 5 hours post administration 
(Duka and Lupp, 1997). We therefore chose to commence testing an hour after drug ingestion. 
Testing was complete within two hours. 
 
5.1.2.2  General levodopa effects & dose rationale  
A large dose of L-dopa (200mg + 50mg benserazide) has been found to cause sedation in drug-
naive, healthy volunteers (Andreu et al., 1999). L-dopa induced sedation scores have found to 
correlate (positively) with reaction time in a button-press task (Micallef-Roll et al., 2001). Due to 
the risk of side effects (especially nausea) at this dose, these studies used pre-administration of 
domperidone. We wished to avoid nausea, sedation and reaction time effects and therefore 
chose to use Madopar tablets containing 100mg of L-dopa in combination with 25mg 
benserazide, a dopa decarboxylase inhibitor. This is also a dose that might be used on initiation 
of therapy in a Parkinsonian patient (Holloway et al., 2004). Previous studies using this dose 
were successful in generating cognitive changes without resulting in significant side effects 
(Duka and Lupp, 1997; Pessiglione et al., 2006).  
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5.2 Methods 
20 right-handed healthy volunteers were recruited of whom 12 (6 female, mean age 22.6yrs, SD 
3.4) went on to complete the study. (The remaining 8 chose not to proceed beyond the training 
session. Their results are not included here but are presented in Chapter 2 upon age effects and 
Chapter 3 on task variants). 
 
Each subject was randomly assigned to receive drug or placebo in the second session and the 
opposite (placebo or drug) in the third. Pre-randomisation was achieved by ensuring that a set 
of letter-coded envelopes contained an equal number of ‘drug-first’ and ‘placebo-first’ options. 
The experimenter was kept unaware of the order until the study and analysis were complete. 
Subjects were also blinded, as the drug and placebo preparations were not easily distinguished 
and had no identifying markings. At the end of the study, there were an equal number of 
subjects in the ‘drug-first’ and ‘placebo-first’ groups. 
 
Subjects were asked to fast for four hours prior to their testing session to ensure an empty 
stomach, therefore increasing the speed to reach peak plasma L-dopa concentration. Sessions 
were conducted at a prearranged time. This time was kept as the start of testing for drug and 
placebo sessions, which were held at one and two weeks after training, to reduce the influence 
of diurnal variation in performance. At the training session, subjects were asked to choose from 
a set of envelopes, and this determined the order of the drug and placebo conditions for the 
remaining 2 sessions. 
 
When subjects arrived for the second session, they were given either Madopar dispersible 
125mg (L-dopa 100mg + benserazide 25mg) or a dispersible multivitamin in liquid. Neither 
tablet imparted any distinctive flavour or colour which would have unblinded the participant 
or experimenter. 
 
The following tests and tasks were administered during the 2-hour period: 
 
5.2.1  Questionnaires 
During the training session, subjects completed two questionnaires before and/or during 
breaks between eye movement testing: 
 
1) The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11). This is a measure that has been used in 
multiple studies of impulsivity in both health and disease (see Chapters 2 & 3 for further 
discussion). 
 
2) The Cloninger Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire (TPQ, (Cloninger, 1987) 
(Chapter 3). It was hypothesised that there might be an inverse correlation between the 
Novelty-Seeking (NS) dimension and risk avoidance in our tasks, a positive relationship 
between the Harm Avoidance (HA) dimension and task risk avoidance and a positive 
correlation between the Reward Dependence (RD) dimension performance on our rewarded 
tasks. 
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5.2.2  Eye Movement Tasks 
Following drug/placebo administration in sessions 2 and 3, subjects were asked to wait in the 
lab for an hour before testing commenced. This was to ensure that drug plasma levels reached 
their peak as testing began. Subjects were free to read, work or use the internet during this 
period but were continuously monitored for any side effects. They were also asked not to drink 
any caffeine prior to or during this first hour, but were offered as much fluid as they wished. 
 
5.2.2.1  SRT Task 
The SRT Task (See Chapter 2, Figure 2.2) required subjects to make eye movements as fast as 
possible when a red STOP signal changed to a green GO signal. The delay from red to green on 
each trial varied randomly between 500 and 1000ms (rectangular distribution). This task was 
not rewarded. The saccades required alternated between a rightward saccade (odd numbered 
trials, from -10 to +10 degrees), and a leftward saccade (even numbered trials, +10 to -10 
degrees). Confirmation of a completed saccade was acknowledged by an auditory “ping” and 
by the cruciform target changing from white to red. Erroneous, early saccades caused an 
aversive “beep” and the trial to repeat. 
 
5.2.2.2  The Traffic Light Task  
In the Traffic Light Task (Chapter 2, Figure 2.1), subjects were asked to make as much money as 
possible by making saccades as quickly as possible in response to a traffic light stimulus. Each trial 
begins with a red light that, after 1000ms, turns amber. The amber duration varies randomly 
from trial to trial but is drawn from a normal distribution (mean 750ms, SD 125ms). Following 
the amber light, a green GO signal appears. Subjects then made a saccade from the stimulus to a 
cruciform target at 20 degrees retinal eccentricity. Trials alternated between left to right (odd 
numbered trials) and right to left (even numbered trials). Correct saccades were rewarded with 
either a “ping” for latencies of >=200ms or a “Kerching” for latencies of <200ms. Reward was 
displayed at the target location for each trial and a cumulative total was displayed immediately 
below the target. 
 
The reward (R) for a successful saccade was calculated by an exponentially decaying 
discounting function in the form: 
 
 
 
Where a = 150, k1=100 and t represents the saccade onset time relative to green onset (t0 , 
milliseconds). 
 
Erroneously early saccades, before the GO signal were punished by an aversive “bleep” and a 
fixed negative reward of -10 pence. 
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Studies in similarly aged healthy volunteers had already demonstrated that this task elicited a 
bimodal distribution of saccadic responses (See Chapter 2). We were interested in the effects of 
L-dopa upon the distribution of ‘reactive’ and ‘anticipatory’ saccades. 
 
5.2.2.3  Reverse Traffic Light Task 
The forward traffic light task tests multiple subject variables, including reaction time, reward 
sensitivity and risk aversion. The reverse traffic light task (Chapter 3, Figure 3.3) was developed 
in order to look at risk avoidance, independent of reaction time. In this task, subjects were asked 
to accrue as much as reward as possible. To do this, they had to fixate a traffic light stimulus, 
which was green at the start of each trial. After 1000ms it turned amber. The amber duration 
was randomly chosen on each trial from a normal distribution (mean 1500ms, SD 250ms). [This 
was deliberately different from the forward traffic light task, to avoid learning effects causing an 
interaction between the two tasks. The task was also presented before and after the forward 
traffic light task to minimise interaction effects]. 
 
After the amber light, a red STOP signal would appear. If subjects made no saccade prior to red 
onset, they received a fixed -10 pence penalty and heard an aversive “bleep”. The aim was to 
wait as long as possible. The later in the amber light subjects made their saccade, the greater the 
reward they received. In other words, subjects were trying to anticipate the red light but ensure 
that they responded before it appeared – similar to “playing chicken”. 
 
Successful anticipation of the red light was rewarded in a similar fashion to the forward task 
except that the reward increased exponentially as the red light onset approached. The reward 
calculation was necessarily slightly more complicated in this task, as the distribution had to be 
‘fitted’ into a variable amber light duration. This ensured that the reward was always a 
maximum of 150 pence but meant that reward varied both as a function of the anticipatory 
interval and the length of the amber light on each trial. 
 
R = Ae(ts-tα-t�)/t�κ 
R=reward (in pence), A=150, ts = time of saccade, tα = time of amber onset, t� = time of red light onset, 
κ=0.1 
 
5.2.2.4  Lateral Reward Task 
The lateral reward task (Chapter 3, Figure 3.1) was adapted from a task designed to look at 
reward sensitivity in non-human primates (Hong and Hikosaka, 2008). We used our version of 
this task to investigate effects of L-dopa versus placebo in affecting reward sensitivity. In this 
task, subjects were asked to attend a central white fixation spot. After 1000ms, the fixation 
disappeared and an identical target appeared at either -10 or +10 degrees retinal eccentricity 
(this varied randomly from trial to trial, 50% of targets were leftward and 50% were rightward). 
To begin with, either leftward or rightward targets were rewarded according to saccade latency. 
Reward was presented numerically with a pound coin symbol at the target location and 
subjects heard an auditory reward similar to that in the traffic light task (“ping “ SRT>=200ms, 
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“Kerching!” for SRT<200ms).  Saccades to targets on the non-rewarded side were 
acknowledged with a change in colour of the target (white to red) and a non-rewarding 
“bleep”. After a jittered number of trials, the rewarded side would switch. On average, 60 
leftward trials were presented and 60 rightward. On average, 30 each of these would have been 
rewarded target locations. The reward side ‘switch’ occurred approximately every 20 trials (5 
switches per 120 trials). 
 
 
The following experimental protocol was followed: 
 
Time (t) = 0 minutes 
Written consent  & Drug (Madopar 125mg) / Placebo (Multivitamin tablet) 
Ingestion 
  Subjects were weighed 
   
t = 60  SRT task† (100 trials) 
  Lateral Reward task† (120 trials) 
  Reverse traffic Light† Task (100 trials) 
  Traffic Light Task (10 blocks x 50 trials) 
  Lateral Reward task† (120 trials) 
  Reverse traffic Light Task (100 trials) 
t = 120  Testing complete, feedback to subjects, debrief and reward payment 
 
During the training session, subjects completed the BIS-11 and the TPQ before proceeding 
immediately with the eye movement tasks. 
 
The reverse, lateral reward task and SRT task were developed during the initiation of the study. 
Therefore the number of subjects participating in each task varied slightly as follows: 
 
Session Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 
SRT Task 9 12 12 
Traffic Lights 12 12 12 
Reverse Task 11 (1 block only) 12 12 
Lateral Reward - 8 8 
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5.3 Results 
Subjects complained of no side effects, or overt mood change in response to L-dopa. There were 
no drug-related complaints or adverse events. 
 
5.3.1  Questionnaires 
The subjects’ mean BIS-11 scores were all within the normal range (mean 60.2, SD 11.3). Both 
the mean and variance were similar to those found in our student survey (see Chapter 3) and in 
a previous study in Baylor undergraduates authored by the scale’s inventor (Patton et al., 1995). 
 
The TPQ results for novelty seeking (mean 16.7, SD 4.9) correlated well with the BIS-11 totals, 
with an R2 of 0.699 (p<0.0005). The means and variances of scores in each category were 
consistent with normal ranges from previous studies (e.g. (Otter et al., 1995)). 
 
We hypothesised that subjects who scored more highly on the impulsiveness and novelty 
seeking scales would behave more aggressively in our rewarded tasks, taking greater risk in 
order to accrue greater rewards. 
 
5.3.2  Saccadic reaction Time (SRT) Task 
The saccadic reaction time task was developed and introduced after the initiation of this study. 
Therefore only 9 of the 12 subjects were tested on this task in the first (training) session. The 
mean SRT for these subjects was 331ms. In Sessions 2 & 3, all 12 participants completed the SRT 
task at the beginning of the testing session. In Session 2, the mean SRT was 324ms. A paired 
Student T-test comparing mean latencies in the first and second sessions showed no statistically 
significant difference. In session 3, the mean was reduced at 305ms. This was significantly faster 
than Session 2 (Paired, 2-tailed, Student T-test, t(11)=2.52, p<0.03). There was therefore a 
practice effect across sessions 2 and 3 (Figure 5.1). The lack of significant effect between sessions 
1 and 2 may be due to the reduced sample size (only 9 of 12 subjects completed this task in 
session 1). 
 
We hypothesised that L-dopa would slow simple saccades, as previously demonstrated (Hood 
et al., 2007; Michell et al., 2006). There was a non-significant slowing effect of L-dopa (SRTD) 
compared to placebo (SRTP) (322ms vs 308ms, Paired, 1-tailed, Student T-test, t(11)=-1.65, 
p=0.06) (Figure 5.1). 
 
We anticipated a training effect would also shorten latencies. In the placebo condition, SRTs 
were non-significantly shorter than in training (SRTP=308ms vs SRTT=330ms; 1-tailed, Student T-
test, t(22)=-1.09, p=0.14). In the drug condition (SRTD=322ms), responses were also non-
significantly faster than in training (SRTT =330ms).  
 
 To investigate whether there was an interaction between the drug/placebo condition and 
session order, a two-factor ANOVA with replication was performed (Figure 5.2). This 
demonstrated a non-significant interaction between the drug condition and session 
(F(1,23)=3.38, p=0.08) suggesting a possible dopaminergic influence on learning. Saccadic 
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latencies were non-significantly slower for subjects given drug first (SRTP1=302ms vs 
SRTD1=346ms; 2-tailed, Student T-test, t(10)=1.72, p=0.12), whereas they were non-significantly 
faster for those given drug compared to those given placebo in the second session (SRTP2=313ms 
vs SRTD1=297ms; 2-tailed, Student T-test, t(10)=-0.79, p=0.45).  
 
Plots of the saccade distributions from this task revealed a typical recinormal distribution of 
latencies (Figure 5.1). These were well modelled by a single LATER unit for which mean and 
variance of the rates of rise were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation (Figure 5.3).  
The modelled medians for each individual closely resemble the true medians of the data and 
correlate significantly (Table 5.1 & Figure 5.4). Maximum likelihood estimation was used to find 
parameters of best fit for recinormal distributions to describe the data. Modelling the group 
data found medians, which approximated well to the data (see Fig 5.4). 
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Figure 5.1  The SRT Task: Effects of Training and Drug 
 
Training improved reaction times non-significantly between sessions 2 and 3. L-dopa non-
significantly slowed SRT compared to placebo. 
 
Top panels: histograms demonstrate mean SRT for the whole group by session (top left) and 
state (top right). Lower panels: saccadic distributions (for the whole group) by session (bottom 
left) and state (bottom right). 
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Figure 5.2  SRT Task: The effect of session order 
Subjects who took drug first were slower in the first of the two sessions. In the second session, 
the mean SRT of those taking drug was, in contrast, reduced. This difference led to a non-
significant interaction between session and drug/placebo order (F(1,23)=3.38, p=0.08). 
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Session Mean 
(ms) 
SD  
(ms) 
Median Modelled 
Median 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(Pearson’s r) 
Significance 
Level 
1 (n=9) 331 112 305 307 0.95 p<0.001 
2 (n=12) 324 109 301 304 0.97 p<0.001 
3 (n=12) 
 
305 101 287 294 0.93 p<0.001 
State Mean  
(ms) 
SD 
(ms)  
Median Modelled 
Median 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(Pearson’s r) 
 
Significance 
Level 
Training 
(n=9) 
331 112 305 307 0.95 p<0.001 
Placebo 
(n=12) 
308 93.2 289 294 0.99 p<0.001 
Drug 
(n=12) 
322 117 299 305 0.94 p<0.001 
 
 
Table 5.1  Modelling Data from the SRT Task 
 
Parameters of best fit for a single LATER unit derived from maximum likelihood estimation 
(MLE) compared and correlated with subjects’ reaction time data. 
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Figure 5.3  SRT task responses are well modelled by a single LATER 
unit 
The raw data is represented in the left hand panels for training, placebo and L-dopa conditions. 
The derived, modelled data for each condition is shown in the right hand panels. The upper 
panels show cumulative density distributions of saccadic latencies whereas the lower panels 
show the same data plotted as probability density distributions.  The rendering of the positively 
skewed quasi-normal saccadic response latency probability density function into a linear 
cumulative density function is the basis for the LATER model (see Chapters 1&2). 
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All correlations are statistically significant (p<0.001) 
 
Figure 5.4  Correlations between SRT Task data derived true median 
latencies and those found by maximum likelihood estimation of parameters 
for a LATER unit 
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5.3.3  Traffic Lights 
5.3.3.1  Training Effects 
The twelve subjects all completed 3 sessions of 500 trials of the Traffic Light task. Across the 
three sessions, performance (measured as reward obtained) significantly improved on each 
occasion, as we hypothesised. In the first session, mean reward was 14.9p per trial, in the 
second it increased to 21.3p (paired, 1-tailed Student t-test, t(11)=-3.68, p=0.002). Reward 
significantly rose again in the third session, to 24p (paired, 1-tailed Student t-test, t(11)=-3.29, 
p=0.004). 
 
This was due to both increased anticipation across all 3 sessions (Figure 5.5) which is indicative 
of a better strategy. In Session 1 there was a mean of 44 correct anticipations (responses between 
0 and 200ms) verses mean 133 correct anticipations in Session 2 (paired, 1-tailed Student t-test, 
t(11)=-10.20, p<0.0001).  The anticipations increased significantly again in Session 3 (165 
anticipations versus 133, paired, 1-tailed Student t-test, t(11)=-2.97, p=0.006). 
 
The improved reward occurred despite significantly increased errors in the second and third 
sessions compared to the first (Figure 5.5). Mean Error1 = 59.6, Mean Error 2 = 108.8; (paired, 1-
tailed Student t-test, t(11)=-4.76, p<0.001); Mean Error 3 = 107.8 (paired, 1-tailed Student t-test, 
t(11)=-4.25, p<0.001). 
 
This training effect is visible from the raw saccadic data distributions (Figure 5.6). In the first 
session, there was only modest anticipatory behaviour (though a separate anticipatory 
distribution is still apparent). Following the initial major increase in anticipatory responding 
(from sessions 1 to 2), there is a smaller increase in the height of the anticipatory peak from 
sessions 2 to 3, but this is insufficient to cause a significant increase in the numbers of saccades 
recorded with latencies of <200ms. 
 
5.3.3.2  Drug Effects 
Analysis of variance was performed to compare the influence of session effects and 
drug/placebo condition upon the three variables: reward, anticipations and errors (fig 5.7). 
There was no interaction between session and drug/placebo when considering reward. 
However, there was a trend toward an interaction when considering the number of 
anticipations (F(1,23) = 3.68, p=0.07). There was a significant interaction between session and 
drug/placebo condition when considering the number of errors (F(1,23) = 5.60, p=0.03). 
Considering each group separately, the ‘drug first’ group (mean 18.9%, SD  8.7%) made non-
significantly fewer errors in the second session than did those receiving placebo (24.6%, SD 
6.2%). In the third session, the situation was reversed, with those receiving L-dopa (the ‘placebo 
first group’) now making non-significantly more errors (mean 25.2, SD 5.9% versus 18.0, SD 
5.3%, Figure 5.8). This raises the possibility of a speed/accuracy trade off when subjects are 
administered L-dopa – the first group favouring slower more accurate responses, the second 
group choosing faster but more error-prone performance. 
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When both sessions are combined, there are no significant differences in any of the three 
measures between drug and placebo; however, there was a small (non-significant) decrease in 
reward with L-dopa due to an increase in the error rate. There is a trend toward more errors 
with L-dopa (24.8%) versus placebo (21.4%) but this does not reach significance. There was no 
change in correct anticipations (Figure 5.8). Therefore, following the major improvement after a 
single training session, performance remained static despite both further training and drug 
administration (Figure 5.9). 
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Figure 5.5  Traffic Light Task Training Effects 
Subjects significantly increased their anticipatory responding across the three sessions and 
significantly increased their error rate, which subsequently plateaus as they find the optimal 
balance between caution and anticipation. This optimisation leads to significant increased in 
reward between each session. 
 
*Statistically significant difference 
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Figure 5.6  Training Effects upon Traffic Light Task Saccade Distributions 
Between sessions 1 and 2, the major change is an increased anticipatory distribution. This 
further enlarges in the 3rd session. The reactive distribution remains quite constant throughout. 
  
  154 
 
Figure 5.7  The interaction between session effects and drug/placebo 
condition upon error rates in the Traffic Light Task 
 
Subjects receiving L-dopa in the second session made non-significantly fewer errors than those 
receiving placebo. In the third session, the reverse was true, with L-dopa recipients making a 
non-significantly increased number of errors. 
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*Statistically significant difference 
 
Figure 5.8  Drug Effects on Traffic Light Task Performance 
There is a marked and significant improvement following the training session, but no 
significant differences between performances on drug versus placebo. 
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Figure 5.9  Drug Effects Upon Traffic Light Task Saccade 
Distributions 
There is a visible difference between the training session, which shows little anticipation, and 
the two experimental sessions. However, responses in the drug and placebo sessions are very 
similar. 
 
Modelling using MLE to find parameters of best fit for a combination of two LATER units fits 
the data well. 
 
A Cumulative probability function for saccadic latency (raw data) 
B Cumulative probability function for saccadic latency (modelled fit) 
C Probability density function for saccadic latency (raw data) 
D Probability density function for saccadic latency (modelled fit) 
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5.3.3.3  Modelling the distributions 
Maximum likelihood estimation was used to find parameters for two LATER units that fitted 
the Traffic Light Task response distributions well (Figure 5.9 and Table 2). Statistical analysis 
(not shown) of the anticipatory parameters revealed no significant differences between drug 
and placebo, but replicated the training effects found by analysis of the raw data.  
 
 
Session Group Modelled 
Anticipatory 
Median (SD) 
Mean Modelled 
Anticipatory 
Median (SD) 
Group Modelled 
Reactive Median 
(SD) 
Mean  
Modelled Reactive 
Median (SD) 
1 2277 (46.5) 1758 (60.0) 294 (32.9) 303 (38.4) 
2 1034 (53.7) 1078 (58.0) 284 (32.5) 295 (36.9) 
3 960.0 (66.8) 1084 (65.6) 305 (31.0) 319 (34.3) 
State Group Modelled 
Anticipatory 
Median (SD) 
Mean Modelled 
Anticipatory 
Median (SD) 
Group Modelled 
Reactive Median 
(SD) 
Mean  
Modelled Reactive 
Median (SD) 
T 2277 (46.5) 1758 (60.0) 294 (32.9) 303 (38.4) 
P 1125 (41.2) 1166 (65.5) 272 (31.7) 293 (31.8) 
D 1169 (40.8) 1163 (58.1) 273 (31.7) 288 (32.0) 
 
Table 5.2  Traffic Light Task Parameters 
Parameters of best fit for the two distributions, anticipatory and reactive for sessions 1-3 and for 
Training (T), Placebo (P) and Drug (D). Anticipatory medians are with respect to amber onset. 
Reactive medians are with respect to green onset. All values are in milliseconds. 
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5.3.4  Reverse Traffic Lights 
The reverse task was also added to the experimental protocol, as a measure of risk 
seeking/avoidance. 11 of the 12 subjects were trained prior to drug/placebo administration. 
During the training session, the 11 subjects completed one block of 100 trials. During the 
drug/placebo sessions, all 12 subjects completed two blocks of 100 trials. 
 
There was a main effect of training, as hypothesised, with subjects improving their strategy 
(taking higher risk and incurring more errors) with each session, and thereby accruing more 
reward overall. The amount by which the subjects anticipated the end of the amber light 
decreased across the sessions (i.e. they were prepared to take greater risk in exchange for higher 
rewards). In the first session, their mean STOP anticipation interval (SAI, the amount of time 
before the red light that the saccade was made) was 378ms. This decreased significantly to 232ms 
in the second session (1-tailed Student T-test, t(21)=2.90, p=0.004) and was significantly reduced 
again to 214ms in the final session, respectively (paired, 1-tailed Student T-test, t(11)=1.79, 
p=0.05) Figure 5.10 & 5.11).  
 
Analysis of variance of mean reward demonstrated no interaction of drug/placebo condition 
with session number (two factor ANOVA with replication, p=0.94). A similar analysis of the 
error rate showed a trend toward an interaction that was also not significant at the 5% level. 
Neither was there a significant interaction between session and anticipation of the STOP signal. 
 
There was no significant difference between drug and placebo conditions. There was a trend 
toward a reduced mean anticipatory interval on L-dopa (214ms) versus placebo (232ms) but this 
did not reach significance. There was no main effect of drug on either reward or error rate. 
STOP anticipation showed a non-significant trend toward riskier behaviour under L-dopa 
(mean 214ms versus placebo mean 232ms). 
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Figure 5.10  Reverse Traffic Light Mean STOP anticipation 
Left: Across the sessions, subjects took greater risk by increasing the time they were prepared to wait before making their response (thus reducing the STOP 
anticipation interval). 
Right: This led to increased errors but also increased reward overall. There is a statistically significant improvement in reward and associated increase in errors 
(indicating a rightward shift of the response distribution) across each session.  
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Figure 5.11  Reverse traffic Light Saccade distributions 
 
There is a rightward shift of the saccade distributions between training and drug/placebo 
sessions. There is no main effect of drug versus placebo. 
 
A Comparison of saccade distributions across sessions with respect to amber onset; 
B The same data plotted with respect to Red onset (Stop!); 
 
C  Comparison of saccade distributions in training versus drug and placebo conditions 
with respect to amber onset; 
D The same data plotted with respect to Red onset (Stop!) 
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5.3.5  The Lateral Reward Task 
The lateral reward task was not administered in the training session, as it had not yet been 
developed. Furthermore, only 8 subjects performed the task, as it was introduced part way 
through the study. There are three variables to consider when interpreting saccadic latencies in 
this task: the session (2 or 3), the drug/placebo condition (D or P) and whether the saccades 
were rewarded or not (R or U).  
 
We performed an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to better understand the contribution of L-
dopa to reward sensitivity (Fig 5.12): A two factor ANOVA (with replication) of the latencies to 
rewarded targets demonstrates a significant interaction between drug /placebo condition and 
session (F(1,15), p=0.03). 
 
5.3.5.1  Lateral Reward Task Session Effects 
In session 2, there were faster saccades to rewarded targets, as expected (Figure 5.12), however 
this difference did not reach statistical significance (Unrewarded saccade mean latency, U1 = 
222ms; Rewarded saccade mean latency, R1 = 218ms; paired, 1-tailed Student T-test, t(7)=0.86, 
p=0.21). In session 3, there were significant differences between saccadic latencies to 
unrewarded (mean 217ms) and rewarded (mean 205ms) targets (paired, 1-tailed Student T-test, 
t(7)=2.29, p=0.03). The magnitude of reward sensitivity/preference therefore increased with 
learning the task. This learning effect may be more pronounced as a result of the lack of a 
training session for this task. Comparing unrewarded saccades between sessions (U1 mean = 
222ms, U2 mean =217ms, paired, 1-tailed Student T-test, t(7)=1.46, p=0.09) separately from 
rewarded saccades (R1 mean = 218ms, R2 mean =205ms, paired, 1-tailed Student T-test, 
t(7)=3.27, p<0.01), it is clear that although both latencies were reduced in Session 3, the change 
was greater and statistically significant only for rewarded saccades. 
 
5.3.5.2  Lateral Reward Task Drug Effects 
In the L-dopa condition, differences between unrewarded (UD, mean=220ms) and rewarded 
(RD, mean=214ms) saccades were not significant (paired, 1-tailed Student T-test, t(7)=1.22, 
p=0.13). However, in the placebo condition, they were (UP = 219ms, RP = 210ms, paired, 1-
tailed Student T-test, t(7)=1.92, p<0.05). This suggests that L-dopa blunts reward sensitivity, 
rather than heightening it. 
 
Previous studies (Hood et al., 2007; Michell et al., 2006) and our SRT Task results suggest that L-
dopa increases saccadic latencies. However, comparing both unrewarded saccades (UP = 
219ms, UD = 220ms, paired, 1-tailed Student T-test, t(7)=0.09, p=0.46) and rewarded saccades 
(UP = 210ms, UD = 214ms, paired, 1-tailed Student T-test, t(7)=0.61, p=0.29), there were no 
significant differences found between the drug and placebo conditions. Saccadic latencies 
toward unrewarded targets are very similar in each condition. However, the latencies are non-
significantly shorter toward rewarded targets in the placebo condition. This suggests that L-
dopa is actually reducing reward sensitivity. However, it may be that, rather than a generalised 
slowing (which would cause increased latencies to both unrewarded and rewarded saccades), 
we are observing an increase in the minimum saccadic latency due to L-dopa. In other words L-
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dopa, rather than effecting a simple ‘sedative’ slowing of reaction times, may set a higher 
threshold for saccade initiation. 
 
In a comparison of rewarded saccades in the ‘drug first’ and ‘placebo first’ groups, there were 
significant differences: In session 1, those who took L-dopa were significantly slower toward 
rewarded targets than those who took placebo (RD1=227ms, RP1 = 209ms, 2-tailed Student t-
test, t(6)=2.70, p<0.05). By contrast, in session 2, those who took L-dopa were non-significantly 
faster than those who took placebo (RD2=200ms, RP2 = 210ms, 2-tailed Student t-test, t(6)=-1.04, 
p=0.33). These samples are small (n=4 in each condition), however, the directional difference of 
the effect suggests that larger samples may reveal an effect of L-dopa upon reward sensitivity in 
this task and explain the interaction demonstrated by the ANOVA (Figure 5.12A). 
 
5.3.4  Correlations with Questionnaire findings 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient was calculated for BIS-11 and TPQ scores with the same 
performance indicators reported in Chapter 3. Self report measures were not significantly 
correlated with performance indicators or of drug/placebo responses in the oculomotor tasks. 
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Figure 5.12  Interaction of drug and session effects upon rewarded saccades 
A Those subjects who received L-dopa in the earlier session were slower in responding to rewarded saccade targets than those who received placebo. In the 
second session, those receiving L-dopa were faster. 
B In both sessions, there was speeding toward rewarded targets; this was significant in session 3. The magnitude of this difference as well as the overall speed 
increased from session 2 to session 3. 
C There was speeding to rewarded targets in both drug and placebo conditions. The magnitude of the difference was non-significantly greater for placebo. 
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5.4 Discussion 
This study examined the effects of L-dopa upon eye movement tasks. There were no reported 
side effects and all enrolled subjects completed the study. 
 
5.4.1  Experimental Results 
As hypothesised, the effects of training across sessions were prominent, a factor often ignored 
in drug/placebo experiments. There were improvements in all tasks across sessions. Analysis of 
variance demonstrated a non-significant interaction between the drug/placebo condition and 
the session in the SRT task (Figure 5.2), suggesting that the order of drug/placebo 
administration is important. The drug effect was of slowed responses compared to placebo in 
the second session, whereas it had no significant effect in the third session. This difference may 
be due to dopaminergic modulation having specific effects on novel tasks but not previously 
trained ones. Dopaminergic effects of task novelty on learned responses have been 
demonstrated by direct physiological recordings from dopaminergic neurons (Schultz et al., 
1993). 
 
Analysis of variance in the Traffic Light Task demonstrated a non-significant interaction 
between drug/placebo condition and session with respect to error rates (Figure 5.7). In the 
second session, L-dopa appeared to reduce error rates compared to placebo, in the ‘drug first 
group’. Conversely, in the third session, when the ‘placebo first’ group were given L-dopa, 
more errors were made than by the placebo group. Training effects upon saccade distributions 
appeared to plateau after the first session. The effect of training was an increase in anticipatory 
responding and errors. This was accompanied by a significant increase in reward. Once 
established (through training), this increased anticipatory response distribution was unaffected 
by drug (or placebo) administration. 
 
In the reverse traffic light task, designed to assess risk seeking and relatively independent from 
reaction time, the main effect was, again, of training, with subjects increasingly willing to risk 
errors in order to reap greater rewards on successful trials. With each session, the distribution 
of saccades shifted rightward.  There was a significant reduction in the mean STOP anticipation 
(SAI, the degree to which subjects accurately anticipated the red light) between sessions 1&2 
and a further significant reduction in Session 3. The task is designed to measure willingness to 
take risk, as it requires responses to be made as late as possible in order to accrue the greatest 
reward. There was no evidence of a change in risk seeking/avoidance resultant from the drug 
versus placebo conditions.  
 
In the lateral reward task, there was a significant interaction for latencies to rewarded targets 
between drug/placebo condition and session (Figure 5.12). It would appear from these results 
that receiving L-dopa in the first session, enhanced the learning effect, leading to even faster 
responses to rewarded targets in the second session. This is apparent from the mean latencies – 
the four subjects who received L-dopa first improved from a mean of 227ms to 210ms, whereas 
those who received placebo first made a smaller improvement from 210ms to 200ms.  One 
might otherwise infer that the ‘drug first’ group were slowed by L-dopa in the first session but 
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were able to exploit enhanced learning in the second session, when they were faster and drug 
free. The ‘placebo first’ group, by contrast, had no enhanced learning and were slowed down by 
L-dopa in the second session, leading to an apparent diminished learning effect. Alternatively 
these findings might represent a “ceiling effect” due to the ‘placebo first’ group being faster 
overall by chance. This also raises the possibility of a speed/accuracy trade-off when subjects 
are administered L-dopa – the first group favouring slower more accurate responses while the 
second group opted for a faster but more error-prone performance. 
 
5.4.2  General Discussion 
There are several reasons that might explain the small differences found when comparing L-
dopa and placebo- modulated performance on our tasks. The simplest explanation is that 
saccadic decisions are unaffected by L-dopa at this dose. Otherwise, effects may have been lost 
due to individual variability in both the direction and the extent of performance difference due 
to the drug.  
 
5.4.2.1  L-dopa has variable reaction time and dosage effects 
The alteration in synaptic dopamine levels due to 100mg of levodopa may be insufficient to 
instigate changes in reward sensitivity, risk seeking, reaction time necessary to influence 
oculomotor task performance on our tasks. With larger doses, more marked effects may have 
seen. However, 100mg L-dopa was found to have the greatest effect (compared to either 25mg 
or 200mg) on paired associative stimulation induced plasticity, thought to reflect learning 
related processes (Thirugnanasambandam et al., 2011).  
 
The lack of significant effects on saccadic reaction times in either the SRT task or the Lateral 
reward task may be due to the dose used (100mg). Previous studies demonstrating manual 
reaction time effects have used higher doses of L-dopa – e.g. 200mg (Rihet et al., 2002). There is 
also evidence that repeated doses in drug studies on healthy volunteers are more effective 
(Knecht et al., 2004). However, consistent with our findings, a previous study using 100mg 
found no effect upon ‘reflexive’ saccadic latencies (Duka and Lupp, 1997).  
 
5.4.2.2  Patient and volunteer responses to L-dopa may differ 
Extrapolation from patient studies is difficult. It is likely that the long term (tonic) drug effects 
reported (Cools et al., 2003, 2010) differ from the acute changes seen following administration of 
a single dose to a drug naive subject. There is evidence that suggests drug naïve PD patients are 
more susceptible to the cognitive effects of L-dopa than those with a stable response to L-dopa 
(Kulisevsky et al., 1998). There are possible differences in patients’ endogenous dopamine levels 
and dopamine receptor numbers/activity as a result of chronic drug administration. Previously 
reported effects of an L-dopa induced increase in saccadic latency (using the patients’ usual 
doses) in PD patients (Hood et al., 2007; Michell et al., 2006) may be due to these differences, or 
dose effects. Furthermore, in antisaccade tasks, L-dopa has been found to cause opposing effects 
in PD patients, who made fewer errors (Hood et al., 2007), and healthy volunteers, who made 
more errors (Duka and Lupp, 1997). Nevertheless, the trend in our results was for faster 
responses in the placebo rather than the L-dopa condition consistent with the patient studies, 
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and it is possible that with larger subject numbers, higher, or repeated dosing we might have 
replicated those findings.  
 
5.4.2.3  There may be independent optimal levels of dopamine for both 
individuals and tasks 
Animal experiments have demonstrated large individual variation in both the direction and 
extent of drug effects.  Experiments demonstrate the “law of initial value” wherein 
pharmacological manipulation of blood pressure and heart rate depended upon the baseline of 
the tested variable (Wilder, 1962).  Similarly, the effects of dopaminergic drugs on cognition 
depend upon baseline levels of performance (Robbins and Sahakian, 1979; Kimberg et al., 1997; 
Mehta et al., 2000; Granon et al., 2000; Mehta et al., 2004). In other words, a dopaminergic drug 
may improve poor baseline performance in a given task, whereas good performance may be 
impaired. If this were the case in our study, we might expect analysis of poor performers in the 
training session to reveal different outcomes from those who performed better at baseline. A 
larger study would be required to demonstrate such differences. However, other animal and 
human experiments also demonstrate that simplistic ‘inverted-U-shape’ relationships between 
DA levels and performance are insufficient to explain or predict performance on cognitive tasks 
(Cools, 2006). Within a single subject, some functions will be enhanced and others impaired by 
the same drug dose. There is therefore task as well as an individual variation in the response to 
these drugs. 
 
Recent research has shown that risk taking is associated with DAT1 polymorphisms when 
subjects perform the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART, see Chapter 3 (Mata et al., 2012)). It is 
also known that genetic variability can affect the response to L-dopa (Eisenegger et al., 2010): A 
high dose (300mg) of L-dopa was administered to a very large group (n=200) of healthy 
volunteers who had been genotyped for DRD4 polymorphism. Without considering D4 
subtypes, L-dopa had no effect upon gambling propensity. However, division by genotype 
found increased gambling tendency in those carrying at least one copy of the 7-repeat allele. It 
is therefore possible that a genetically heterogeneous group might demonstrate opposing effects 
of the drug. There may also be underlying dopaminergically derived individual differences in 
the amount of effort people are willing to expend for rewards (Treadway et al., 2012). These 
effects might, when superimposed, cause regression to the mean. 
 
5.4.2.4  Differential learning effects due to the order of drug/placebo 
presentation 
Analysis of variance demonstrated similar interactions of drug/placebo condition and session 
in SRT (interaction not significant) and Lateral Reward (interaction significant) tasks. There was 
also a non-significant interaction with regard to the number of errors in the Traffic Light task. 
Such interactions may indicate an enhanced training effect due to dopamine in the earlier 
session, or a chance ceiling effect due to the ‘placebo first’ group being faster to start with. A 
study using methylphenidate found that the drug enhanced performance on spatial tasks from 
the CANTAB battery (Robbins et al., 1994b) when taken in the first session but impaired 
performance and reduced response latency if taken in the second session (Elliott et al., 1997).  
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5.4.2.5  L-dopa modulates reward sensitivity 
The lateral reward task is a measure of reward sensitivity. L-dopa administration non-
significantly attenuated reward sensitivity. It is possible that this apparent difference is due to 
reaction time effects, in that L-dopa could be creating a ‘cap’ on the maximum saccade speed. 
Alternatively, excessive dopamine may impair an already optimal dopaminergic state, thereby 
reducing reward responsiveness. This may contrast with PD patients, in whom reward 
sensitivity might be optimised by exogenous dopamine administration. L-dopa withdrawal 
studies have demonstrated that the drug improves cognition in some patients, but causes 
deterioration in others (Gotham et al., 1988). Consistent with the inverted U-shape hypothesis, 
patients who were performing particularly poorly off the drug gained the most benefit from L-
dopa, whereas those who performed well off drug were impaired by its administration. This 
finding has lead to the so-called “Dopamine overdose” hypothesis (Vaillancourt et al., 2013) . 
This suggests that the doses of L-dopa required to replace endogenous neurotransmitter in 
damaged brain areas lead to an overdose of other (intact) brain areas. 
 
5.4.2.6  More potent dopaminergic modulation or alternate agents may 
have greater impact upon oculomotor decisions. 
It is possible that drugs with greater DA receptor subtype specificity might prove more effective 
in modulating response to our tasks. Many of the reported examples of drug effects on decision 
making in both healthy volunteers and PD patients have used DA agonists, D2 agonists in 
particular (Frank et al., 2004; Cools et al., 2007, 2009).  This is consistent with the finding of a 
greater incidence of impulse control disorder in PD patients treated with DA agonists than 
those treated with L-dopa alone (Grosset et al., 2011). The relationship between specific 
pharmacological agents and task effects is complex; agents within the same class have been 
shown to have opposing effects. For example, bromocriptine has been shown to affect cognitive 
flexibility (in dual-tasking and Wisconsin card Sorting Task) but not simple delayed-response 
task (Kimberg et al., 1997; McDowell et al., 1998). Pergolide, on the other hand, modulated 
delayed-response tasks but did not affect set-shifting (Kimberg	  and	  D’Esposito,	  2003).  
 
Further experiments might consider the use of dopamine agonists, with greater DA receptor 
specificity and/or stimulant drugs that are more potent in acutely altering synaptic DA levels. 
The next chapter will discuss oculomotor experiments using a potent DA reuptake inhibitor, 
methylphenidate. 
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6. The effects of methylphenidate on 
oculomotor decisions 
  169 
6.1 Introduction 
In attempt to provoke a greater dopaminergic response in our healthy volunteer experimental 
subjects, we used an alternative compound to L-dopa; methylphenidate. 
 
6.1.1  Methylphenidate: Pharmacology 
MPH belongs to the piperidine class of compounds and increases the levels of dopamine (DA) 
and norepinephrine (NA) in the brain through reuptake inhibition of the monoamine 
transporters (Booij et al., 1997; Volkow et al., 1998, 2004). MPH also increases the release of DA 
and NA. Both of these mechanisms cause an increase in extra-striatal dopamine concentrations 
(de Haes et al., 2007; Montgomery et al., 2006). Imaging studies have demonstrated that this is 
associated with reduced prefrontal cortex activation (Mehta et al., 2000; Schweitzer et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, PET imaging has demonstrated that therapeutic doses of MPH significantly 
increase extracellular DA in the basal ganglia (Volkow et al., 2002).  
 
6.1.2  Methylphenidate: Clinical and Experimental Effects 
Methylphenidate (MPH) is a psychostimulant drug approved for treatment of attention-deficit 
hyperactivity disorder, postural orthostatic tachycardia syndrome (Kanjwal et al., 2010), and 
narcolepsy (Mitler, 1994). It has also been used to treat apathy (Marin et al., 1995; Galynker et 
al., 1997; Jansen et al., 2001; Hardy, 2009). Clinical research has demonstrated that MPH can 
reduce abnormal risk taking behaviour in patients with frontotemporal dementia (Rahman et al., 
2006). More recently, it has become one of the handful of drugs taken, often without 
prescription, as ‘cognitive enhancers’ by whose who are medically well, in the hope of 
improved academic or work performance - or simply to remain awake (Maher, 2008; Swanson 
and Volkow, 2008; Repantis et al., 2010; Husain and Mehta, 2011; Smith and Farah, 2011; 
Linssen et al., 2014a). 
 
6.1.3  Stimulant behavioural effects are variable and task dependent 
We might infer some hypotheses of MPH behavioural effects from animal studies. However, 
these show variable effects: A comparison of atomoxetine and methylphenidate in rats 
performing a 5 choice serial reaction time task (5-CSRTT) found that methylphenidate 
improved overall attention but that the highest dose also significantly increased impulsivity 
(Navarra et al., 2008). By contrast, rats also demonstrated reduced impulsivity following MPH 
administration in a delayed reward task (Vangaalen et al., 2006). There is also evidence of 
contextual effects: Amphetamine (a stimulant with similar effects to MPH), increased 
preference for the large/risky option when probabilities decreased over a session, but had the 
opposite effect if probabilities increased (St Onge et al., 2010). This demonstrates a task-
dependent effect of stimulants upon decision-making under risk. 
 
6.1.4  MPH effects on tasks of response inhibition 
In humans, MPH has been found to cause “low level“ effects such as the speeding of simple 
reaction times – particularly for more complex responses - and reductions in errors (Hermens et 
al., 2007; Naylor et al., 1985). MPH also reduced go-trial reaction time in a stop-signal reaction 
time (SSRT) task (Eagle et al., 2007). Similarly, MPH led to shortened reaction times in a 
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memory-scanning task, (Fitzpatrick et al., 1988). In a spatial Go/Nogo task under MPH ) faster 
reaction times and a trend towards less impulsivity errors under MPH vs. placebo were 
observed (Kratz et al., 2009). There is further evidence to support “higher level” cognitive 
effects too – in addition to faster processing: An fMRI study using two versions of the stop-
signal task to assess the effects of a 40mg dose of MPH (Pauls et al., 2012) found that MPH 
improved inhibitory performance in association with significantly reduced activation of regions 
within the right inferior frontal gyrus/insula to infrequent stimuli associated with successful 
inhibition, failed inhibition, and attentional capture – implying improved concentration 
/reduced distractibility. 
 
6.1.5  MPH may have effects on other higher processes 
Evidence of subject-independent effects of MPH are reported in a study of cognitive ability and 
decision-making: This study compared the response of ADHD diagnosed adults and healthy 
controls: In both groups MPH (15mg, adjusted for body mass extremes) was associated with an 
increase in digit span compared to placebo. However, there was no effect upon decision-
making in either group (Agay et al., 2010). 
 
There is some evidence of MPH induced improvement in “performance monitoring” (Hester et 
al., 2012): A single dose of methylphenidate (30mg) significantly improved the ability of healthy 
volunteers to consciously detect performance errors. This behavioural effect was associated 
with a strengthening of activation differences in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and inferior 
parietal lobe during the methylphenidate condition for errors made with versus without 
awareness. 
 
MPH higher-level effects may be context and/or task dependent: In a study wherein subjects 
underwent fMRI during a Go/Nogo task and a tracking stop-signal task after administration of 
40mg MPH or placebo (Costa et al., 2013), results revealed both task and condition-specific 
effects of MPH: There was increased activation in the putamen only during inhibition errors but 
not during successful inhibition and only in the Go/Nogo task. It is possible that task specificity 
of the effect might be due to differences in the degree of error saliency in the task designs. Errors 
were few in the Go/Nogo task and thus had high saliency and the stop-signal task was 
designed to elicit 50% of errors in all subjects, diminishing the error saliency effect. The findings 
suggest that neural MPH effects interact with the saliency of the behaviour under investigation. 
 
Beneficial effects of MPH (20 and 40mg) have been demonstrated in healthy volunteers using 
tasks sensitive to frontal lobe damage (Elliott et al., 1997). Methylphenidate had significant 
effects on performance of the tests of spatial working memory and planning. However, there 
was an interaction between the drug/placebo state and the session order: When the drug was 
taken on the first test session, performance on the spatial tests was enhanced. When the drug 
was taken second, performance accuracy was impaired whereas response latencies were 
decreased. These results are consistent with a hypothesis that methylphenidate influences 
performance in two conflicting ways; enhancing executive aspects of spatial function on novel 
tasks but impairing previously established performance. 
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A review and meta-analysis of 46 studies of MPH looked for effects upon motivation, 
wakefulness, attention and vigilance (Repantis et al., 2010). The authors also found that no 
consistent evidence was available for any “neuroenhancing” effect of MPH: For single dose 
administration, the main discernable effect was on memory – with a significant improvement 
found. No main effects upon attention, mood or executive function were found in the meta-
analysis. Imaging studies suggest an important role for dopaminergic effects of MPH (40mg) in 
increasing the speed of processing of uncertainty (but not the choice outcome) in decision 
making tasks (Schlösser et al., 2009). However, given this lack of change in the decision 
outcome, the behavioural importance of changes in cerebral blood flow remains unclear. More 
subtle (or complex) cognitive effects may be less amenable to experimental modulation with 
MPH: No main effects of the drug on a continuous performance task, a short-term memory task 
or cognitive rating scales were found in 12 healthy adult volunteers given 0.3mg/kg MPH 
(Aman et al., 1984).  
 
6.1.6  Methylphenidate: Eye Movement Effects 
The majority of studies of methylphenidate’s cognitive effects are reported in patients with 
ADHD. Given the “paradoxical effect” of stimulant medication in this condition (Robbins and 
Sahakian, 1979), results must be interpreted with caution. ADHD without medications causes 
abnormalities in various saccadic tasks (Mostofsky et al., 2001) including decreased SRT for pro-
saccades, delayed voluntary anti-saccades, increased intra-subject variance (Munoz et al., 2003) 
and impaired response inhibition in a memory guided saccade ‘oculomotor delayed response’ 
task (Ross et al., 1994). No saccadic or other eye movement effects upon healthy volunteers are 
reported to date. Specific investigation of drug-related oculomotor effects in ADHD is also 
limited.  Methylphenidate (10mg) was found to reduce both pro- and anti-saccadic reaction 
times, error correction times and the proportion of direction errors in an anti-saccade task when 
given to 27 boys with ADHD (Klein et al., 2002). Another study using oculomotor tasks in 
ADHD found that MPH improved performance in both motor planning and response inhibition 
(O’Driscoll et al., 2005).  
 
6.1.7  Summary 
Methylphenidate may improve simple motor performance by improving attention and 
reducing reaction times. However, cognitive effects are complex, vary between individuals and 
also within individuals according to the task being performed, the degree of novelty, saliency of 
e.g. errors and the drug dosage received. Few studies have investigated the effects of MPH on 
healthy volunteers, and none that we know of have looked at MPH on human eye movements. 
Given the effects on reaction time and inhibition, I hypothesized that MPH might influence 
performance on oculomotor decision making tasks. 
 
The same crossover design and experimental protocol was used as that described in Chapter 5 
on L-dopa. Due to the lack of a main effect of drug in that study, twice as many subjects were 
tested in order to increase the power of this experiment. 
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6.2 Methods 
30 right-handed healthy volunteers were recruited of whom 24 (12 female, mean age 23.1yrs, SD 
4.1) went on to complete the study. 
 
Subjects were asked to fast for four hours prior to their testing session to ensure an empty 
stomach, with the aim of increasing the speed to reach peak plasma MPH concentration (Kimko 
et al., 1999). Training sessions were conducted at a prearranged time. This time was kept as the 
start of testing for drug and placebo sessions. These were held at the same times, one and two 
weeks after training (randomised counterbalancing of the order was planned in advance). 
 
We used the same experimental protocol as for the L-dopa study. Some participants (n=2) 
participated in both studies. In that case they did not receive a further training session, as they 
were already familiar with the tasks. The two studies were sufficiently separated in time that 
any very specific latency related procedural memory was unlikely to have persisted from the 
prior drug study. 
 
We tested each subject on 3 separate occasions. Many drug/placebo studies fail to account for 
the effects of training on their measures. We wished to reduce the influence of sessional training 
effects upon our main interest; the drug versus placebo comparison. To this end, we trained 
each subject prior to drug and placebo sessions.  
 
Each subject was randomly assigned to receive drug or placebo in the second session and the 
remaining placebo or drug in the third. Pre-randomisation was achieved by ensuring that a set 
of drug containers contained an equal number of ‘drug-first’ and ‘placebo-first’ options. The 
experimenter was kept unaware of the order until the study and analysis were complete. 
Subjects were also blinded, as the drug and placebo preparations were not easily distinguished 
and had no identifying markings. At the end of the study, there were an equal number in the 
‘drug-first’ and ‘placebo-first’ groups. 
 
This counter-balanced, crossover design allowed observation of both training effects across the 3 
sessions and also comparison of the effects of drug versus placebo, independent of any training 
effect. We could also infer effects of drug and/or placebo upon learning. 
 
Subjects were asked to fast for four hours prior to their testing session to ensure an empty 
stomach, therefore increasing the speed to reach peak plasma MPH concentration. Sessions 
were conducted at a prearranged time. This time was kept as the start of testing for drug and 
placebo sessions which were held at one and two weeks after training. At the training session, 
subjects were asked to choose a letter from the remaining set of envelopes, and this determined 
the order of the drug and placebo conditions for the remaining 2 sessions. 
 
The onset of CNS effects occurs rapidly (within 60-90 minutes (Volkow et al., 2002)) following 
ingestion of methylphenidate and persist for about 4 hours (Wolraich and Doffing, 2004). We 
therefore chose to commence testing an hour after drug ingestion. Testing was complete within 
  173 
two hours. We opted to use a similar dose to that employed in a prior successful study on 
young healthy controls:  60mg (Clatworthy et al., 2009). 
 
6.2.1  Experimental Design 
When subjects arrived for the second session, they were given a drug container that contained 
either MPH 60mg (as 3 x 20mg tablets) or 3 multivitamin tablets. Neither tablet imparted any 
distinctive flavour or colour which would have unblinded the participant or experimenter. 
The following tests and tasks were administered during the 2-hour period: 
 
6.2.2.1  Questionnaires 
During the training session, subjects completed two questionnaires before and/or during 
breaks between eye movement testing: 
 
3) The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11). This is a measure that has been used in 
multiple studies of impulsivity in both health and disease (see Chapter 3 for further discussion). 
4) The Cloninger Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire (TPQ, (Cloninger, 1987) 
(Chapter 3). We hypothesised that there might be an inverse correlation between the Novelty-
Seeking (NS) dimension and risk avoidance in our tasks, a positive relationship between the 
Harm Avoidance (HA) dimension and task risk avoidance and a positive correlation between 
the Reward Dependence (RD) dimension performance on our rewarded tasks. 
 
6.2.2.2  Eye Movement Tasks 
Following drug/placebo administration in sessions 2 and 3, subjects were asked to wait in the 
lab for an hour before testing commenced. This was to ensure that drug plasma levels reached 
their peak as testing began. Subjects were free to read, work or use the Internet during this 
period but were continuously monitored for any side effects. They were also asked not to drink 
any caffeine prior to or during this first hour, but were offered as much fluid as they wished. 
 
SRT Task (See Chapter 2) 
Though we believe the anticipatory and reactive distributions of the traffic light task to be 
independent, we felt it would be important to exclude a simple speeding or slowing effect of 
drug or placebo in a reward independent task. We therefore designed a task-relevant saccadic 
reaction time (SRT) task. 
 
This required subjects to make eye movements as fast as possible when a red STOP signal 
changed to a green GO signal. The delay from red to green on each trial varied randomly 
between 500 and 1000ms (rectangular distribution). This task was not rewarded. The saccades 
required alternated between a rightward saccade (odd numbered trials, from -10 to +10 
degrees), and a leftward saccade (even numbered trials, +10 to -10 degrees). Confirmation of a 
completed saccade was acknowledged by an auditory “ping” and by the cruciform target 
changing from white to red. Erroneous, early saccades caused an aversive “beep” and the trial 
to repeat. 
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Traffic Light Task (See Chapter 2). 
Subjects were asked to make as much money as possible by making saccades as quickly as 
possible in response to a traffic light stimulus. Each trial begins with a red light that, after 
1000ms, turns amber. The amber duration varies randomly from trial to trial and is drawn from 
a normal distribution (mean 750ms, SD 125ms). Following the amber light, a green GO signal 
appears. Subjects then made a saccade from the stimulus to a cruciform target at 20 degrees 
retinal eccentricity. Trials alternated between left to right (odd numbered trials) and right to left 
(even numbered trials). Correct saccades were rewarded with either a “ping” for latencies of 
>=200ms or a “Kerching” for latencies of <200ms. Reward was displayed at the target location 
for each trial and a cumulative total was displayed immediately below the target. 
 
The reward (R) for a successful saccade was calculated by an exponentially decaying 
discounting function in the form: 
 
 
Where a = 150, k1=100 and t represents the saccade onset time relative to green onset (t0 , 
milliseconds). 
 
Erroneously early saccades, before the GO signal were punished by an aversive “bleep” and a 
fixed negative reward of -10 pence. 
 
Studies in similarly aged healthy volunteers had already demonstrated that this task elicited a 
bimodal distribution of saccadic responses (See Chapter 1). We were interested in the effects of 
MPH upon the distribution of ‘reactive’ and ‘anticipatory’ saccades. 
 
Reverse traffic Light (Go!) Task (See Chapter 3) 
The forward traffic light task tests multiple subject variables, including reaction time, reward 
sensitivity and risk aversion. We therefore sought to introduce other tasks that investigated 
each of these in turn. 
 
The reverse traffic light, or “Go!, task was developed in order to look at risk avoidance, 
independent of reaction time. In this task, subjects were asked to accrue as much as reward as 
possible. To do this, they had to fixate a traffic light stimulus that was green at the start of each 
trial. After 1000ms it turned amber. The amber duration was randomly chosen on each trial 
from a normal distribution (mean 1500ms, SD 250ms). [This was deliberately different from the 
forward traffic light task, to avoid learning effects causing an interaction between the two tasks. 
The task was also presented before and after the forward traffic light task to minimise 
interaction effects]. 
 
After the amber light, a red STOP signal would appear. If subjects made no saccade prior to red 
onset, they received a fixed -10 pence penalty and heard an aversive “bleep”. The aim was to 
wait as long as possible. The later in the amber light subjects made their saccade, the greater the 
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reward they received. In other words, subjects were trying to anticipate the red light but ensure 
that they responded before it appeared – similar to “playing chicken”. 
 
Successful anticipation of the red light was rewarded in a similar fashion to the forward task 
except that the reward increased exponentially as the red light onset approached. The reward 
calculation was necessarily slightly more complicated in this task, as the distribution had to be 
‘fitted’ into a variable amber light duration. This ensured that the reward was always a 
maximum of 150 pence but meant that reward varied both as a function of the anticipatory 
interval and the length of the amber light on each trial. 
 
 
 
a = 150, k1=100 and t-t0 represents the interval time from saccade onset (t0) to the chosen red onset 
for that trial (t) in milliseconds. 
 
Lateral Reward Task (See Chapter 3) 
The lateral reward task was adapted from a task designed to look at reward sensitivity in non-
human primates (Hong and Hikosaka, 2008). We used our version of this task to investigate 
effects of MPH versus placebo in affecting reward sensitivity. 
 
In this task, subjects were asked to attend a central white fixation spot. After 1000ms, the 
fixation disappeared and an identical target appeared at either -10 or +10 degrees retinal 
eccentricity (this varied randomly from trial to trial, 50% of targets were leftward and 50% were 
rightward). To begin with, either leftward or rightward targets were rewarded according to 
saccade latency. Reward was presented numerically with a pound coin symbol at the target 
location and subjects heard an auditory reward similar to that in the traffic light task (“ping“ 
SRT>=200ms, “Kerching!” for SRT<200ms).  Saccades to targets on the non-rewarded side were 
acknowledged with a change in colour of the target (white to red) and a non-rewarding 
“bleep”. 
 
After a jittered number of trials, the rewarded side would switch. On average, 60 leftward trials 
were presented and 60 rightward. On average, 30 each of these would have been rewarded 
target locations. The reward side ‘switch’ occurred approximately every 20 trials (5 switches per 
120 trials). 
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The following experimental protocol was followed*: 
 
Time (t) = 0 minutes 
Written consent  & Drug (Methylphenidate 3 x 20mg tablets [60mg total])  / 
Placebo (3 x Multivitamin tablets) Ingestion 
  Subjects were weighed 
   
t = 60  SRT task (100 trials) 
  Lateral Reward task (120 trials) 
  Reverse traffic Light Task (100 trials) 
  Traffic Light Task (10 blocks x 50 trials) 
  Lateral Reward task  (120 trials) 
  Reverse traffic Light Task (100 trials) 
 
t = 120  Testing complete, feedback to subjects, debrief and reward payment 
 
 
*Except during the training session, when subjects completed the BIS-11 and the TPQ before 
proceeding immediately with the eye movement tasks. 
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6.3 Results 
6.3.1  Questionnaires 
The mean BIS-11 score for all subjects was 67.1 (SD 9.67) – non-significantly higher than the L-
dopa study group (mean 60.2, SD 11.3; Chapter 5), perhaps reflective of the personalities of 
subjects more likely to volunteer for a trial using a more potent agent. No significant differences 
were found between BIS-11 scores (or component dimensions of the BIS) when the genders 
were compared. The mean scores for the three dimensions of the TPQ were: Novelty Seeking 
19.3 (SD 4.5), Harm Avoidance 11.7 (SD 3.9) and Reward Dependence 18.6 (SD 1.7). The mean 
scores in each category were consistent with normal ranges from previous studies e.g. (Otter et 
al., 1995) and with those found in the experiment described in Chapter 5. 
 
6.3.2  SRT Task 
A two-way ANOVA (with replication, Figure 6.1) revealed no significant interaction between 
session and drug condition (F(1,44)=1.01, p=0.32) for reaction time in the SRT task. There was a 
non-significant speeding effect of MPH on saccadic latency (SRTP = 300ms, SRTD = 288ms; paired, 
two-tailed Student T-test t(23) =1.05, p =0.31). The main effect, however, was of training. We 
anticipated this training effect, as it was seen in the experiments described in Chapter 5. Mean 
SRTs improved from SRT1 = 341ms (SD 72ms) in the training session to SRT2 = 298ms (SD 72ms) 
in the second session (paired, two-tailed Student T-test t(23)=2.35, p=0.01). There was a 
statistically non-significant further improvement in the third session (SRT3 = 290ms, SD 66ms; 
paired, two-tailed Student T-test t(23)=0.62, p=0.27). 
 
Those who took drug in the second session (SRTD2 = 301ms) were non-significantly slower than 
those who took placebo (SRTP2 = 294ms). Those who took the drug in the third session (SRTD3 = 
274ms) were faster than those who took placebo (SRTP3 =307ms). Neither trend reached 
statistical significance (this subgroup analysis, n=12, Figure 6.1). Modeling the data using 
minimum likelihood estimation of parameters (�, σ) for a single LATER unit fitted the data well 
(Figure 6.2 & Table 6.1). 
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Figure 6.1  Drug/Placebo & Session order effects on the SRT task 
MPH caused non-significantly shorter latencies overall but the training effect was significant. 
175
195
215
235
255
275
295
315
335
355
S ess ion 2 S ess ion 3
Placebo First
Drug First
S
RT
 (m
s)
  179 
 
 
Figure 6.2  Drug Effects on the SRT task 
SRT response distributions are typically recinormal and differ little from training to drug and 
placebo sessions. The drug and placebo sessions are, graphically, almost indistinguishable. 
 
A good fit is achieved by minimum likelihood estimation of parameters for a single LATER 
unit. 
A Cumulative Saccadic Latency Function (experimental data) 
B Cumulative Saccadic Latency Function (modelled data) 
C Probability Density Saccadic Latency Function (experimental data) 
D Probability Density Saccadic Latency Function (modelled data) 
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Session Mean (median) ms Modelled Mean 
 
1 
 
341* (320) 
 
326* 
2 298* (289) 291* 
3 290 (277) 291 
State Mean (median) ms Modelled Mean 
 
Training 
 
341 (320) 
 
326 
Placebo 300 (287) 292 
Drug 288 (279) 290 
 
Table 6.1  SRT Raw Data and modelled distributions 
*There was a statistically significant improvement (reduction in SRT latency) between sessions 1 
& 2. However there were no significant differences between other sessions.
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6.3.3 Traffic Lights 
This subject group demonstrated a well-developed anticipatory distribution of saccadic 
responses to the traffic light task during the training session (Figure 6.3). As a result, the 
training effect is less marked than in the L-dopa study (Chapter 5). There is no difference 
between Session 2 & 3 in either raw or modelled saccade distributions. Training effects on 
Anticipations, Errors and Reward are confined to the sessions 1 and 2 (Figure 6.4). Though 
effects of drug on these parameters do not reach statistical significance, there is a trend toward 
more cautious behaviour with less anticipation, fewer errors and slightly lower rewards. 
 
Reward significantly increased between sessions 1 and 2 (R1=17.8p, R2=23.9p; paired 1-tailed 
Student T-test, t(23)=-4.98, p<0.0001) (Figure 6.4). There was a negligible further improvement 
in session 3 (R3=23.9p; paired 1-tailed Student T-test, t(23)=-0.37, p=0.36). This was due to a 
significant increase in the mean number of successful anticipatory responses at 0-200ms after 
green onset (A1=118, A2=157; paired 1-tailed Student T-test, t(23)=-4.02, p<0.001; [A3=157]) and a 
significant decrease in mean errors (E1=127, E2=109; paired, 1-tailed Student T-test, t(23)=2.04, 
p=0.03; E3=111). 
 
In order to further investigate possible learning effects of MPH, mean rewards and the 
corresponding saccadic response latencies were calculated across 5 ‘epochs’ (equivalent to 100 
trials, or 2 blocks) (Figure 6.5). In the first session (training), statistically significant 
improvements in RT and reward occurred between epochs 2 and 3 (RT2 = 209ms, RT3=191ms; 1-
tailed, paired Student T-test, t(22)=1.82, p=0.04; Reward2 = 16.0p, Reward3 = 19.4p; 1-tailed, 
paired Student T-test, t(22)=-2.98, p<0.005). Though improvements occur across all 5 epochs, 
this is the only one that reaches statistical significance. The epochs in Session 2 are more 
variable, and although there are statistically significant differences in reward between Epochs 
1&2, 2&3 and 3&4, the direction of these differences alternates, suggesting a plateau in the 
learning and/or the effects of variable attention. In session 3, again there is a significant 
improvement between epochs 2 & 3, but the general trend is that of a completed learning phase. 
 
Comparing individual reward epochs across sessions, all epochs in Session 1 are significantly 
less rewarded than they are in either session 2 or 3. There are 2 significant differences when 
contrasting epochs in sessions 2 and 3: the second and third epochs are both significantly 
different. Again, the direction (sign) of these differences is different across sessions and the 
significance is not robust when correcting for multiple (5) comparisons. These results are 
graphically represented with a table of the relevant data (Figure 6.5 and Table 6.2). 
 
There were no significant differences between any epoch in the drug/placebo condition for 
either RT or reward (Figure 6.6). There were also no sustained patterns of inter-epoch difference 
that contribute to any possible change in learning due to either drug or placebo. 
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Figure 6.3  Traffic Light Task Performance: Saccadic Distributions 
Saccade probability density functions plotted against amber (top row) and green (bottom row) 
light onsets. The raw data is shown on the left, modelled functions on the right. Graphically, 
there is slightly less anticipation in the first (training) session than in either of the second or 
third sessions which are almost identical. 
 
A Saccade Latency Cumulative Density Function (data) 
B Saccade Latency Cumulative Density Function (model) 
C Saccade Latency Probability Density Function (data) 
D Saccade Latency Probability Density Function (model) 
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Figure 6.4  Traffic Light Task Performance: Sessional and 
conditional effects 
 
Left: On comparing percentage anticipations, percentage errors and reward, there are 
significant differences between session 1 and session 2 or session 1 and session 3 but not 
between the latter 2 sessions. 
Right: Similarly, there are significant differences between the training session and placebo or 
training session and drug but not between drug and placebo for all 3 variables. 
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Figure 6.5  Traffic Light Task Learning by Session 
In the first session (training), statistically significant improvements in RT and reward occur between epochs 2 and 3. The epochs in Session 2 are more variable, and 
although there are statistically significant differences in reward between Epochs 1&2, 2&3 and 3&4, the direction of these differences alternates, suggesting a plateau 
in the learning and/or the effects of sustained attention. In session 3, again there is a significant improvement between epochs 2 & 3, but the overall trend is that of a 
completed learning phase. 
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Epoch 1 2 3 4 5 
Session 1 RT 
(ms) 
215 209 191* 183 185 
Session 2 RT 
(ms) 
175 176 182 184 182 
Session 3 RT 
(ms) 
187 174 169 167 163 
Session 1 
Reward (p) 
16.0 16.0 19.4* 19.0 20.2 
Session 2 
Reward (p) 
22.5 25.0* 22.7* 24.6* 23.6 
Session 3 
Reward (p) 
23.7 22.4 24.8* 24.4 25.1 
 
Table 6.2  Learning effects within sessions by 100 trial epoch 
*Significant differences from previous epoch (2-tailed T-test, p<0.05). 
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Figure 6.6 Traffic Light Task Learning by Drug/Placebo condition 
Analysis of the numbers of response times and reward in each epoch by conditions (training/drug/placebo) demonstrated a statistically significant difference 
between training and subsequent sessions for all epochs but no main effect of drug versus placebo. 
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 6.3.4  Reverse Traffic Light Task 
There was a significant improvement in task performance between sessions 1 & 2 (Figure 6.6). 
The improvement continued but differences were not statistically significant when comparing 
sessions 2 & 3: The mean stop anticipation interval (SAI, the mean time in advance of the stop 
signal that a saccade was made) decreased from 370ms (SD 149) in session 1 to 262ms (SD 
142ms) in session 2, (paired, 2-Tailed Student T-test t(23)=3.26, p<0.005). The session 3 SAI was 
non-significantly lower still at 257ms (SD 130ms) (paired, 2-Tailed Student T-test t(23)=0.20, 
p=0.84). This led to significant improvement in reward across the first two sessions: Mean 
reward session 1 (R1)= 12.90 pence per trial (SD 5.07), R2 = 16.04p (SD 5.25), (paired, 2-Tailed 
Student T-test t(23)=-3.11, p<0.005). The mean reward was also non-significantly higher in 
Session 3 at 18.07p (SD 5.15). 
 
The number of punished trials (errors) also influences reward (Figure 6.6). Errors increased 
(non-significantly) between sessions 1 (mean 25 errors)  & 2 (mean 32 errors), but then 
decreased again in session 3 (mean 29 errors). This demonstrates that improved accuracy (on 
correct trials) rather than greater risk taking (which would be evident in a higher error rate) was 
responsible for task performance improvement. 
 
Though learning effects were evident in comparison of the training session with both drug and 
placebo conditions (Figure 6.6), there were no significant effects of drug versus placebo state. 
Therefore, to investigate the interaction between the two, I compared the reward accrued in 
sessions 2 & 3 between those taking drug first versus those taking placebo first. There was no 
significant interaction between drug and session effects in a two factor ANOVA with 
replication. 
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Figure 6.7  Reward and Error Effects in Reverse Traffic Lights  
There was a significant improvement in task performance between sessions 1 & 2 and between 
sessions 1 & 3. There was a significant improvement in reward across the first two sessions. The 
mean reward (non-significantly) higher still in Session 3. Errors increased (non-significantly) 
between sessions 1 & 2, but decreased again in session 3 (n.s.). This demonstrates that improved 
accuracy rather than greater risk-taking was responsible for the trend in performance 
improvement. 
*p<0.05
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Figure 6.8  Reverse Traffic Light Task Anticipatory Response Effects 
There was a significant improvement in task performance between sessions 1 & 2 and between 
sessions 1 & 3. Differences were not statistically significant when comparing sessions 2 & 3: The 
mean stop anticipation interval (SAI, the mean time in advance of the stop signal that a saccade 
was made) significantly decreased from 370ms in session 1 to 262ms in session 2. The session 3 
SAI was lower still at 257ms. This led to significant improvement in reward across the first two 
sessions. 
**p<0.01 
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6.3.5  Lateral Reward Task 
There were significant differences between rewarded (R) and unrewarded (U) saccade latencies 
in all sessions, as hypothesised (Figure 6.9 & Table 6.3). (U1=228, R1=221ms, paired, 1-tailed 
Student T-test, t(21)=3.94, p<0.001; U2=211ms, R2=202ms, paired, 1-tailed Student T-test, 
t(21)=5.01, p<0.001;  U3=207ms, R3=194ms, paired, 1-tailed Student T-test, t(21)=4.59, p<0.001;). 
There were significant improvements (reductions) in the latency of unrewarded and rewarded 
saccades in the second session when compared to the first: (U1=228, U2=211ms, 1-tailed 
Student T-test, t(41)=2.99, p<0.005; (R1=221ms, R2=200ms, paired, 1-tailed Student T-test, 
t(41)=3.46, p<0.001;). There was further, non-significant, improvement in latency between the 
second and third sessions for both rewarded (R3=191ms) and unrewarded (U3=205ms) 
saccades, Across the three sessions, the magnitude of the “reward preference” – the difference 
between mean unrewarded and rewarded saccade latency increased across the sessions (U1-
R1=D1=7ms; U2-R2=D2=11ms; U3-R3=D3=13ms). This increase in difference was not 
statistically significant between consecutive sessions but comparing Sessions 1 and 3 does reach 
statistical significance (1-tailed Student T-test, t(42)=-1.87, p=0.03). 
 
There were no main effects of drug (D) versus placebo (P) on the lateral reward task (Figure 6.8 
& Table 6.3). There was a significant reduction in latencies to both rewarded (R) and 
unrewarded (U) targets when compared to the training session (T) (Table 6.3). However, there 
was no significant difference in saccadic latencies due to the drug or placebo condition (DU = 
207ms, PU = 208ms; DR = 196ms, PR = 196ms). There was, however, a persistent significant 
difference between saccade latencies to rewarded versus unrewarded targets in each condition, 
as expected from the original experiment (Hong and Hikosaka, 2008). Training (TU =228ms vs 
TR=221ms), paired, 1-tailed Student T-test, t(21)=3.94, p<0.001; Placebo (PU =208ms vs 
PR=197ms), paired, 1-tailed Student T-test, t(21)=5.46, p<0.001; Drug, (DU =209ms vs 
DR=197ms), paired, 1-tailed Student T-test, t(21)=5.01, p=0.01. 
 
6.3.6  Correlations 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients calculated for BIS-11 and TPQ scores and oculomotor 
indices demonstrated no relationships with task performance or drug response.
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Figure 6.9  Lateral Reward Task Training and Drug Effects 
There was significant speeding toward rewarded targets in sessions 2 & 3, demonstrating reward preference. 
This reward preference increased across the 3 sessions. However, there was no main effect of drug versus placebo. 
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Session 1 2 3 
 
Unrewarded Rewarded Unrewarded Rewarded Unrewarded Rewarded 
Latency 
(ms) 
228 221 211 202 207 194 
Condition Training MPH Placebo 
 
Unrewarded Rewarded Unrewarded Rewarded Unrewarded Rewarded 
Latency 
(ms) 
228 221 209 197 208 197 
 
Table 6.3  Lateral Reward Task Response Latencies 
All sessions and conditions demonstrated significant reward sensitivity. There was significant 
improvement between sessions 1 & 2. Speeding after training to either drug or placebo was 
significant but there were no significant differences between sessions 2 & 3 or between drug 
and placebo conditions. 
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6.4  Discussion 
This study examined the effects of methylphenidate (MPH) upon eye movement tasks. There 
were no reported adverse side effects and all enrolled subjects completed the study. Many 
subjects (20 of 24) reported subjective side effects upon their mood and 3 became somewhat 
disinhibited during the drug session. These effects diminished within a few hours and were 
without significant consequence. The analysis was performed while blinded from this 
information, but both the subject and experimenter may have been inadvertently unblinded by 
these side effects. 
 
6.4.1  Findings 
There was a reduction in SRT latency across sessions, as anticipated, with a recinormal 
distribution, as seen in other simple saccade tasks. Task performance was similar to that seen in 
healthy volunteers in experiments reported in Chapters 2 and 5. Latencies were non-
significantly reduced by MPH compared to placebo, consistent with previous studies which 
have shown shorter reaction times under the influence of this drug (Klein et al., 2002; Mostofsky 
et al., 2001).  Greater subject numbers might render this a statistically significant effect. 
 
There was a trend toward fewer early responses in the Traffic Light Task with methylphenidate 
(both correct, highly rewarded anticipations and punished errors). This difference did not reach 
statistical significance. If representative, this trend might reflect a reduction in impulsivity due 
to methylphenidate (DeVito et al., 2008a) or improvements in timing (Rubia et al., 2009). 
Learning effects across epochs of 100 trials were similar in the drug/placebo condition, and 
performance had reached a plateau after the training session. The effects of training were again 
clearly evident, but there were no main effects of drug/placebo on the stop anticipation or its 
contingent reward. 
 
There was a consistent finding of reward-sensitive speeding in the lateral reward task. There 
was significant improvement following training but no difference between unrewarded and 
rewarded saccade latencies due to methylphenidate. 
 
6.4.2  General Discussion 
There are a number of possible explanations for the lack of main effect of drug versus placebo 
in this experiment (other than that the drug simply had no effect on the measures used). An 
alternative argument might contend that there were effects of different directions on subjects at 
either extreme of baseline measures. For example, due to a genetic variation in the dopamine 
transporter gene (DAT1) which may alter the response to stimulant medications (Lott et al., 
2004). This could cause regression to the mean in a genetically heterogeneous group. There is 
also evidence that low doses of MPH may improve function in various cognitive domains, 
whereas healthy volunteers may be less able to benefit from higher ones (Linssen et al., 2014a). 
 
There is accumulating evidence of an inverted U-shaped curve effect of dopaminergic drugs on 
task performance for a number of measures (Vijayraghavan et al., 2007; Levy, 2009; Clatworthy 
et al., 2009; Monte-Silva et al., 2009; Cools and D’Esposito, 2011; Berridge et al., 2012). For 
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example, MPH has been shown to cause a reduction in the go-trial reaction time in a stop-signal 
reaction time (SSRT) task (Eagle et al., 2007). In this study, its effects were relative to baseline 
performance: MPH decreased SSRT in slow responders but increased SSRT in fast responders – 
consistent with the “optimal DA” level / inverted U-shaped curve dose effects discussed in 
Chapter 1. Other task behaviours also demonstrate this effect: In a task testing visual short-term 
memory (vSTM), plasma levels of MPH were measured following 40mg oral administration. 
Higher plasma levels led to greater performance enhancement in low-performers and 
decreasing improvement in high-performers (Finke et al., 2010). Similarly, a study of dextro-
amphetamine (AMP) found that stop-signal reaction time was improved only in those subjects 
with slow baseline stop RTs (de Wit et al., 2000). Alternatively, MPH may only exert it’s effects 
upon those whose baseline performance is poor, as demonstrated in a recent study (Agay et al., 
2014) and similar to the positive effects of L-dopa in PD. In fact MPH has already been 
demonstrated to improve response vigor in PD patients, but not healthy controls (Drijgers et al., 
2012). 
 
A possible mechanism for this individual difference in responding is implied by a radiolabelled 
(D2/D3 ligand 18 F-fallypride) PET study (Volkow et al., 2002). This study found higher trait-
impulsivity (BIS-11 score) was predicted by diminished D2/D3 autoreceptor binding and 
greater amphetamine-induced DA release in the striatum. Impulsive subjects might therefore be 
differently affected by the MPH than less impulsive ones. PET imaging has also demonstrated 
that therapeutic doses of MPH significantly increase extracellular DA in the basal ganglia  but 
that this PET dopaminergic effect was affected by endogenous DA ‘tone’: MPH appeared to act 
through ‘amplification’ of each individual’s baseline DA release rate (Volkow et al., 2002). This 
might also explain variability in individual responses to the drug.  
 
Another explanation for lack of main effect could be differential dose responses. A study 
comparing the effects of MPH and atomoxetine upon the prefrontal cortex (PFC) of monkeys 
found an inverted-U dose response curve (Gamo et al., 2010). Optimal doses improved PFC 
function in a spatial working memory task, whereas excessive doses did not. These findings 
were mirrored by memory related neuronal firing, which was differentially blocked by both α2 
and D1 antagonists. A study of MPH dose-dependent effects upon 3 rhesus monkeys 
performing oculomotor delayed response tasks sensitive to working memory, impulsivity, 
response accuracy and precision as well as attentional performance found that task 
performance was affected in an inverted-U shaped manner with respect to dose (in all 3 
monkeys) (Rajala et al., 2012): There was an initial reduction in premature responding but no 
benefit in remembering target locations. This effect declined with higher doses of MPH, as did 
performance on attentional measures. Significantly, there were task dissociable effects in that 
the optimal dose for “duration of participation” was already sufficient to impair working 
memory.  This has connotations for clinical use, as well as for this study. 
 
The inverted U-shape relationship between cognitive performance and dopaminergic activity in 
fronto-striatal circuits has also been investigated using radiolabelled neurotransmitter imaging 
(Clatworthy et al., 2009). [11C]-raclopride radioligand PET imaging following a dose of 60mg 
MPH in healthy volunteers predicted performance on a reversal-learning task – specifically by 
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the drug-induced change in D2/D3 receptor availability in the post-commisural caudate. Spatial 
working memory task performance was related to similar changes in the ventral striatum. 
Interestingly, reversal-learning performance was also predicted by subjects’ trait impulsivity 
(BIS-11): The most impulsive individuals (at baseline) benefited most from the drug.  
 
The order of drug and placebo administration may also be important. In their study, Elliot et al 
(1997) found that although MPH enhanced spatial task performance when taken in the first 
session, it actually impaired performance accuracy when taken in the second session. Their 
explanation for this is that MPH might have a specific benefit on novel tasks, but otherwise 
impair previously established performance. We might have hoped that this would have been 
evident as a drug interaction with session order. However, the initial training session might 
have been sufficient to abolish any effect of MPH upon novelty. That being the case, we might 
have expected performance to be impaired by methylphenidate, but this also was not apparent. 
 
We, and others, have focused on the possible dopaminergic effects of methylphenidate. 
However, it also has noradrenergic effects through reuptake inhibition. These effects may 
independently influence eye movement tasks. A visuo-motor control task found that the SNRI, 
reboxetine, caused both changes in dynamic causal modelling (DCM) and improved task 
performance (Grefkes et al., 2010). However, the output modality of this study was hand 
movement, so putative effects upon eye movements must be inferred with caution. 
Furthermore, dexmedetomidine, an α2-adrenoreceptor agonist, had no effect upon saccadic 
latency, just saccade velocity (Aantaa, 1991). 
 
6.4.3  Summary 
Though both this experiment and that with levodopa (Chapter 5) failed to demonstrate 
significant effects of drug, there were interesting trends that may become significant on 
increasing the power of the study. Furthermore, stratification of larger groups through either 
genetic polymorphisms or baseline indices such as BIS-11 score could allow interrogation of 
differential effects on impulsive versus non-impulsive volunteers. 
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7. The Effects of Parkinson’s Disease, 
Impulse Control Disorders and Pathological 
Gambling upon Oculomotor Impulsivity 
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7.1 Introduction 
Why do some people take up gambling when for others it holds no interest? Some people feel 
compelled to gamble despite continued losses, leading them to financial (and social) ruin. In 
this extreme case the disorder is termed pathological gambling (PG) (Grant et al., 2014; 
Hinchliffe, 2014; Lobo et al., 2014). Such abnormal behaviour is associated with both impulsive 
traits and “novelty seeking” (Alessi and Petry, 2003; Blaszczynski et al., 1997; Fuentes et al., 
2006; Michalczuk et al., 2011; Steel and Blaszczynski, 1998). 
 
Parkinson’s Disease (PD) is associated with both apathy (Starkstein et al., 1992; Isella et al., 2002; 
Pluck and Brown, 2002; Robert et al., 2002; Dujardin et al., 2007) and impulsivity (Nombela et 
al., 2014; Voon et al., 2011a; Weintraub and Nirenberg, 2012; Weintraub et al., 2010). In some PD 
patients, particularly those treated with dopamine agonists, impulse control disorders develop, 
including pathological gambling (Avanzi et al., 2006; Driver-Dunckley et al., 2003; Gallagher et 
al., 2007; Molina et al., 2000; Voon et al., 2011a; Weintraub et al., 2010). This propensity may 
reflect a gradient pattern of dorso-ventral striatal degeneration and/or differential 
dopaminergic treatment effects upon those structures (Steeves et al., 2009; MacDonald and 
Monchi, 2011; Lawrence et al., 2013). 
 
Parkinson’s Disease provides a model of disrupted fronto-striatal dopaminergic circuitry in 
which impulse control disorders (ICDs) may develop. This “PD-ICD” group can be compared 
with non-impulsive PD patients and gamblers without neurological disease as well as healthy 
volunteers. The Traffic Light Task (Chapter 2) encourages “functional impulsivity” (Dickman, 
1990) through highly rewarded anticipatory eye movement behaviour. Would the impulsivity 
of known problem gamblers result in high rewards? Or, would gamblers be less sensitive to 
punishment and therefore persist in attempts to respond quickly, despite high rates of error 
(thereby exhibiting “dysfunctional impulsivity”)? How might non-impulsive PD patients 
perform on the task and how would that contrast with PD patients with impulse control 
disorders? I used the Traffic Light Task and other measures to compare these groups with age-
matched controls. 
 
7.1.1  Disordered Decision-Making occurs in PD 
Cognitive deficits are a recognised consequence of PD (Burn et al., 2014), including early in the 
disease course and younger patients (Aarsland et al., 2003; Collins, 1998; Lewis et al., 2003). 
Fronto-striatal executive impairment in non-demented PD patients may impair decision-
making and/or change patients’ risk sensitivity (Robbins and Cools, 2014). PD patients are less 
able to make profitable choices in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) compared with age and IQ 
matched healthy volunteers (Mimura et al., 2006). PD patients have also been found to be 
impaired on a Game of Dice Task (GDT), another measure of decision-making under risk 
(Brand et al., 2004). Some authors suggest that these IGT performance deficits emerge only 
following treatment with dopamine agonists and subsequent overstimulation of orbito-fronto-
striatal networks (Poletti et al., 2010). In studying dopaminergic drug effects, investigators have 
found both 1) improvement in some cognitively demanding tasks and 2) impaired task 
performance in other kinds of test when comparing PD patients on and off medication (Cools et 
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al., 2003). In particular, it seems that dopaminergic medication strengthens associations between 
reward processing and novelty seeking but disrupts the links between punishment processing 
and harm avoidance (Bodi et al., 2009). 
 
When reward processing and harm avoidance (and hence decision-making) are disrupted in 
PD, impulse control disorders may occur (Brand et al., 2004, 2005). PD patients with Impulse 
Control Disorders (ICD) seem to over-value immediate rewards despite intact reward learning 
(Housden et al., 2010). Would PD-ICD patients make excessive errors in the Traffic Light Task, 
driven by the desire for high rewards? Previous studies in patients with PD with and without 
ICDs inform our hypotheses about their oculomotor decision-making. A factor analysis (Poletti 
et al., 2010) comparing impulsiveness in PD patients (without diagnosed ICDs) with healthy, age-
matched controls found that four principal factors explained 60% of the variance in the results 
(Nombela et al., 2014). Three of these four factors provide a useful framework for the 
consideration of experimental findings relevant to hypothesis formation for our battery of 
measures: 
 
1. Tests of response conflict, interference and self-assessment of impulsive behaviours on the 
Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS-11, see Chapter 3). 
A screen for ICDs, impulsivity and compulsive behaviours in a large cohort of PD patients 
before initiating dopamine replacement therapy showed that a significant proportion of PD 
patients did demonstrate ICDs. These patients had higher Attentional Impulsiveness (AI) 
compared to non-PD ICD subjects on the BIS-11 (Antonini et al., 2011). Results discussed in 
Chapter 3 suggest that higher AI scores might predict higher reward in both the Traffic Light 
Task (due to a higher AER) and the reverse traffic Light Task and greater reward sensitivity in 
the lateral reward task. 
 
2. Tests of motor inhibitory control, and the self-report behavioural approach system. 
An investigation of treated and untreated PD patients found higher “motor impulsiveness” and 
total BIS-11 scores in those with ICDs (Bentivoglio et al., 2013). There was also a trend toward 
worse performance of the PD-ICD group on neuropsychological tasks sensitive to frontal lobe 
dysfunction. We found no correlations between the motor and total BIS-11 scores and our 
oculomotor tasks (Chapter 3), however, we might speculate that our task is sensitive to frontal 
lobe dysfunction and that patients with PD-ICD might therefore perform more poorly than 
healthy controls. 
 
3. Time estimation and delay aversion 
Fronto-striatal systems appear to be important for shifting attention from one temporal context 
to the other (Meck and Benson, 2002). PD patients have been found deficient in estimating short 
(seconds) intervals but, by contrast, are equally capable of estimating longer (tens of seconds) 
intervals as controls (Riesen and Schnider, 2001). Their timing deficits appear to be ameliorated 
by dopaminergic treatment (Pastor et al., 1992; Lange et al., 1995; Malapani et al., 1998). Studies 
in the time range (hundreds of milliseconds) relevant to these experiments are few but have 
demonstrated sparing of this range while replicating the deficits found by others in the longer, 
“seconds”, time range (Smith et al., 2007b). PD patients may therefore find oculomotor tasks, 
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which require an internal “representation” of time intervals for good performance (such as the 
Traffic Light and reverse traffic Light tasks), more difficult. However, the brevity of the task 
intervals used here (mean SRT delay 500ms, mean traffic light delay 750ms, Lateral Reward task 
delay 1000ms, mean reverse traffic light amber duration 1500ms) may render PD patients 
relatively unimpaired. If they are impaired, we might expect a restorative effect of 
dopaminergic medications upon their performance – perhaps such that levodopa equivalent 
dose (LED) correlates positively with task performance. 
 
The fourth factor ‘Reflection in hypothetical scenarios including temporal discounting’ is not directly 
relevant to our battery, but reaction time data from studies of temporal discounting may inform 
interpretation of our results: Increased temporal discounting and other treatment-related 
behavioural disorders occur in PD with PG (Voon et al., 2009; Housden et al., 2010). Patients in 
one of these studies had faster reaction times compared with PD controls (Voon et al., 2009). 
However, other authors found no differences in reaction times or error rates when PD patients 
with and without PG were compared on the Stroop test (Djamshidian et al., 2011; Rossi et al., 
2010). As far as we know, no one has previously used saccadic (or other eye movement) tasks to 
compare Parkinson’s patients with and without impulse control disorders. 
 
7.1.2  Eye Movements in Parkinson’s Disease Reflect Cognitive 
Processes 
Numerous studies have demonstrated abnormal oculomotor control in PD (Jankovic, 2008). 
However, saccadic latencies appear to correlate with (diminished) executive function rather 
than motor severity (Perneczky et al., 2011), suggesting that they may remain useful for 
cognitive testing. Most relevant to The Traffic Light Task are PD effects on 1) simple reaction 
time, 2) antisaccades (a measure of prepotent response inhibition that is associated with 
impulsivity) and 3) anticipatory responding. 
 
Reflexive saccades to visual targets are relatively spared from impairment in most reported 
studies of patients with PD (White et al., 1983; Rascol et al., 1989; Vidailhet et al., 1994; Briand et 
al., 1999). However there are exceptions to this, which demonstrate increased latency (Bronstein 
and Kennard, 1985; Shibasaki et al., 1979). In all the reported studies found using oculomotor 
prepotent response inhibition, latencies of antisaccades (AS) were increased and PD patients 
committed more pro-saccadic errors (Briand et al., 1999; Chan et al., 2005; Kitagawa et al., 1994; 
Lueck et al., 1990; White et al., 1983). In one of these studies, the latency increase correlated with 
the degree of bradykinesia (Kitagawa et al., 1994), suggesting that cognitive effects are not fully 
independent of motor severity. 
 
With regard to the likelihood of anticipatory responding, PD patients have been shown to make 
more ‘express saccades’ (correct saccades in the latency range 90-140ms) in a study using both 
pro- and anti-saccades (Chan et al., 2005). However, an earlier study of PD patients and age-
matched controls found that patients were less likely to make anticipatory saccades. This was 
thought to be due to their over-reliance on visual input (Bronstein and Kennard, 1985).  In a 
study that used both manual and saccadic responses, the authors concluded that, though capable 
of predictive hand and eye movements, PD patients tend to avoid them due to their greater 
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inaccuracy (Crawford et al., 1989). We might therefore hypothesise that PD patients will commit 
more errors and/or avoid anticipation. 
 
7.1.3  Pathological Gambling (PG) causes impaired prepotent 
response inhibition 
To our knowledge, no one has previously used saccadic tasks to study problem gamblers. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of reports of fundamental psychophysical measures (such as a 
reaction time) in this group. Only seven specific neuropsychological experimental reports 
involving gamblers were found by a 2004 review (Goudriaan et al., 2004). This author has since 
described experiments which demonstrated that pathological gamblers performed poorly in 
tasks requiring inhibition, time estimation, cognitive flexibility and planning (Goudriaan et al., 
2006a). 
 
Gamblers also exhibit poor decision-making. Gamblers had impaired performance on three 
decision-making tasks and deficient feedback processing compared to the control group on the 
IGT and a Card Playing Task (Goudriaan et al., 2005). Delay discounting and decision-making 
impairment on the IGT are consistently found to be impaired in PG (Alessi and Petry, 2003; 
Cavedini et al., 2002; Kertzman et al., 2011; Petry, 2001). 
 
Further behavioural investigation of pathological gamblers has focused on tasks of prepotent 
response inhibition, such as stop-signal reaction time (Lipszyc and Schachar, 2010) and 
Go/Nogo tasks (Kertzman et al., 2008): A (poorly controlled) study found that pathological 
gamblers’ performance was impaired versus other groups in a stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) 
task (Odlaug et al., 2011). Gamblers also had slower response latencies on “go” trials and made 
more errors on a cognitive flexibility task. A major confound in this study was that of 
significantly higher chronological age in the pathological gambling group. This may account for 
some (or all) of the differences found. A better controlled study using both SSRT and delay-
discounting tasks found greater delay discounting in all gamblers, but SSRT impairment only in 
the most severely affected (Brevers et al., 2012). A recent review found consistent abnormalities 
in pathological gamblers in the IGT, delay and probability discounting tasks but poor inter-task 
correlations (Wiehler and Peters, 2014). Genetic polymorphisms affecting genes encoding 
specific dopamine receptor subtypes have been associated with these task abnormalities (e.g. 
(Gray and MacKillop, 2014). 
 
On the basis of these findings, we might hypothesise that pathological gamblers will be more 
variable in the their traffic light task responses and may fail to adapt their strategy to achieve 
optimum rewards. 
 
7.1.4 Summary 
Patients with Parkinson’s disease demonstrate cognitive deficits in tasks sensitive to frontal lobe 
or executive dysfunction, including decision making tasks. Saccadic reaction times may be 
relatively spared but relate to cognitive deficits more strongly than motor impairment. There 
are similarities in the neuropsychological deficits of pathological gamblers.  We investigated 
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these groups’ performance in The Traffic Light Task, to further understand the effects of 
impulse control disorders on oculomotor impulsivity and to look for similarities and differences 
in the deficits shown by each group. 
 
We investigated three patient groups: 
 
1. Patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD) without impulse control disorders (ICD) 
2. Patients with Parkinson’s disease with diagnosed ICDs (PD-ICD) 
3. Problem gamblers without neurological disease (PG) 
4. Age matched healthy volunteers 
 
7.2 Methods 
7.2.1  Experimental Groups 
PD Group 
Sixteen patients (8 female) with a diagnosis of idiopathic Parkinson’s disease (PD) were 
recruited from general neurology clinics at the National Hospital for Neurology and 
Neurosurgery and Charing Cross Hospital. Fourteen of these (7 female, 2 left handed, mean age 
64.8yrs, SD 8.2) went on to successfully complete 500 trials of The Traffic Light Task (Chapter 2) 
and the BIS-11 questionnaire (see Chapter 3). Two patients were taking no anti-Parkinsonian 
medication. The mean levodopa equivalent dose (using dose equivalencies according to 
(Tomlinson et al., 2010)) of all 14 patients (L-dopa Equivalent Units, LEU) was 308mg/day (SD 
362) of which a mean of 113mg/day (SD 110) were due to DA agonists. The patients’ mean 
Unified Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale (UPDRS) was 31 (SD 11). 
 
Two patients failed to complete the task due to one being unable to learn the task and one 
because of impaired vision/technical failure of eye tracking due to spectacles. Some of the 14 
participants completed newer tasks described elsewhere in this thesis. Though they are not the 
main subjects of this chapter, the results of the other tasks will be presented here, where 
informative. 
 
PD-ICD Group 
Seven patients (1 female, mean age 50yrs, SD 11yrs, 1 left handed) with a diagnosis of 
Parkinson’s disease who had developed and been diagnosed with an impulse control disorder 
since diagnosis were recruited and tested. Patients with identified impulse control disorders, a 
prior history of gambling, alcoholism or other addiction were excluded. These patients were 
identified by their participation in other research at the Institute of Neurology, University 
College London. 
 
The patients had a heterogeneous group of ICDs: One patient collected compulsively 
(O’Sullivan	   et	   al.,	   2010a), one was recklessly generous (O’Sullivan	   et	   al.,	   2010b), one was 
adulterous and four had developed pathological gambling. The extent of the gambling ranged 
in severity from a significant increase from baseline (pre-Parkinson’s) gambling to severe 
pathological gambling leading to bankruptcy.  
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All 7 ICD-PD patients were taking anti-Parkinsonian medication. The mean LEU dose of was 
478mg/day (SD 379) of which a mean of 144mg/day (SD 145) were due to DA agonists. Both 
mean LEU and LEU due to DA agonists were therefore (non-significantly) higher than in the 
PD without ICD group. The patients’ mean Unified Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale (UPDRS) 
was also non-significantly higher than in the non-ICD group (mean 57, SD 21). 
 
Tasks presented: All PD-ICD subjects completed the SRT task (Chapter 2), the Traffic Light Task 
(Chapter 2), The Lateral Reward Task (Chapter 3) and The Reverse Traffic Light Task (Chapter 
3).  
 
PG Group 
11 gamblers (all male, all R handed, mean age = 37.0 yrs) were recruited from the National 
Problem Gambling Clinic in Soho (Central and North West London NHS Trust) after 
identification as suitable following a review of the medical records. Comorbid psychiatric 
disorders or neurological disease were exclusion criteria. Gamblers were at various stages of 
assessment and/or treatment for problem gambling as identified by their G.P. or by self-
referral.  
 
Tasks presented: 10 gamblers completed the SRT task, the traffic light task, the lateral reward 
task and the reverse traffic light task. The 11th subject performed the SRT and traffic lights tasks 
only. 8 completed the BIS-11, the other 3 refused. 
 
Controls 
Age matched controls for the PD group (Older volunteers, n=14, 8 female, 3 left handed, mean 
age 65.5yrs, SD 8.9) were drawn from our older healthy volunteer group (see Chapter 2). Older 
volunteers completed the BIS-11 and traffic light task only. 
 
Due to difficulty in recruiting healthy volunteers in the 50 to 65 year age group (particularly 
male) for comparison with the PD-ICD and PG groups, controls for SRT, Reverse Traffic Light 
and Lateral reward tasks were necessarily younger than the patient group. This group is 
referred to as Middle 1. 
 
A second, better age matched group drawn from both the older control group and the middle 
aged control group was used as a control set for the traffic light task. This group is referred to as 
Middle 2. 
 
Middle 1: Controls (n=13, all male, 3 left handed, mean age 41, SD 5.7) were drawn from 
our healthy volunteer group. 
 
Middle 2: Controls (n=16, 5 female, 3 left handed, mean age 50, SD 10.7) were drawn from 
our healthy volunteer group. 
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7.2.2  The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) 
The 30-item BIS-11 questionnaire (Patton et al., 1995; Stanford et al., 2009) measures 
impulsiveness through items such as “I act on impulse” and “I consider myself always careful”. 
Participants indicate how frequently each statement applies to them on a 4-point Likert scale 
(never, occasionally, often, and almost always). Possible score totals range from 30 to 120, with 
higher scores indicating greater total levels of impulsiveness. Analysis of the BIS-11 comprises 
six first-order factors: attention, motor, self-control, cognitive complexity, perseverance, and 
cognitive instability. These first-order factors are combined to generate three second-order 
factors: attentional impulsiveness (inability to focus attention or concentrate), motor 
impulsiveness (acting without thinking), and non-planning impulsiveness (lack of forethought). 
 
7.2.3  Oculomotor Tasks 
Oculomotor Task Apparatus and Data Acquisition 
Subjects sat on a height adjustable chair under a height adjustable table in a dimly lit room. 
They placed their forehead on a rack mounted EyeLink 1000 infra-red video-based eye tracker 
(SR Research Ltd, Ontario, Canada) recording eye position at 1000 Hz. A chin rest was then 
adjusted to provide comfortable support. The task stimuli were displayed on a flat screened 22” 
CRT monitor (Dell P1230, 507.7mm viewable, displaying 1024x768 pixels, refresh rate 150 Hz) at 
60cm from the vertical plane of the subject’s eye. Eye position was calibrated to a 9 point 
rectangular matrix before testing began. 
 
The task stimuli were programmed in C/C++ and run on a personal computer ((PC), Dell 
Optiplex 755 running Windows XP SP3). The eye tracker was controlled by a separate PC (Dell 
Precision 380) networked to the stimulus/display PC. This allowed real-time task feed-back 
responses to eye movements. Eye position and pupil area data were acquired in real time and 
exported into Matlab R2008a (The Mathworks, Massachusetts, USA) for analysis. 
 
Data Analysis 
Eye position data was used to detect fixations during each trial. Though blink errors were 
unavoidably included in the real-time feedback to the participant, blink trials were excluded 
from our post hoc analysis. 
 
7.2.3.1  Traffic Light Task (See Chapter 2 & Figure 2.1) 
In the Traffic Light Task, participants were told that their main aim was to win as much money as 
possible. They were asked to make rapid eye movements from a ‘traffic light’ (coloured disc 3 
degrees in diameter) to a target cross (3x3 degrees), both presented on a computer monitor 
(60cm from the chin rest/plane of the eye). The traffic light and target were 10 degrees either 
side of the screen center. Subjects were requested to fixate the traffic light stimulus while it 
turned from red (duration 1000 ms) through amber to green. They were asked to make their 20 
degree saccade to the target cross as quickly as possible and as soon after the GO signal as 
possible. They had a maximum of 1000ms in which to respond. 
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The reward (R) for a successful saccade was calculated by an exponentially decaying 
discounting function in the form: 
 
 
Where a = 150, k1=100 and t represents the saccade onset time relative to green onset (t0 , 
milliseconds). 
 
The timing of the GO signal (green light) onset was not absolutely predictable from trial to trial. 
Instead, the duration of the amber light (Figure 2.1B) was randomly selected on each trial from 
a normal distribution (mean 750ms, SD 125ms). To perform optimally, participants therefore 
needed to make as many rewarded anticipations as possible, while keeping errors to a 
minimum. They had to make a choice of whether to stay (wait longer) or go and risk a small 
penalty versus the possibility of a large reward. On gaze arriving at the target cross (fixation 
tolerance 2o), subjects received both aural and visual feedback on their performance. They were 
shown the reward (in pence) on the trial just completed, and a running total beneath (in 
pounds). There were also aural cues to trial performance. For rewards of less than 20 pence, 
they heard a ‘ping’. For rewards of 20 pence or more, they heard a more rewarding ‘kerching!’ 
sound. The target cross was then replaced by a red light (circle) and a target cross now 
appeared on the opposite side of the screen to begin the next trial. To perform optimally, 
subjects should therefore make as many anticipations as possible, but as few errors as possible. 
Subjects performed ten blocks of fifty trials, the first trial in each block started from a left sided 
stimulus (rightward saccade) and then alternated.  
 
7.2.3.2  Saccadic reaction time (SRT) task (See Chapter 2 & Figure 2.2) 
In addition to The Traffic Light Task, some subjects were also tested on a control, non-rewarded 
saccadic reaction time (SRT) task. In this paradigm, the red light was followed immediately by 
green, with no amber light between these. Red light duration varied between 500-1000ms 
(rectangular probability distribution, mean 750ms). Data acquisition was as above. This task 
allowed us to obtain response distributions for ‘reactive’ saccades – those programmed in 
response to green onset, without any need to anticipate the GO signal. 
 
7.2.3.3  The Lateral Reward Task (See Chapter 3) 
Subjects were asked to fixate a central spot for 1000ms before making a saccade to a target 
appearing 10 degrees to the right or left (50% probability on each trial). The rewarded side 
changed every 10-14 trials, jittered such that 60 leftward and 60 rightward rewarded sides were 
encountered by each subject overall, in a 120 trial block. Rewarded trials were acknowledged by 
the display of a pound coin and a number representing the magnitude of the reward in pence. 
Reward value was dependent on latency using a similar function to that employed in the Traffic 
Light Task. The reward function was slightly shifted to accommodate longer mean latencies 
(discovered in piloting) due to the unpredictable target position. A red circle and a zero 
acknowledged unrewarded trials.  
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Participants performed two blocks of 120 trials. Their reward for participation was scaled to 
their total reward accrued across the tasks presented. The difference between the reaction times 
to the rewarded and unrewarded sides was used as a measure of a subject’s sensitivity to 
reward. 
 
7.2.3.4  The Reverse Traffic Light Task 
In this task, patients were told to fixate a green light that would then turn amber (after 1000ms). 
They were told to make their saccade at some time during the amber light. It was explained that 
the later they made their eye movement, the more highly rewarded their response would be. 
However, were the amber light to turn red before they made their eye movement, they lost 10 
pence. The amber light duration was varied randomly from trial to trial selected at random 
from a Gaussian probability distribution with a mean of 1500ms (SD 500ms). This was intended 
to force subjects to wait slightly longer on each trial than in the traffic light task and also to 
avoid “cross-over” effects between tasks, within or across testing sessions. 
 
R = Ae(ts-tα-t�)/t�κ 
R=reward (in pence), A=150, ts = time of saccade, tα = time of amber onset, t� = time of red light onset, 
κ=0.1 
 
The closer subjects make their saccade to the red light onset, the greater the reward they 
received. Due to the changing amber duration, the reward calculation had to be slightly more 
complex: Reward was derived as an exponentially increasing figure related to the red onset on 
each trial. The reward curve is “fitted” into the variable amber duration on each trial. There is, 
therefore, not a fixed reward for any particular anticipatory gap, however this contingency 
ensures that similarly high rewards are achieved for accuracy on each trial. 
 
Performance on this task was measured both in terms of reward accrued and in terms of the 
mean Stop Anticipatory Interval (SAI), the mean amount of time between subjects’ saccades 
and the programmed onset of the red light. 
 
7.3 Results 
7.3.1 BIS-11 
The PD group mean total BIS-11 score was 61.3 (SD 9.3) (See Table 7.1). The older volunteers 
mean was 59.5 (SD 10.8). These were not significantly different. Neither did patients nor age-
matched controls differ significantly on any factor or dimension of the BIS-11 {Attention, Motor, 
Self-Control, Cognitive Complexity, Perseverance, Cognitive Instability, Attentional 
Impulsiveness, Motor Impulsiveness, Non-Planning Impulsiveness }. 
 
PD-ICD patients were non-significantly more impulsive than controls according to BIS-11 totals. 
The mean PD-ICD total was 67.0 (SD 11). One patient (Subject E) who continued to use DA 
agonists despite on-going gambling problems scored 88 on the BIS-11. The Middle 1 group 
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scored a mean of 65.4 (SD 12.9). The Middle 2 group scored a mean of 61.8 (SD 12.8). These were 
not significantly different from any other group. 
 
As expected, the pathological gamblers (PG) group were significantly more impulsive 
compared to both age matched control groups: BIS-11(Gamblers) mean = 75.56, SD 10.1,  BIS-11(Middle1) 
mean = 65.4,  SD 12.9, 1-Tailed Student’s T test:  t(18) = -1.95, p=0.03; BIS-11(Middle2) mean = 61.8 SD, 
13.2, 1-Tailed Student’s T test:  t(22) = -2.52, p=0.02).  
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Bis-11 totals Males Females Whole Group 
Group Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Middle Aged 
Controls (All) 
(m11;f3) 
65.82* 12.60 64.33 11.02 65.50 11.88 
Middle 1 
(m13;f0) 
65.40 12.90 - - 65.40 12.90 
Middle 2 
(m11;f5) 
- - - - 61.80 12.8 
Elderly Controls 
(m5;f12)  
57.40 11.48 60.33 10.88 59.47 10.78 
PD Patients 
 (m6, f6)  
63.33 10.58 59.33 8.33 61.33 9.32 
PD-ICD Patients 
(m6;f1) 
69.17 11.32 56 - 67.29 11.47 
Pathological 
Gamblers  
(m11;f0) 
75.56* 10.10 - - - - 
 
Table 7.1  Mean BIS-11 Scores for each group 
Pathological	   gamblers	  were	   significantly	  more	   impulsive	   than	   age-­‐matched	   controls	   (*Student	  T-­‐
test,	  1	   tailed,	   t(17)	  =	  1.89,	  p<0.05)).	  All	  other	  meaningful	   group	  comparisons	   (including	  between	  
genders	   within	   groups)	   found	   no	   statistically	   significant	   differences.
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7.3.2 SRT Task 
5 PD patients completed the SRT task. Their mean saccade latency was 537ms (mean SD 148ms). 
Their responses formed a typical recinormal distribution (Figure 7.1). The SRT task was 
developed after older, age matched, controls were tested. We do not therefore have age 
matched control group for this task. The PD patients were significantly slower and more 
variable than middle-aged volunteers (mean 411ms, SD 56ms; 2-tailed Student T-test, t(16)=2.72,  
p=0.02). However, an F-test found the two samples to be of significantly different variances 
(F(4,12)=6.75. p=0.02). A Welch’s T-test (for samples of unequal variance) does not reach the 
required significance level (t(4)=1.87, p=0.06).  
 
All seven PD-ICD patients completed the SRT task. Their mean SRT was 442ms, SD 91ms. 
Variability was therefore intermediate between controls and non-ICD PD patients. A recinormal 
distribution was produced by the task (Figure 7.1). There was no significant difference between 
the PD-ICD patients and controls, neither did an F-test find the samples to differ significantly in 
variance. 
 
The mean of gamblers mean latencies in the SRT task was 438ms (mean SD 128ms). The task 
generated a recinormal distribution of responses (Figure 7.1). There was no significant 
difference when compared to the age matched control group. However, the greater variability 
in the gamblers was reflected in a significant F-test demonstrating the two samples to be of 
different variance (F(10,12)=4.01, p=0.01). 
 
In summary, the PD, PD-ICD and PG group were all more variable in their responding than 
controls, but this effect was only statistically significant for the PD and PG groups. Though PD 
patients were slower, they were also the most variable, and were older than the control group. 
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Figure 7.1 SRT Task performances across groups 
Saccadic latencies are significantly slower comparing PD patients and a group of middle-aged 
healthy volunteers. The PD group were also significantly more variable in their responding.  
Both PD-ICD and PG groups were also more variable than controls, the PG group significantly 
so. There were no significant differences in reaction time between these groups, however. All 
groups produced a recinormal distribution of saccadic latencies. 
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7.3.3  The Traffic Light Task 
PD Group 
PD patients demonstrated little anticipation in the traffic light task (Figures 7.2 & 7.3). One 
patient made no anticipatory saccades (Subject J). Subject C made the greatest number of correct 
anticipations, making 116 such saccades (25% of non-blink trials). This range is similar to that 
seen in age-matched controls (min 0 [n=3], max 127 (32%) anticipatory saccades, Figure 7.3). Of 
the 14 PD subjects, only 5 demonstrate a convincing bimodal distribution of saccadic responses 
(Figure 7.2). 
 
The low rate of anticipation (mean 7.0% of trials, SD 8.5%) led to a modest mean reward per 
trial (mean 7.1p, SD 4.1p, Figure 7.3). As expected, PD patients accrued even less reward than 
age-matched controls (mean 9.7p, SD 3.9p, 1-tailed Student T-test, t(26) = -1.71, p<0.05). This 
was not due to the anticipatory rate. In fact, the mean number of anticipations (saccades of 
latency 0-200ms) was similar identical (PD 7.0% of trials, SD 8.5%; Older 6.0% of trials, SD 
9.9%). However PD patients did make non-significantly more errors (saccades before the green 
“Go!” signal; PD 13.5% of trials, SD 10.6%; Older 8.4% of trials, SD 10.7%). The PD correct 
Anticipations:Errors ratio (AER) was therefore non-significantly lower (0.42, SD 0.34) than that 
of the controls (0.70, SD 1.16). The main feature was the large range in this data for both groups, 
for example 0-116 anticipations by PD patients and 0-127 anticipations by older controls (three 
of whom made zero anticipatory responses). 
 
Since there were no age-matched controls for the SRT task, it is useful to separately consider the 
reactive saccades (those made at >200ms latency). The mean latency for these in the PD patients 
was 379ms (SD 62.4ms) compared to the control mean of 350ms (SD 68.0ms). Though this 
difference was also not significant, the combination of greater errors in the early distribution 
and a longer latency for the reactive distribution combine to explain the significant reward 
reduction in PD patients. 
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Figure 7.2  PD Probability densities for saccadic latencies in the 
Traffic Light task: 
14 PD Patients (Subjects A:N) and the group as a whole. X axes: Response latency 
(milliseconds), Y axes: Probability Density (no units). 
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Figure 7.3  Traffic Light Saccade Distributions and Performance 
Analysis. 
Both PD patients and Older Volunteers show very few anticipatory saccades leading to near 
unimodal saccadic distribution (left), with only a very small early distribution of saccades. 
However, there is a significant difference in reward benefitting the healthy controls. Separate 
analysis of the number of correct and anticipations (right) reveals that this is due to a slightly 
greater rate of earlier, mostly erroneous, responding overall in the PD group. Within the PD 
early responses, there are a greater number of errors relative to correct anticipations (neither 
result is statistically significant). The PD reactive distribution is also (non-significantly) right-
shifted (of longer mean latency) compared to the controls. 
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PD-ICD Group 
PD-ICD patients show some anticipation in the traffic light task (Figures 7.4 & 7.5). There is 
more evidence of a bimodal distribution than was evident for older PD patients and controls. 
There is an early distribution of responses that begins before the “Go!” signal but that also 
includes many highly rewarded saccades in the 0-100ms range. This is similar to the response of 
the age-matched controls. 
 
The moderate rate of anticipation (mean 13.9% of trials, SD 12.9%) led to a moderate mean 
reward per trial (mean 8.5p, SD 5.2p, Figure 7.5). PD-ICD patients accrued less reward than age-
matched controls (mean 12.8p, SD 5.8p, n.s.). This was due to the lower anticipatory rate 
(Middle 2 mean 15.7% of trials, SD 12.9%, not significant) and a similar error rate to controls 
(PD-ICD mean 24.4% of trials, SD 8.3% ; Middle 2 mean 24.2%, SD 21.1%). The PD-ICD 
Anticipations:Errors ratio (AER) was therefore non-significantly lower (0.49, SD 0.4 ) than that 
of the controls (0.76, SD 0.67 ). 
 
PG Group 
The majority of the pathological gamblers’ (n=11) traffic light saccade distributions (Figures 7.6 
& 7.7) demonstrate a bimodal distribution of early and reactive responses. Only one subject 
(subject K) shows very little anticipation. 
 
Performance on the task was good, with a group mean reward per trial of 15.4p (SD 30.4p). This 
was non-significantly less than age matched healthy controls without gambling problems 
(n=13, mean reward 17.6p, SD 31.4p). This was due to a trend toward fewer correct, highly 
rewarded, anticipations in the gamblers (mean 21.0% of trials, SD 10.1%) than in the control 
group (mean 24.5% of trials, SD 8.0%) and the gamblers also committed a non-significantly 
greater number of errors (mean 27.3% of trials, SD8.0%) compared to controls (mean 24.2% of 
trials, SD 12.6%). This trend would appear to indicate a slight leftward shift in the early 
distribution of saccades. If we isolate responses made at <200ms, this is demonstrated by a non-
significantly lower mean anticipatory latency of 92.8ms (SD 19.9ms) versus 101ms (SD 10.8ms) 
in the controls.  
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Figure 7.4  PD-ICD Probability densities for saccadic latencies in the 
Traffic Light task 
7 PD-ICD Patients (Subjects A:G) and the group as a whole. X axes: Response latency 
(milliseconds), Y axes: Probability Density (no units) 
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Figure 7.5  PD-ICD Saccade distributions in response to the Traffic 
Light Task 
The PD-ICD population does make anticipatory saccades  - non- significantly fewer than age-
matched controls. They also make non-significantly more errors than controls. The result of 
these effects is a non-significant reduction in reward. 
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 Reactive saccades (responses >200ms), on the other hand, are slightly right shifted (mean 
346ms [SD 40ms] compared to 327ms [SD 58ms] in controls). Reactive saccades are more 
variable (mean SD 163ms compared to 132ms in controls). F-tests show that this difference is 
also not statistically non-significant, but the combination of a left shifted (more erroneous) early 
distribution, a right shifted (slower) reactive distribution and greater response variability 
explains the reduction in overall reward. 
 
Age Effects 
As discussed in Chapter 2, healthy volunteers produce fewer anticipatory responses as they 
age. Pathological gamblers were the youngest study group here, followed by the PD-ICD group 
and the PD group who were oldest. Plotting the response distributions compared to control 
groups of similar ages reveals quite similar differences. This suggests that any disease or 
condition specific differences may be being masked by a larger age-effect (Figure 7.8). 
 
Traffic Light Task Performance Indicators 
There is a strong correlation between the ratio of correct anticipations to erroneously early 
responses (AER) and reward (Figure 7.9). AER was found to correlate with both BIS-11 factors 
and other oculomotor task performance indicators in the experiments reported in Chapter 3. 
The gamblers make many early responses, however, they make so many errors that the AER is 
similar to that of older controls, who make few early responses. However, the task strongly 
rewards early responding (due to the steeply declining reward/latency curve), so gamblers 
nevertheless outperform older controls in terms of reward.  
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Figure 7.6  PG Probability densities for saccadic latencies in the 
Traffic Light task 
11 Gamblers (Subjects A:K) and the group as a whole. X axes: Response latency (milliseconds), 
Y axes: Probability Density (no units) 
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Figure 7.7  Saccade distributions for Gamblers compared to age-
matched controls on the traffic Light Task. 
The response distributions are very similar and the subtle differences in numbers of errors and 
correct anticipations within the earlier distribution are not easily perceptible. There are no 
significant differences between reward, anticipations and errors when comparing means. 
However, there is a general trend toward lower rewards as a consequence of fewer correct 
anticipations and more errors. 
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Figure 7.8  Traffic Light Response Distributions – Age & Disease 
Effects 
The saccade distributions from the traffic light task reveal differences between both healthy 
volunteers from different age groups and between the experimental groups {PD, PD-ICD, 
Gamblers} described in this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.9  Traffic Light Task Performance 
There is a strong correlation between the ratio of correct anticipations to erroneously early 
responses and reward. Gamblers make many early responses, however, they make so many 
errors that the ratio is similar to that of older controls, who make few early responses. However, 
the task strongly rewards early responding (due to the steeply declining reward/latency curve), 
so gamblers nevertheless outperform older controls in terms of reward. 
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7.3.4  Lateral reward 
3 of the PD patients completed the lateral reward task. None showed significant speeding 
toward rewarded targets. Furthermore, two of the patients were slower to rewarded targets than 
unrewarded, (though neither difference was statistically significant). 
 
Six PD-ICD patients completed the lateral reward task. There was no statistically significant 
difference in group means but a trend toward slower saccades to unrewarded targets (LRU = 
292ms, SD 56ms) compared to rewarded targets (LRR = 284ms, SD 59ms). Two of the six 
individuals showed significant speeding toward rewarded targets. (Subject B mean LRU = 
248ms, SD 64ms; LRR = 230ms, SD 58ms; 1-tailed Student T-test 191ms, t(238) = 2.27, p=0.01. 
Subject D mean LRU = 191ms, SD 27ms; LRR = 185ms, SD 24ms; 1-tailed Student T-test 191ms, 
t(238) = 1.66, p=0.048). 
 
By contrast, the PG group showed significant reward sensitivity in the lateral reward task. 
There was speeding toward rewarded targets (Group mean LRU =242ms, SD 26ms; mean LRR 
= 217ms, SD 27ms; 1-tailed Student T-test t(18) = 2.07, p=0.027).   
 
In the (larger n=13, Middle 1) control group, no overall significant group effect is seen but there 
is a trend toward speeding (Mean LRU = 235ms, SD 15ms, Mean LRR = 231ms, SD 17ms). 2 
individuals showed statistically significant speeding (Subject B mean LRU = 248ms, SD 64ms; 
LRR = 230ms, SD 58ms; 1-tailed Student T-test 191ms, t(238) = 2.27, p=0.01. Subject D mean 
LRU = 191ms, SD 27ms; LRR = 185ms, SD 24ms; 1-tailed Student T-test 191ms, t(238) = 1.66, 
p=0.048) and the remaining subjects show a trend to shorter latencies for the rewarded side. 
 
These results suggest that PD patients might have reduced reward sensitivity whereas 
pathological gamblers reward sensitivity is heightened. 
 
7.3.5  Reverse Traffic Lights 
PD patients did not perform the reverse traffic light task. 
 
3 PD-ICD patients attempted the reverse task. Of these only 2 completed all 100 trials. 
Nevertheless, the mean Stop Anticipation Interval (SAI, 339ms, SD 57ms) and mean reward per 
trial (13.8p, SD 3p) for these two patients were similar to those seen in the control group (n=8, 
mean SAI 393ms, SD 89ms; mean reward 9.15p, SD 3p)). The task was later abandoned for use 
in impulsive patients as they generally found it too difficult to tolerate the prolonged fixations 
required.  
 
The mean anticipation of the stop signal by gamblers (n=10) in the reverse task was 412ms (SD 
77ms) yielding a mean reward of 10.6p per trial (SD 2.9p). This was similar to the performance 
of age-matched controls. 
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7.3.6  Levodopa equivalent dose (LED) & disease severity 
There were no significant correlations between individual LED or UPDRS values and any 
outcome parameters. The PD-ICD group had a non-significantly greater mean LED and UPDRS 
score than the PD group. Normal reward performance in the PD-ICD group may be due to 
greater dopaminergic medication dosages (possibly leading to restoration of reward sensitivity 
and reduction in saccadic latency). The lack of correlation between task performance and motor 
severity is also consistent with previous studies of saccadic latency. 
 
7.4 Discussion 
7.4.1  Summary of findings 
BIS-11 
There were no significant differences in BIS score between PD patients and age-matched 
controls. The group size of PD-ICD patients was small, which limited the power of the study, 
however there was a trend toward higher BIS-11 scores, as has been found by previous 
investigators (Antonini et al., 2011; Bentivoglio et al., 2013). Pathological gamblers were 
significantly more impulsive according to BIS-11 scores, as expected and found in previous 
studies (Martins et al., 2004). 
 
Traffic Light task 
In the main Traffic Light Task, PD patients made significantly less reward than healthy, age-
matched controls. This was due to a combination of a greater number of errors, fewer correct 
anticipations and slower reactive saccades. Responses in the SRT task were also slow and 
highly variable. Anticipatory responses in the Traffic Light Task were non-significantly greater 
in number than controls. This suggests that PD patients continued to make early responses 
despite higher error rates, and therefore failed to learn from negative feedback. This is a feature 
of other studies of reward learning in PD where intact learning from positive feedback is seen 
but there is a lack of response to negative feedback, or aversive learning (Cools, 2006; Rowe et 
al., 2008). 
 
PD-ICD patients were similar in their rate of anticipation to age-matched controls, but there 
was a trend toward fewer rather than more correct anticipatory responses, in contrast to the PD 
group. This may suggest greater fronto-striatal dysfunction in the PD group compared to PD-
ICD (Santangelo et al., 2009), however, the PD-ICD group were also younger, so it is not 
possible to separate the contributions of age and impulsivity in this study. This result is 
consistent with a previous study that demonstrated intact executive function in a PD-ICD group 
(Siri et al., 2010) and we did not see greater errors in the PD-ICD group compared to controls. 
 
Pathological gamblers made fewer correct anticipations and made more errors compared with 
controls. Furthermore, their reactive saccades were non-significantly slower than those of 
controls. These effects contribute to an overall lower mean reward. In this way the PG group 
resembled the PD patients, but they out-performed them overall, perhaps because they were 
younger. This finding echoes that of a probabilistic decision-making experiment: All PD 
patients were impaired compared to the control group but the PD-ICD patients showed similar 
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addictive behaviours to illicit substance abusers, whereas PD patients without ICDs more closely 
resembled reward sensitive (and insufficiently punishment-averse) pathological gamblers (Furl 
and Averbeck, 2011). 
 
Lateral Reward task 
PD-ICD patients showed some (non-significant) speeding to rewarded targets similar to the 
control group. Gamblers, however, showed significant reward sensitivity manifest as saccadic 
speeding. The absence of such speeding in age-matched controls might suggest heightened 
reward sensitivity in the PG group. Results from neuroimaging studies in pathological 
gamblers show diminished ventral striatum and vmPFC/VLPFC activation during non-specific 
rewarding and punishing events in pathological gamblers compared to normal controls (Reuter 
et al., 2005; de Ruiter et al., 2008) implicating a blunted neurophysiological response to rewards 
as well as to losses in pathological gamblers. This is in contrast to our finding and suggests that 
what we are measuring is reward drive rather than sensitivity (Loxton et al., 2008). 
 
Reverse Traffic Light Task 
The reverse traffic light task was difficult for patients – particularly those who were impulsive - 
to complete. Pathological gamblers and the PD-ICD group performed similarly to age matched 
controls. We did not demonstrate greater risk taking (diminished risk aversion). We might have 
expected the PG group to demonstrate reduced risk aversion and hence produce a shorter Stop 
Anticipation Interval (SAI), as previous studies have suggested that diminished responsiveness 
is associated with the condition (van Holst et al., 2010; Loxton et al., 2008). 
 
7.4.2  PD patients demonstrate reward insensitivity, low anticipation 
and slow responses whereas PD-ICD patients did not. 
PD patients were slow in the SRT task compared to healthy controls. This may have been due to 
their greater age. Gamblers, PD-ICD patients and age-matched controls all demonstrated 
similar SRTs. We therefore replicated the finding that PD-ICD patients were faster than non-
ICD PD patients in a previous study (Voon et al., 2009) but, unlike other authors (Siri et al., 
2010), we have not failed to acknowledge the  significance of age in generating this difference 
(see also Chapters 1 & 2). PD patients also showed lack of reward sensitivity in the lateral 
reward task. There were no age-matched controls for this task so the absence of reward 
sensitivity may be due to age and/or disease. Furthermore, the effects of drugs (including type, 
dose and duration of treatment) and the time of testing in relation to the time of medication 
administration could not be adequately controlled for in a study of this size.  
 
Levodopa has been shown to improve reward sensitivity, but also to increase errors in the face 
of negative feedback (Czernecki et al., 2002; Kobayakawa et al., 2010; Rowe et al., 2008). 
Dopaminergic medications may also improve tasks requiring timing (Kw et al., 1994; Malapani 
et al., 1998; Pastor et al., 1992). The PD-ICD patients were, on average, taking more 
dopaminergic medication in total (and larger levodopa equivalent doses of dopamine agonists) 
than the PD group. These dose differences were not significant but higher dopamine doses may 
have contributed to some normalisation of performance due to both improvement in timing 
and heightened reward sensitivity. 
  223 
 
7.4.3  There are some similarities but also significant differences 
between the pathophysiology of de novo pathological gambling and ICDs in 
PD 
Both the PD-ICD and PG groups showed reduced anticipation in the Traffic Light Task but only 
the PG group committed more errors. Similarly, Go/Nogo performance is found to be impaired 
in gamblers, with both more errors and increased performance variability compared with 
controls (Kertzman et al., 2008). There are therefore similarities in the cognitive/executive 
deficits shown by pathological gamblers with those of PD patients, especially those with ICDs, 
however there are also important differences that may be evident in oculomotor task 
performance. Though this study failed to demonstrate significant group effects, there are trends 
toward differences in task performance that warrant further discussion and investigation.  
 
There is experimental evidence for differences in the cognitive disturbances that cause de novo 
pathological gambling compared with those seen in PD-ICD patients. Frontal deficits are 
particularly implicated in the development of PG. There is a similarity between the behaviours 
of problem gamblers and patients with VMPFC lesions when attempting the IGT (Cavedini et 
al., 2002) and poor performance by gamblers in the Game of Dice Task, a risky decision-making 
task which is sensitive to dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) damage (Brand et al., 2005). This has led to 
the suggestion that dysfunction in these (frontal) areas might also have a role in the 
pathophysiology of problem gambling. Low fMRI BOLD activation of the DLPFC is associated 
with impulsive scores on the BIS-11 (Asahi et al., 2004) a region known to be involved in 
oculomotor control (Kim	  and	  Shadlen,	  1999;	  Pierrot-­‐Deseilligny	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Pierrot-­‐Deseilligny	  et	  
al.,	  2003). This may explain some of the (non-significant) differences between the PG group and 
controls. 
 
7.4.4  Similarities and differences are task dependent 
Whether or not the gambling tendency in PD-ICD is the same as that seen in otherwise healthy 
people may depend upon how the question is phrased – that is to say which measures are 
employed to answer it. In order to compare the neuropsychological impairments found in PD-
ICD patients, substance abusers and pathological gamblers, a study using the bead task (a 
measure of subjects ability to make rational decisions about probability (Furl and Averbeck, 
2011)). This investigation found that all PD patients made more impulsive and irrational choices 
than the control group. PD-ICD patients   showed similar behaviour to illicit substance abusers, 
whereas patients without ICDs more closely resembled pathological gamblers. We did not 
replicate this finding, but our PD group was older than both the PD-ICD and PG groups. 
 
In contrast, a functional imaging study has shown similarities between (disordered) brain 
activation in PG and that of alcohol dependent subjects. Both had significantly reduced activity 
in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), insula, and ventral striatum during prospect 
and anticipation phases of both gains and losses. Furthermore, activity in the ventral striatum 
correlated inversely with levels of impulsivity in PG participants (Balodis et al., 2012). Impulse 
control disorders in PD, by contrast, are attributed to excessive dopaminergic stimulation of 
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ventral striatal projections to frontal areas such as orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (Frank and Claus, 
2006). OFC neurons are known to encode information about economic value (Padoa-Schioppa 
and Assad, 2006). Lesions of the OFC cause impairment in decisions related to the expected 
outcome of actions (Tremblay and Schultz, 1999). Dopaminergic striatal neurons activated in 
relation to the expectation and detection of reward show activity related to the preparation, 
initiation and execution of movements which reflect the expected reward (Schultz et al., 2000). 
ICDs in PD may therefore result from disordered dopaminergic striatal input to frontal areas. 
 
7.4.5  Limitations of this study 
Drug effects were not demonstrated in this experiment. To do so would require that either 
patients omit their medications for pre- and post- dose testing, which leads to travel difficulties, 
or the study of a far larger group such that the patient groups could be sub-divided according 
to treatment type/dose. Even then, there would still be a risk of confounding by disease 
severity (more severely affected patients are likely to be taking more medication). Neither is 
testing subjects “off” and then “on” without issue: Cognitive and behavioural effects of chronic 
medication may outlast many plasma half-lives of the drug, as a result of receptor changes in 
the brain (DiCaudo et al., 2012; Riverol et al., 2014). “Wash-out” periods of weeks or months are 
reported and employed in clinical trials (Fahn, 2006). The most effective method for cognitive 
assessment of drug effects in PD might be testing treatment naïve patients both before and after 
taking medication. This is both difficult to achieve and also tells us little about patients with 
more advanced disease. 
 
Age effects are difficult to control for. Recruitment of healthy age matched controls in middle 
and older age groups is fraught with selection bias. Our older controls were noticeably different 
in personality (though not BIS-11 scores) from the middle-aged group. They were more likely to 
be retired and pursuing further education opportunities in the local area. They were generally 
volunteering as subjects for altruistic reasons and were less motivated by payment. Middle-
aged male controls, however, were more likely to be unwillingly unemployed and motivated to 
participate by the payment. This may have led to inadvertent differences in personality-type 
that may have obscured other group differences. 
 
7.4.6  Summary 
There is evidence that dysfunction in multiple frontal and (especially ventral) striatal brain 
areas impacts upon both 1) rewarded decision-making and 2) oculomotor control. Furthermore, 
there are functional anatomic distinctions between pathological gambling as an impulse control 
disorder in PD and pathological gambling in otherwise healthy people. The Traffic Light Task 
and the rest of our battery of oculomotor tasks have revealed interesting findings in both PD, 
PD with associated ICDs and pathological gamblers. These findings warrant further 
investigation with larger subject groups, on and off medications and/or in combination with 
dynamic measures of focal brain function, such as fMRI or MEG. 
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8. Discussion 
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8.1   Summary of findings 
The aim of the experiments described in this thesis was to establish the utility of rewarded 
oculomotor decision-making tasks as an index of motivated behaviour in age, disease and 
under the influence of drugs affecting dopaminergic neurotransmission. Here, I summarise the 
results of the six experimental chapters before discussing the implications of the findings, 
limitations of the studies and future investigations suggested by them. 
 
8.1.1  The Traffic Light Task and the effects of Age 
I developed a simple saccadic task, the Traffic Light Task (Figure 2.1), which measures decision-
making when participants are required to make rapid choices (stay or go) under risk (Chapter 
2). The task generated two groups of responses in young, healthy volunteers: a reactive 
distribution and an anticipatory distribution (Figure 2.3B). Separately parameterised linear rise-
to-decision threshold processes model the two distributions well (Figures 2.6 & 2.8). Task 
performance, measured as reward obtained, correlated strongly with the percentage of 
anticipatory, correct responses (i.e., those which fall in the range 0-200ms after the GO signal). 
Participants had to take a decision about whether to stay and wait longer, or make a response 
before the green light, risking the possibility of a small penalty against a potentially large 
reward. Young adults made what might be called functionally useful anticipations (Dickman, 
1990). They were willing to take a risk and make early responses because overall this would 
optimize overall reward. By contrast, older subjects demonstrated little evidence of anticipatory 
behaviour (Figure 2.10). Instead, the vast majority of their responses were triggered after the 
GO signal and, for them, reward simply correlated inversely with reaction time. 
 
This finding of altered responding with age is recognised in a number of different reaction time 
and rewarded tasks e.g. (Chowdhury et al., 2013; Shohamy and Wimmer, 2013; Wolkorte et al., 
2014), To our knowledge,  age related changes in oculomotor decision-making have not 
previously been reported, however. Reductions in dopaminergic frontostriatal connections 
(especially between the ventral striatum and the prefrontal cortex (Kaasinen and Rinne, 2002; 
Erixon-Lindroth et al., 2005; Mell et al., 2009; Klostermann et al., 2012)) are a recognised 
correlate of the effects of healthy aging upon cognitive task performance. Such changes could 
reasonably be implicated in poor rewarded oculomotor task performance. Foraging tasks 
suggest a reduction in exploration with aging (Mata et al., 2013). The traffic light task requires 
exploration in early trials in order to establish the mean duration of the amber light. Older 
subjects are perhaps so punishment avoidant that they do not allow sufficient exploratory trials 
in order to establish an optimal strategy. 
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8.1.2  The relationship of traffic light task performance to other 
measures of oculomotor responding and motivated behaviours 
In order to assess the various factors influencing traffic light task performance and to compare 
oculomotor task outcomes with self-reported impulsivity, I compared traffic light task 
outcomes with a number of other measures (Chapter 3). 
 
Mean SRT Task (Figure 2.2) saccade latency correlated significantly with mean reaction time in 
the Traffic Light Task, negatively with the ratio of Anticipations to Errors (AER) in the Traffic 
Light Task, and positively with latencies in the Lateral Reward task (both rewarded and 
unrewarded). Faster subjects were therefore likely to make more correct early responses than 
were slower subjects. SRT task performance was not correlated with personality scores or sub-
scores (BIS-11 or TPQ), suggesting that rewarded tasks better index motivated behaviour. 
 
The lateral reward task (Figure 3.2) demonstrated baseline non-significant reward-related 
speeding of saccade initiation in both young and middle aged volunteers. There was a negative 
correlation between rewarded and unrewarded mean saccade latencies and AER in the traffic 
light task. Negative correlations were also found between mean latencies and two BIS-11 sub-
scores (the Motor factor and Attentional Impulsiveness dimension) – correlations that did not 
exist for the SRT task. A negative correlation between right dorsolateral prefrontal activity 
(BOLD response) during response inhibition in a Go/Nogo task also demonstrated correlation 
with Motor Impulsiveness on the BIS-11 (Asahi et al., 2004). Despite a lack of statistically 
significant reward-related speeding, it would appear that the Lateral Reward task is sensitive to 
something more than simple saccadic reaction time, and may be sensitive to reward-related 
(functional) impulsivity which is dependent upon functional ventrostriatal-prefrontal 
connections. 
 
The reverse traffic light (RTL) task (Figure 3.4) allows insight into subjects’ willingness to take 
risk. It is independent of motor reaction times as the decision to initiate the saccade is made 
without the trigger of any novel stimulus. A positive correlation between mean reward in this 
task and the Anticipation:Error Ratio (AER) in The Traffic Light Task suggests that similar traits 
are required for task success – qualities such as sensitivity to reward and willingness to take 
risk, may be required to perform optimally in both tasks. Reward in this task is significantly 
correlated with the Attentional Impulsiveness (AI, second order factor) score of the BIS-11. The 
inverse relationship between mean SRT and AER in concert with a positive correlation between 
AER and mean RTL rewards fits with a model of successful traffic light task performance that 
depends upon a combination of speed, timing, reward sensitivity and willingness to take risk. 
Oculomotor performance correlations between tasks and with BIS-11 factors support the 
inference that the tasks might be sensitive to impulsivity as defined by other recognised and 
validated measures. Attentional impulsiveness has been shown to correlate with increased 
errors in measures of response inhibition and poorer choices in the Iowa Gambling Task 
(Christodoulou et al., 2006). Iowa Gambling task performance is sensitive to prefrontal cortical 
function (Bechara et al., 2005; Brevers et al., 2013; Lawrence et al., 2009). Similar correlation with 
reward here lends support to a hypothesised role for this region in reverse traffic light task 
performance. 
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8.1.3  Dopaminergic modulation of oculomotor responses in a patient 
with apathy due to bilateral pallidal lesions 
I used these novel probes of oculomotor decision-making to demonstrate relative insensitivity 
to reward in an individual with apathy following bilateral GPi lesions (Chapter 4). KD initially 
made very few anticipatory responses in the traffic light task compared with age-matched 
controls (Figure 4.6A). Pallidal outflow to posterior medial frontal cortex (Alexander et al., 1986) 
is implicated in modulating cortical error-related activity (Herrojo Ruiz et al., 2014). Absence of 
this information may lead to avoidance of risky strategies such as anticipatory responding 
(similar to that seen in Parkinson’s disease (Crawford et al., 1989). 
Dopaminergic therapy, first with levodopa and then with ropinirole, increased anticipatory 
responses to within the normal range (Figure 4.6B). The lateral reward task demonstrated that 
KD had SRTs within the normal range but showed no speeding to the rewarded side (RS), 
unlike healthy volunteers (Figure 4.7). Treatment with levodopa led to reward sensitivity, with 
speeding of responses to the RS and slowing to the unrewarded side compared to baseline. Off 
medication, the difference in SRTs to rewarded and unrewarded targets became non-significant. 
Subsequently on ropinirole, a direct dopamine D2/D3 receptor agonist, KD again demonstrated 
reward sensitivity, as well as generalized speeding. These effects on dopaminergic medication 
were associated with clinical improvement, reduction of apathy and increased motivation to 
find work and in social interactions – most prominently while on the dopamine agonist. The 
findings demonstrate a causal relationship between basal ganglia function and motivation or 
willingness to make an effort for reward. They provide proof-of-concept data for the treatment 
of apathy which is increasingly recognized to be a key component of several neurological 
disorders (Marin, 1991; Bonelli and Cummings, 2008; Chow et al., 2009; Starkstein et al., 2009).  
 
8.1.4  Dopaminergic modulation of oculomotor responding in healthy 
volunteers 
In order to qualify these dopaminergic effects further, we used both levodopa (Chapter 5) and 
methylphenidate (Chapter 6) to investigate their impact upon oculomotor decision-making in 
healthy controls. As hypothesised, the effects of training across sessions were prominent in both 
experiments (Figures 5.1, 5.5, 5.6, 5.10, 6.4, 6.5, 6.7, 6.8) a factor often ignored in drug/placebo 
experiments. 
 
Analysis of variance demonstrated a non-significant interaction between the L-dopa/placebo 
condition and the session in the SRT task (Figure 5.2), suggesting that the order of 
drug/placebo administration might be important. The apparent drug effect was of slowing 
responses compared to placebo in the second session, whereas it had no significant effect in the 
third session. This may be a true difference due to dopaminergic modulation having effects on 
relatively novel tasks as compared to previously trained ones. Latencies were non-significantly 
reduced by MPH compared to placebo (Table 6.1), consistent with previous studies which have 
shown shorter reaction times under the influence of this drug (Klein et al., 2002; Mostofsky et 
al., 2001).  Greater subject numbers might render this a statistically significant effect. 
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Analysis of variance in the Traffic Light Task demonstrated a non-significant interaction 
between L-dopa/placebo condition and session with respect to error rates (Figure 5.7). In the 
second session, L-dopa appeared to reduce error rates compared to placebo, in the ‘drug first 
group’. Conversely, in the third session, when the ‘placebo first’ group were given L-dopa, 
more errors were made than by the placebo group. There was a trend toward fewer early 
responses with methylphenidate (both correct, highly rewarded anticipations and punished 
errors, Figure 6.4). If truly representative, this trend might reflect a reduction in impulsivity due 
to methylphenidate (DeVito et al., 2008b) or reflect improvements in timing (Rubia et al., 2009). 
Learning effects across epochs of 100 trials were similar in the drug/placebo condition, and 
performance had already reached a plateau after the training session. 
 
In the reverse traffic light task, designed to assess risk seeking and relatively independent from 
reaction time, the main effect was of training, with subjects becoming increasingly willing to 
risk an error in order to reap greater rewards on successful trials (Figures 5.10 & 6.7). With each 
session, the distribution of saccades shifted rightward (Figures 5.11 & 6.8).  There was a 
significant reduction in the mean STOP anticipation (the degree to which subjects accurately 
anticipated the red light) between sessions 1&2 (p<0.01) and a strong trend toward a further 
reduction in Session 3 (p=0.05). The task is designed to measure willingness to take risks, as it 
requires responses to be made as late as possible in order to accrue the greatest reward. There 
was no evidence of a change in risk seeking/avoidance resultant from either L-dopa or MPH. 
 
In the lateral reward task, there was a non-significant interaction for latencies to rewarded 
targets between the L-dopa/placebo condition and session (Figure 5.12). It would appear from 
these results that receiving L-dopa in the first session, enhanced the learning effect, leading to 
even faster responses to rewarded targets in the second session. One could interpret that the 
‘drug first’ group were slowed by L-dopa in the first session but were able to exploit enhanced 
learning in the second session, when they were faster and drug free. The ‘placebo first’ group, 
by contrast, had no enhanced learning and were slowed down by L-dopa in the second session, 
leading to an apparent diminished learning effect. This may, however, represent a chance 
“ceiling effect” due to the ‘placebo first’ group being faster overall just by chance. There was a 
consistent finding of reward-sensitive speeding overall in the lateral reward task. There was 
significant improvement following training but no difference between unrewarded and 
rewarded saccade latencies due to methylphenidate. 
 
8.1.5  Parkinson’s Patients and Impulse Control Disorders 
Pathological gamblers were significantly more impulsive according to BIS-11 scores, as found 
in previous studies (Martins et al., 2004) but there were no significant differences between PD 
patients (with or without ICDs) compared with age-matched controls. PD patients were slow in 
the SRT task compared to healthy controls (Figure 7.6). Responses in the SRT task were also 
slow and highly variable. This may have been due to their greater age. Gamblers, PD-ICD 
patients and age-matched controls all demonstrated similar SRTs. We therefore replicated the 
finding that PD-ICD patients were faster than non-ICD PD patients in a previous study (Voon 
et al., 2009) but, unlike other authors (Siri et al., 2010), we have not failed to recognise the  
significance of age in generating this difference (see also Chapters 1 & 2). 
  230 
In the Traffic Light Task, PD patients made significantly less reward than healthy, age-
matched controls due to a combination of a more errors, fewer correct anticipations and slower 
reactive saccades (Figure 7.3). Anticipatory responses in the Traffic Light Task were non-
significantly greater in number than controls. This suggests that PD patients continued to make 
early responses despite higher error rates, and therefore failed to learn from negative feedback. 
This is a feature of other studies of reward learning in PD where intact learning from positive 
feedback is seen but there is a lack of response to negative feedback, or aversive learning (Cools, 
2006; Rowe et al., 2008). 
 
PD-ICD patients demonstrated a trend toward fewer rather than more anticipatory responses in 
the Traffic light Task compared with controls (Figure 7.4), in contrast to the PD group. This may 
suggest greater fronto-striatal dysfunction in the PD group compared to PD-ICD (Santangelo et 
al., 2009), however, the PD-ICD group were also younger, so it is not possible to separate the 
contributions of age and impulsivity in this study. This result is consistent with a previous 
study that demonstrated intact executive function in a PD-ICD group (Siri et al., 2010). 
 
Pathological gamblers made fewer correct anticipations and made more errors compared with 
controls (Figure 7.7). Furthermore, their reactive saccades were non-significantly slower than 
those of controls (Figure 7.8). These effects contribute to an overall lower mean reward (Figure 
7.9). In this way the PG group resembled the PD patients, but they out-performed them overall, 
perhaps because they were younger. 
 
In the Lateral Reward Task, PD-ICD patients showed (non-significant) speeding to rewarded 
targets similar to the control group. Gamblers, however, showed significant reward sensitivity 
manifest as saccadic speeding. The absence of such speeding in age-matched controls might 
suggest heightened reward sensitivity in the PG group. PD patients showed lack of reward 
sensitivity in the lateral reward task. There were no age-matched controls for this task so the 
absence of reward sensitivity may be due to age and/or disease. The reverse traffic light task 
was difficult for patients – particularly those who were impulsive - to complete. Pathological 
gamblers and the PD-ICD group performed similarly to age matched controls. 
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8.2  General Discussion 
8.2.1  Conclusions 
We have demonstrated that these novel oculomotor tasks are sensitive to reward motivated 
behaviour in a clinically relevant manner. We have also demonstrated the significance of the 
effects of age and training – often ignored in other reported behavioural studies. We did not 
demonstrated main effects of either levodopa or methylphenidate on rewarded decisions in 
healthy volunteers. This and the lack of main effects (or obscuration by age effects) between the 
groups described in Chapter 7 may reflect the number of subjects studied. 
 
8.2.2  The current knowledge of oculomotor impulsivity 
Oculomotor impulsivity has tended to be defined as a deficiency in inhibitory control. 
Accordingly it has been interrogated through the use of pre-potent response inhibition (e.g. 
stop signal, Go/Nogo, antisaccade and countermanding tasks) (Roberts et al., 2011). Others 
have proposed alternatives such as a visual pursuit task (Cirilli et al., 2011) in which an 
anticipatory saccade is provoked by the delayed appearance of a pursuit target. This is similar 
to express saccades (Fischer and Ramsperger, 1984) other than that the expected response is a 
pursuit movement as opposed to a single saccade. The measurement (and modulation) of 
bimodal reaction time distributions as an index of behavioural motivation described here is a 
novel one. 
 
8.2.3  The Significance of early (saccadic) response distributions 
The cognitive significance of these early saccadic response distributions remains somewhat 
unclear. If we assume that early responses form a completely separate group of saccades from 
the more typical, “reactive” saccades (albeit one that might overlap in latency), then we might 
suggest that such saccades arise from a discrete “short circuit” which bypasses procrastinating 
“modules”. This circuitry might be less susceptible to inhibition by cortical regions or other 
basal ganglia nuclei. Support for such a hypothesis arises from computational models derived 
from rewarded saccadic tasks (N’guyen et al., 2014). This model proposes that, after a period of 
learning, saccades can be triggered by a “hyper-direct” pathway from retina to superior 
colliculus,. This pathway is normally inhibited (“braked”) by the basal ganglia, preventing it 
from initiating saccades. We might hypothesise that impulsivity is due to inappropriate release 
(or the absence) of this brake – for example due to the actions of dopamine agonists in PD-ICD, 
changes in fronto-striatal circuitry in ADHD or a focal brain lesion. Conversely, apathy may be 
due to either excessive inhibition/braking or the inability to learn and thereby release the brake. 
The low rate of anticipatory responding in older age and in PD potentially supports a 
dopaminergic role in “unbraking” – since both conditions are associated with dopaminergic 
deficits in frontal and/or striatal circuitry. This effect may not be specific to saccades. We (and 
others e.g. (Machado-Pinheiro et al., 1998)) have demonstrated early response distributions in 
manual tasks. A manual version of the traffic light task (using a button box response) produces 
a similar bimodal response distribution, supporting the existence of a modality independent 
mechanism for early responses (Heyes et al., 2012). 
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8.2.4  What does the Traffic Light Task Measure? 
One explanation for the findings is that the Traffic Light task is sensitive to deficits in 
“functional” impulsivity – whether impaired by age, PD or focal lesions of the basal ganglia 
(Figure 8.1) – but less so to “dysfunctional” impulsivity (as may be elevated by drugs or 
impulse control disorders). Furthermore, although trait impulsivity is frequently correlated 
with neurocognitive mechanisms involved in response monitoring and inhibition, the same is 
not necessarily true of mechanisms of self-regulation and decision making (Perales et al., 2009). 
We did find more errors in both pathological gamblers and patients with Parkinson’s disease 
but the effects did not reach statistical significance. It is possible that more extreme 
disinhibition, as found in frontal lobe lesions and/or attention deficit disorder, might manifest 
in a more left-shifted anticipatory distribution (Figure 8.1), demonstrative of persistent early 
responding in the face of errors. Attempts to study patients with these pathologies were stifled 
by profound difficulties in attending to the oculomotor tasks and/or their ability and/or 
willingness to attend for testing sessions. Nevertheless, it would be instructive to attempt to 
improve the anticipation of PD patients and/or older volunteers by administration of 
dopaminergic drugs. Modulation (of reward prediction error) in older healthy volunteers has 
been demonstrated using levodopa but this required a larger cohort (n=32) and post hoc 
division of the group into low and high performers to achieve a statistically significant result 
(Chowdhury et al., 2013). 
 
8.2.5  Confounds of time estimation and speed/accuracy trade- off 
A potential criticism of the Traffic Light Task (in forward and reverse guises) is its dependence 
upon subjects’ ability to estimate, remember and reproduce time intervals. Deficits in time 
interval estimation are found in both healthy aging and in neurodegenerative basal ganglia 
disorders (Gunstad et al., 2006; Parker et al., 2013; Rubia et al., 2009; Wild-Wall et al., 2008). 
However, these studies focus upon longer durations in the seconds to minutes range. Shorter 
intervals, in the millisecond range, are consistently spared in patients with PD (Cope et al., 2014; 
Smith et al., 2007b). Work subsequent to that described in this thesis used a time estimation task 
in tandem with the Traffic Light Task and found that ability in the time estimation task did not 
explain variability in Traffic Light task Performance (Burnett Heyes et al., 2012). One might 
assume that impulsive subjects would tend to respond too quickly and thereby incur more 
errors (thereby producing a left shift in the anticipatory distribution of traffic light task 
responses). However, evidence suggests that this may be an oversimplified view (e.g. (Dickman 
and Meyer, 1988)). In a reaching task, where a motor response direction was cued at different 
levels of uncertainty, there was an interaction between BIS-11 impulsivity score, gender and 
level of uncertainty in the task but no main effect of impulsivity on precision errors or RT 
(Tzagarakis et al., 2013). Further analysis of the effect of RT and impulsivity on precision errors 
showed a different pattern for high versus low impulsives in the high uncertainty condition. In 
addition, there was a significant early error speed-accuracy trade-off for women, primarily 
under low uncertainty but a 'reverse' speed-accuracy trade-off for men in the high uncertainty 
condition. These results further define impulsivity as a behavioural trait that modulates speed 
versus accuracy response styles depending on environmental constraints. 
 
 
  233 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1  Hypothesised Traffic Light Task Saccadic Probability 
Distribution Effects 
Age and/or Parkinson’s Disease and focal basal ganglia (GPi) lesions caused a large reduction 
in (or the absence of) anticipatory responding and an increase in errors (Chapters 2,4 & 7). This 
was reversed by levodopa and ropinirole (a dopamine agonist) in the patient with GPi lesions 
(Chapter 4).  We might hypothesise that dopaminergic drugs could have a similar effect on 
older volunteers and those with PD. Furthermore, dopamine might also lead to speeding of 
reactive saccades, thereby normalising both distributions. 
 
In contrast, patients with frontal lesions or ADHD and pathological gamblers might 
demonstrate increased anticipatory responding but with a leftward shift in the distribution – 
leading to more errors and poorer overall performance. Such deficiencies might respond to 
methylphenidate. In contrast, due to their already “optimal” dopamine levels, young controls 
would not benefit from either drug. 
 
It is unclear whether the dopamine agonist effects in Parkinson’s Patients with Impulse Control 
Disorders (PD-ICD) would lead to patterns consistent with the proposed pathological 
gambler/frontal lesion hypothesis or simply improve their responding such that it matched 
that of healthy controls. A larger study is needed to investigate this. Furthermore, we might 
seek to investigate patients with more extreme disorders of disinhibition (such as in frontal 
lesions and ADHD) and attempt to improve their performance using methylphenidate. 
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8.2.7 Mesolimbic dopamine and reward 
Experimental evidence for dopaminergic roles in decision-making supports a hypothesis of 
functional and neurochemical reciprocity between the striatum and the prefrontal cortex 
(Figure 8.2A, (Cools, 2008)). This suggests that optimal DA levels in the striatum are required 
for cognitive flexibility (a lack thereof leading to inflexibility), whereas optimal levels allow for 
cognitive stability in the PFC, where a lack causes distractibility. If distractibility leads to 
impulsive behaviours, we might anticipate impulsive oculomotor responding in frontally 
depleted states such as those demonstrated in aging (Bäckman et al., 2006) and pathological 
gambling (Reuter et al., 2005). However, coincident lack of cognitive flexibility due to 
concurrent striatal DA depletion may reduce exploratory behaviour and anticipatory 
responding in tasks like the traffic light task. Dissociating the effects of Parkinson’s Disease and 
age has proven difficult using oculomotor tasks, but imaging studies suggest that there are 
differences in both anterior cingulate responses to reward feedback and diminished 
connectivity between midbrain and ventral striatum (Schott et al., 2007). 
 
A limitation in the patient studies was sample size – both in numbers of individuals and in 
numbers of responses. Neurophysiological recordings in macaques benefit from many more 
(thousands of) data points, albeit in a few (often only 2) highly trained individuals. Recording 
fewer trials in humans requires the comparison of group means. There is greater vulnerability 
to noise as a result of inter-individual variability. It is also difficult to control for sustained 
attention during a 1 hour long testing session - humans may be less motivated by the increasing 
“money bank” displayed on the screen compared to macaques receiving immediate juice or 
food rewards. 
 
8.2.8  How might we otherwise demonstrate drug effects? 
Though we did not demonstrate main effects of either levodopa or methylphenidate in young 
healthy volunteers, this may be due to (a failure to disrupt) their already optimal baseline 
dopamine levels for the task. We might not have chosen the optimum dose to demonstrate the 
greatest effect. This is not necessarily the highest dose, as demonstrated by other experiments 
with levodopa and MPH (Linssen et al., 2014b). It is also possible that a genetically 
heterogeneous group might demonstrate opposing effects of the drug, thus negating potential 
differences (through regression to the mean). Furthermore, there may also be dopaminergically 
derived individual differences in the amount of effort people are willing to expend for reward 
(Treadway et al., 2012). Risk taking is associated with DAT1 polymorphisms when subjects 
perform the Balloon Analogue Risk Taking Task (BART, see Chapter 3 (Mata et al., 2012)). 
Genetic variability affects the response to L-dopa (Eisenegger et al., 2010) and to stimulant 
drugs (Hart et al., 2012) including MPH in ADHD (Hong et al., 2012; Park et al., 2012; Roman et 
al., 2004). Segregating subjects by baseline performance and/or genetic polymorphisms (see 
(Passamonti et al., 2006; Boettiger et al., 2007; Eisenberg et al., 2007; White, 2008; Congdon et al., 
2008; Levy, 2009; Paloyelis et al., 2010)) may enhance experimental results and lead to greater 
insights into the mechanisms of rewarded decisions.  
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8.2.8  Other neurotransmitters are implicated in impulsivity 
That dopaminergic drugs are recognised as a risk factor for the induction of impulsivity in PD 
is due, in part, to treatment bias. Drugs that modulate other neurotransmitters are less 
frequently employed in PD and so the evidence for their contribution is not as strong. However, 
other studies – in animals and in humans - implicate neurotransmitters, such as noradrenaline 
(NA), gamma-amino-butyric acid (GABA) and serotonin (5HT) in impulsivity (Boy et al., 2011; 
Dalley and Roiser, 2012; Economidou et al., 2012; Robinson et al., 2008; Seo et al., 2008; Swann et 
al., 2013). Recent studies using response inhibition tasks demonstrate a benefit from both 
serotonergic and adrenergic drugs in patients with PD (Kehagia et al., 2014; Ye et al., 2014a, 
2014b). It is possible that oculomotor effects in healthy volunteers are also more amenable to 
modulation by adrenergic or GABAergic (Hikosaka and Wurtz, 1985) drug effects. Serotonergic 
effects on decision making have been demonstrated through tryptophan depletion, which 
increased impulsive responses and increased attentional capacity (Fikke et al., 2013), this would 
be a potential method of modulation of traffic light task responding, but one for which the 
clinical relevance is less obvious. 
 
8.2.9  The relevance of the ventral striatum to oculomotor responses 
The ventral striatum is demonstrated to be instrumental in the determination of rewarded 
decision-making (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Schultz et al., 1992) and is a neural correlate of 
abnormal cognition in aging (de Jong et al., 2012; Penner and Mizumori, 2012), PD (MacDonald 
et al., 2013, 2011), PD with ICDs (Evans et al., 2006) and PG (Koehler et al., 2013; Linnet et al., 
2010). Furthermore, methylphenidate is demonstrated to exert its effects in ADHD by 
increasing dopamine at that location (Volkow et al., 2012) and L-dopa specifically impairs 
ventral putaminal activation for sequence learning in PD (Kwak et al., 2012). This and other 
evidence has led to the proposal of functionally distinct dorsal fronto-striatal circuitry for 
“higher order” cognitive processes and ventral limbic-striatal circuitry for motivational 
processes (Figure 8.2B). However, there is evidence to suggest that although both dorsal and 
ventral striatal circuitry is involved in the anticipation of potential future rewards, only the dorsal 
striatum and its connections to cortical networks are involved directly in the modulation of 
oculomotor behaviour by motivation (Harsay et al., 2011). This might explain sparing of rewarded 
oculomotor task effects from ventral striatal abnormalities, and mean that our tasks are more 
likely to reflect changes in the dorsal circuitry. The two regions do not act in isolation, however, 
and a model where the “flow of (dopaminergic) information” from ventral to dorsal striatum 
links “limbic” motivational (e.g. reward) salience to motor output via regions susceptible to 
“top down” cognitive control (especially from frontal cortical areas) is perhaps more convincing 
than a discrete “modular” approach (Figure 8.3, (Aarts et al., 2011)). 
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Figure 8.2  Functionally Distinct Dorsal and Ventral frontostriatal circuits 
A Motivational processes are thought to involve ventral limbic-striatal circuitry whereas 
‘higher order’ cognitive processes implicate dorsal fronto-striatal circuitry. PFC – prefrontal 
cortex, GPi – Globus Pallidus interna, SNpr – Substantia Nigra pars reticulata, VA – ventral 
anterior thalamus, MD – medial dorsal thalamus 
B The working hypothesis stating that dopamine in the prefrontal cortex promotes 
cognitive stability, whereas dopamine in the striatum promotes cognitive flexibility. The 
functional opponency between stability and flexibility parallels neurochemical reciprocity 
between dopamine in the prefrontal cortex and dopamine in the striatum. DA = dopamine 
Adapted from (Cools, 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3  Ventromedial to dorsolateral direction of information 
flow through frontostriatal-nigral circuitry. 
Interactions between the different frontostriatal loops involved in motivational control (red), 
cognitive control (yellow), and motor control (blue) can take place at the level of the striato-
nigral-striatal (SNS) connections (bend arrows) or at the level of the fronto-striatal connections 
(straight arrows). The direction of information flow is always from ventromedial to dorsolateral 
regions in the frontostriatal circuitry. SNS, striato-nigral-striatal; N. Acc, nucleus accumbens 
(ventromedial striatum); Caud, caudate nucleus (dorsomedial striatum); Put, putamen (dorsolateral 
striatum); OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex; PMC, premotor cortex (Aarts et al., 2011). 
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8.2.10  Combined imaging and electrophysiology enable the temporal 
and spatial precision required to elucidate the neural substrates of 
oculomotor decisions 
To gather evidence for such models using oculomotor behaviour in humans, more complex 
methods may be required. Dynamic imaging studies in humans are limited in resolution but are 
increasingly able to measure subcortical changes in BOLD response. Combination with 
electrical measures enables event related information gathering at higher temporal resolutions. 
Studies of prepotent response inhibition (including antisaccades) have successfully combined 
both neurophysiological measures such as magneto encephalography (MEG e.g.   (Boehler et 
al., 2009)), electroencephalography (EEG e.g. (Huster et al., 2013; Mueller et al., 2009)), or both 
e.g. (Astle et al., 2012) - often in combination with structural and/or functional neuroimaging 
e.g. (Smith et al., 2013; Lavallee et al., 2014). This allows reasonable temporo-spatial 
quantification of the substrates of behavioural tasks. Similar techniques could reasonably be 
applied to the oculomotor decision making tasks in this thesis in order to better understand the 
relative contributions of the various components of the cortico-striatal circuitry. 
 
Through combinations of imaging (e.g. fMRI and PET) studies, consistencies emerge in the 
neural circuitry required for pro- and anti-saccades (for meta-analysis see (Jamadar et al., 
2013)). Similar techniques might yield a neural correlate for braking mechanisms on a retino-
tectal “escape” circuit (N’guyen et al., 2014) that otherwise leads to early saccades. Deficiencies 
in these braking areas might then be investigated as a locus for impulsive decision-making. 
 
8.2.11  Toward models of rewarded oculomotor decision making 
Since the early descriptions of cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical loops (Alexander et al., 
1986), many hundreds of models of the circuitry have been developed in order to explain 
cognitive functions in various domains (Pennartz et al., 2009). Some of these attempt to combine 
elements of limbic and oculomotor loops and thereby explain rewarded oculomotor decision-
making (Fee, 2012; N’guyen et al., 2014; Sato and Hikosaka, 2002; Soltani et al., 2013). The 
output of the BG can be thought of as having discrete motor “channels.”  In a simple model 
(that explains speeding to rewarded targets in the lateral reward task), these channels can be 
driven by sensory inputs from cortex. Neurons in the substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr) are 
tonically active and inhibit the generation of saccades by the superior colliculus. SNr neurons 
can be inhibited by spiking in medium spiny neurons in the striatum, thus releasing the 
superior colliculus from inhibition (Hikosaka et al., 2000b). During training, rewarded saccades 
are generated with a shorter latency than saccades in the unrewarded direction. This 
behavioural change is thought to be mediated by activation of medium spiny neurons in the 
rewarded “channel” by the appropriate cortical inputs. The output of the SNr biases saccade 
generation by a projection to intermediate “motor” layers of SC. This model would likely be 
disrupted by the known changes in dopaminergic connectivity in GPi lesions (Chapter 4), 
Parkinson’s Disease (Chapter 7) and Age (Chapter 2)  (Figure 8.5). 
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Figure 8.4  Schematic diagram of a reward modulated oculomotor circuit in 
the basal ganglia (BG). 
The output of the BG can be thought of as having discrete motor “channels.” In this simple 
model, these channels can be driven by sensory inputs from cortex. Neurons in the substantia 
nigra pars reticulata (SNr) are tonically active and inhibit the generation of saccades by the 
superior colliculus. SNr neurons can be inhibited by spiking in medium spiny neurons in the 
striatum, thus releasing the superior colliculus from inhibition (Hikosaka et al., 2000b). During 
training, rewarded saccades are generated with a shorter latency than saccades in the 
unrewarded direction. This behavioural change is thought to be mediated by activation of 
medium spiny neurons in the rewarded “channel” by the appropriate cortical inputs. The 
output of the SNr biases saccade generation by a projection to intermediate “motor” layers of 
SC. 
Adapted from (Fee, 2012)
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Figure 8.5 Hypothesised sites of disruption of oculomotor reward learning 
This model of reward learning provides an explanation for the absence of reward sensitivity (as 
measured by the lateral reward task) in the patient with bilateral GPi lesions (Chapter 4), 
patients with PD (Chapter 7) and, hypothetically, in normal aging. Sites of abnormal function 
are outlined in red. 
Adapted from (Fee, 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.6 Separate cortical and subcortical loops 
A General organisation for cortical loops 
B General organisation for subcortical loops 
Arrowheads indicate excitatory connections, perpendicular lines indicate inhibitory 
connections. Dashed lines indicate inhibitory centres. The thalamic nuclei involved differ 
between circuits: A (ventral anterior, ventrolateral, medial dorsal); B (pulvinar, lateral posterior, 
rostral and caudal intralaminar). SN – Substantia Nigra; GPi – Globus Pallidus interna 
 
Adapted from (McHaffie et al., 2005) 
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Figure 8.7 Structure of a model which predicts early response 
distributions. 
Dark gray shaded layers on BG modules are input layers with reinforcement learning 
capabilities (N’guyen et al., 2014) 
 
BG  - Basal ganglia; FEF – frontal eye p?F>M SG – saccade generators; SC – superior colliculus; 
Th - thalamus; V4|IT, - Feature perception area including IT (TE region) interacting with V4 
visual cortex area.  
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8.2.12 Subcortical “short cut” loops to explain early response distributions 
Responses in the traffic light task are driven by more complex stimuli. Visual (exogenous) 
information such as red (trial start) and then amber light onsets interact with the subject’s 
experience of previous trials, in terms of both amber durations and previous reward 
(endogenous information). This necessitates a more complex model. One such recently 
proposed model (Figure 8.8 (N’guyen et al., 2014)) invokes separate but similar subcortical (as 
opposed to cortical) basal ganglia loops (McHaffie et al., 2005)  which learn concurrently to 
produce saccades  (Figure 8.6). This model (Figure 8.7) produces short latency saccades after a 
period of learning, and, though it cannot account for early saccades produced spontaneously (as 
in express saccades (Fischer and Ramsperger, 1984), it may neatly explain the existence of early 
distributions in tasks like the traffic light task. Separate LATER units (Carpenter and Williams, 
1995) might arise and drive saccades from each circuit and are modulated by reward learning 
which depends upon striatal D1 and D2 dopaminergic neurons. This is compatible with other 
recent (non-saccadic) models of reward learning in the basal ganglia e.g. (Clark and Dagher, 
2014). 
 
8.3 Summary 
The experiments in this thesis describe novel and adapted oculomotor tasks which demonstrate 
oculomotor reward sensitivity and learning through both reduction in response latency and 
separate early distributions of anticipatory saccades. Impairments in these effects are 
dissociable but seem to occur together in both healthy aging and Parkinson’s Disease. Increased 
erroneous responding in gamblers and PD patients with impulse control disorders was present 
but did not reach statistical significance. There were common correlations between the tasks 
described here with BIS-11 sub scores similar to those previously reported in association with 
both pre-potent response inhibition tasks and gambling tasks. This suggests that our tasks 
might also index abnormal fronto-striatal circuitry, particularly relating to the prefrontal cortex. 
Whether oculomotor tasks are somewhat protected from ventral striatal abnormalities remains 
uncertain. 
 
Further research, using other drugs, or in combination with known genetic polymorphisms 
may enable further insights into the chemical effects upon oculomotor decision making in 
humans. Combination of neurophysiological techniques with dynamic imaging might enable a 
higher yield of spatial and temporal information (from manageable sample sizes) to inform 
future models of oculomotor decision making which otherwise rely heavily on animal work. 
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Appendix 
 
i The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 
  
(Patton et al., 1995) 
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ii Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire 
True/False Statements 
1. I usually am confident that everything will go well, even in situations that worry most people  
2. I often try new things just for fun or thrills, even if most people think it is a waste of time  
3. I like to discuss my experiences and feelings openly with friends instead of keeping them to myself  
4. When nothing new is happening, I usually start looking for something that is thrilling or exciting 
5. Usually I am more worried than most people that something might go wrong in the future 
6. I don’t mind discussing my personal problems with people whom I have known briefly or slightly  
7. I would like to have warm and close friends with me most of the time  
8. I nearly always stay relaxed and carefree’, even when nearly everyone else is fearful  
9. I usually demand very good practical reasons before I am willing to change my old ways of doing 
things  
10. I often have to stop what I am doing because I start worrying about what might go wrong  
11. I hate to change the way I do things. even if many people tell me there is anew and better way to do it  
12. My friends find it hard to know my feelings because I seldom tell them about my private thoughts 
13. I like it when people can do whatever they want without strict rules and regulations 
14. I often stop what I am doing because I get worried even when my friends tell me everything is going 
well 
15. It wouldn’t bother me to be alone all the time 
16. I like to be very organized and set up rules for people whenever I can 
17. I usually do things my own way - rather than giving in to the wishes of other people 
18. I usually feel tense and worried when I have to do something new and unfamiliar.  
19. I often feel tense and worried in unfamiliar situations, even when others feel there is little to worry 
about.  
20. Other people often think that I am too independent because I won’t do what they want.  
21. Even when most people feel it is not important, I often insist on things being done in a strict and 
orderly way.  
22. I often do things based on how I feel at the moment without thinking about how they were done in the 
past.  
23. I often feel tense and worried in unfamiliar situations, even when others feel there is no danger at all  
24. I often break rules and regulations when I think I can get away with it.  
25. I don’t care very much whether other people like me or the way I do things.  
26. I usually stay calm and secure in situations that most people find physically dangerous.  
27. I feel it is more important to be sympathetic and understanding of other people than to be practical and 
tough-rninded 
28. I lose my temper more quickly than most people.  
29. I am usually confident that I can easily do things that most people would consider dangerous (such as 
driving an automobile fast on a wet or icy road).  
30. I often react so strongly to unexpected ‘news that say or do things that I regret.  
31. People find it easy to come to me for help, sympathy, and warm understanding  
32. I am much more reserved and controlled than most people.  
33. When I have to meet a group of strangers. L am more shy than most people  
34. 1 am strongly moved by sentimental appeals (like when asked to help crippled children)  
35. I almost never get so excited that I lose control of myself 
36. I have a reputation as someone who is very practical and does not act on emotion 
37. I often avoid meeting strangers because I lack confidence with people I do not know 
38. I usually stay away from social situations where I would have to meet strangers, even if I am assured 
that they will be friendly  
39. I usually push myself harder than most people do because I want to do as well as I possibly can  
40. I am slower than most people to get excited about new ideas and activities 
41. I often push myself to the point of exhaustion or try to do more than I really can. 
42. I would probably stay relaxed and outgoing when meeting a group of strangers, even if I were told 
they were unfriendly 
43. It is difficult for me to keep the same interests for a long time because my attention often shifts to 
something else  
44. I think I would stay confident and relaxed when meeting strangers, even if I were told they were angry 
at me.  
45. I could probably accomplish more than do but I don’t see the point in pushing myself harder than is 
necessary to get by  
46. I like to think about things for a long time before I make a decision.  
47. Most of the time I would prefer to do something a little risky (like riding in a fast automobile over 
steep hills and sharp turns) rather than having to stay quiet and inactive for a few hours  
48. I often follow my instincts, hunches, or intuition without thinking through all the details 
49. I try to do as little work as possible even when other people expect more of me  
50. I often have to change my decisions because I had a wrong hunch or mistaken first impression 
51. Most of the time I would prefer to do something risky (like hang-gliding or parachute jumping) rather 
than having to stay quiet and inactive for a few hours 
52. I am satisfied with my accomplishments, and have little desire to do better  
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53. I see no point in continuing to work on something unless there is a good chance of success  
54. I have less energy and get tired more quickly than most people 
55. I usually think about all the facts in detail before I make a decision  
56. I nearly always think about all the facts in detail before I make a decision, even when other people 
demand a quick decision 
57. I often need naps or extra rest periods because I get tired so easily 
58. I don’t go out of my way to please other people 
59. I am more energetic and tire less quickly than most people 
60. I am usually able to get other people to believe me, even when I know what I am saying is exaggerated 
or untrue 
61.  I find it upsetting when other people don’t give me the support I expect from them 
62. I can usually do a good job of stretching the truth to tell a funnier story or to play a joke on someone.  
63. I usually can stay “on the go.” all day without having to push myself.  
64. I am usually more upset than most people by the loss of a close friend.  
65. I have trouble telling a lie, even when it is meant to spare someone else’s feelings  
66. I am better at saving money than most people. 
67. Even after there are problems in a friendship, I nearly always try to keep it going anyway 
68. I recover more slowly than most people from minor illnesses or stress. 
69. I need much extra rest, support or reassurance to recover from minor illnesses or stress  
70. I often spend money until I run out of cash or get into debt from using too much credit  
71.  I seldom get upset when I don’t receive the recognition I deserve. 
72. Because I so often spend too much money on impulse, it is hard for me to save money - even for special 
plans like a vacation. 
73. It is extremely difficult for me to adjust to changes in my usual way of doing things because I get so 
tense, tired, or worried 
74. If I am feeling upset, I usually feel better around friends than when left alone  
75. I usually feel much more confident and energetic than most people, even after minor illnesses or stress 
76. Some people think I am too stingy or tight with my money 
77. I often keep trying the same thing over and over again, even when I have not had much success in a 
long time 
78. It is hard for me to enjoy spending money on myself, even when I have saved plenty of money 
79. I seldom let myself get upset or frustrated: when things don’t work out, I simply move on to other 
activities 
80. I recover more quickly than most people from minor illnesses or stress 
81. I hate to make decisions based only on my first impressions 
82. I think I will have very good luck in the future 
83. I am often moved deeply by a fine speech or poetry  
84. If I am embarrassed or humiliated, I get over it very quickly 
85. I like tried and trusted ways of doing things much better than trying new and improved ways 
86. I like to keep my problems to myself 
87. I enjoy saving money more than spending it on entertainment or thrills 
88. Even when I am with friends, I prefer not to open up very much 
89. I feel very confident and sure of myself in almost all social situations 
90. I usually like to stay cool and detached from other people  
91. I never worry about terrible things that might happen in the future 
92. I am more hard-working than most people  
93. In conversations I am much better as a listener than as a talker  
94. I like to please other people as much as I can 
95. Regardless of any temporary problem that I have to overcome, I always think it will turn out well 
96. I like to stay at home better than to travel or explore new places 
97. I am usually so determined that I continue to work long after other people have given up 
98. I usually have good luck in whatever I try to do 
99. I like to play close attention to details in everything I do 
100. It is easy for me to organize my thoughts while talking to someone 
(Cloninger, 1987) 
 
